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Nearly twenty years ago, Congress officially extended copyright
protection to computer programs.1   Five years later, the Supreme Court
1  Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. '' 101, 
102 & 117 (1988 & Supp. 1994)).
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issued a decision that definitively established computer programs'
eligibility for patent protection.2 The two developments had very
different trajectories; the debate over patent protection was long, hard-
fought, and occasionally acrimonious,3 while the extension of copyright 
protection was accomplished by committee and consensus, almost as an 
afterthought.4 The developments were similar in one respect, however. 
Both Congress and the Supreme Court treated computer programs as 
autonomous intellectual products, intended for use on a stand-alone
basis in the same manner as a copyrighted book or a patented industrial 
apparatus.5 Today, in contrast, it is evident that the value of a computer 
program to its users depends heavily on its compatibility, or
interoperability, with a particular computer system and with other
programs.6 Whether interoperability-related issues should affect
copyright and patent treatment of computer programs, and if so, how, 
are among the decade's most hotly debated legal questions.7
For creators of computer programs, achieving interoperability with 
particular computers  and  operating  systems  is  necessary  for   com-
mercial survival.8     Interoperability has also become a watchword for 
consumers who seek applications  programs  that  will  operate  on  their 
2  Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
3  For an exhaustive chronicle of this debate, see Pamela Samuelson, Benson Revisited:
The Case Against Patent Protection for Algorithms and Other Computer-Related Inventions, 
39 EMORY L.J. 1025, 1032-99 (1990) [hereinafter Samuelson, Benson Revisited].
4 See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 51 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5664 (“[C]omputer programs, for exampleCcould be regarded as an 
extension of copyrightable subject matter Congress had already intended to protect, and were 
thus considered copyrightable from the outset without the need of new legislation.”); FINAL
REPORT OF THE NAT 'L COMM'N ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS 12, 15-
16 (1978) [hereinafter CONTU, FINAL REPORT ].
5 See 17 U.S.C. ' 101 (1988) (defining “computer program” as “a set of statements or 
instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain 
result”); Diehr, 450 U.S. at 185-87 (describing program invention as a process in which “a 
mathematical formula” and “a digital computer” are used).
6 See Dennis S. Karjala, Copyright Protection of Computer Documents, Reverse 
Engineering, and Professor Miller, 19 U. DAYTON L. REV. 975, 990 (1994) [hereinafter 
Karjala, Computer Documents]; Dennis S. Karjala, Copyright, Computer Software, and the 
New Protectionism, 28 JURIMETRICS J. 33, 63-64 (1987) [hereinafter Karjala, New
Protectionism]; Timothy S. Teter, Note, Merger and the Machines: An Analysis of the Pro-
Compatibility Trend in Computer Software Copyright Cases, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1061, 1063-66
(1993).
7 The first court before which issues of compatibility were raised termed the defendant's 
desire to achieve compatibility “a commercial and competitive objective” irrelevant to the 
intellectual property analysis. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 
1240, 1253 (3d Cir. 1983). That conclusion is discussed and rejected infra part III.B.
8 See, e.g., Peter S. Menell, Tailoring Legal Protection for Computer Software, 39STAN.
L REV. 1329, 1357-58, 1361-63 (1987) [hereinafter Menell, Tailoring Legal Protection].
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existing computer systems, or who may base selection of new systems 
on the applications programs available. Manufacturers of computer
systems and operating systems have responded in a variety of different 
ways to program developers' demands for access to interoperability-
related information. Some have made program interface specifications
and protocols freely available to applications developers.9 Others have 
licensed the rights to create compatible programs to third parties,
although some withhold complete technical information on in-
teroperability requirements from their licensees.10 Still others, chiefly
manufacturers of specialized computers designed to serve industry
specific customer bases, have attempted to keep their systems com-
pletely proprietary.11  As a result of the frequent unavailability of in-
teroperability-related information through ordinary market channels,  
“reverse engineering” of interface specifications for proprietary and
quasi-proprietary systems has become common. In particular, many
third-party software developers have come to rely on a method of re-
verse engineering known as “disassembly” or “decompilation,” which 
parses the binary object code in which computer programs are distrib-
uted into higher-level, human-readable commands.12
The rise of reverse engineering by third-party  software  developers
 in  turn  has led some computer manufacturers to seek technological
protection  against  unwanted  competitors.13   Within the video game 
industry, several system manufacturers have developed  specialized
“lock-out” programs that limit access to their hardware to program
disks or cartridges that contain  the  “key.”14      Lock-out  programs are 
9  Apple Computer and Microsoft Corporation fall within this category. Both companies 
also compete with third-party developers to create applications programs compatible with their 
respective operating systems. However, third-party developers have raised recurrent concerns 
about whether the shared information is complete. See, e.g., Kathy Rebello et al., Is Microsoft
Too Powerful?, BUS. WK., Mar. 1, 1993, at 82.
10 See Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510,1514 (9th Cir. 1992), as
amended, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 78 (9th Cir. 1993); Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., 
Inc., 30 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1401, 1403 (N.D. Cal. 1993); infra text  accompanying notes 26-
27. 
11 See, e.g., MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993) 
(relating to a dispute over access to a completely proprietary system).
12  The process of reverse engineering through decompilation is described in detail in An-
drew Johnson-Laird, Software Reverse Engineering in the Real World, 19 U. DAYTON L. REV.
843 (1994). 
13  For a discussion of this technological one-upmanship, see Marshall Leaffer, 
Engineering Competitive Policy and Copyright Misuse, 19 U. DAYTON L. REV. 1087, 1096-97
(1994).
14 See Sega, 977 F.2d at 1515; Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 
832, 836 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
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designed to exclude all “unauthorized” programs, and to make reverse
engineering more difficult.15 However, lock-out programs, like other
computer programs, also can be reverse engineered. Lock-out
programs therefore complicate, but do not defeat, third-party research 
and development efforts. Ultimately, neither technological nor market
solutions have enabled computer manufacturers to prevent determined
competitors from creating and marketing compatible programs. As a 
result, computer manufacturers and software developers have sought 
recourse under the copyright and patent laws. They have argued that 
both the reverse engineering process and the subsequent creation of
compatible programs that include “keys” to their systems infringe their 
intellectual property rights.
Reverse engineering of interface specifications and use of the in-
formation gained through reverse engineering to create a compatible
program raise novel questions in the overlapping realms of copyright
law, patent law, and public policy.   Over the past few years, there has 
been an abundance of scholarship dealing with the appropriate scope of 
copyright and patent protection for computer programs.16   This Article 
approaches those problems from a slightly different perspective,
focusing on the discrete problem of lock-out programs.   The choice of 
lock-out as a paradigm for exploring the interoperability question and
the contours  of copyright and  patent  protection of  computer  programs 
15 See, e.g., Johnson-Laird, supra note 12, at 853-56 (describing the problems that 
confront those seeking to reverse engineer a lock-out program). 
16  Regarding copyright protection, see, for example, Anthony L. Clapes et al., Silicon
Epics and Binary Bards: Determining the Proper Scope of Copyright Protection for Computer 
Programs, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1493 (1987); Karjala, Computer Documents, supra note 6;
Karjala, New Protectionism, supra note 6; Peter S. Menell, An Analysis of the Scope of 
Copyright Protection for Application Programs, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1045 (1989) [hereinafter
Menell, Application Programs]; M enell, Tailoring Legal Protection, supra note 8; Arthur R. 
miller, Copyright Protection for Computer Programs, Databases, and Computer-Generated
Works. Is Anything New Since CONTU?, 106 HARV. L. REV. 977 (1993); David A. Rice, Sega 
and Beyond: A Beacon for Fair Use Analysis . . . At Least As Far As It Goes, 19 U.DAYTON L.
REV. 1131 (1994) [hereinafter Rice, Sega and Beyond]; Pamela Samuelson, Computer
Programs, User Interfaces, and Section 102(b) of the Copyright Act of 1976: A Critique of 
Lotus v. Paperback, 6 HIGH TECH. L.J. 209 (1992) [hereinafter Samuelson, Critique of 
Paperback]; Pamela Samuelson, Creating a New Kind of Intellectual Property: Applying the 
Lessons of the Chip Law to Computer Programs, 70 M INN. L. REV. 471 (1985) [hereinafter
Samuelson, Chip Law]; Pamela Samuelson, CONTU Revisited: The Case Against Copyright 
Protection for Computer Programs in Machine-Readable Form, 1984 DUKE L.J. 663
[hereinafter Samuelson, CONTU Revisited]. Regarding patent protection, see, for example, 
Donald S. Chisum, The Patentability of Algorithms, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 959 (1986); A.
Samuel Oddi, An Uneasier Case for Copyright Than for Patent Protection of Computer Pro-
grams, 72 NEB. L. REV. 351 (1993); Samuelson, Benson Revisited, supra note 3; Richard H. 
Stem, Tales From the Algorithm War. Benson to Iwahashi, It's Deja Vu All Over Again, 18
AIPLA Q.J. 371 (1991).
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is informed by two considerations. First, for purposes of the inter-
operability inquiry, lock-out programs represent an extreme; they are 
discrete, self-contained modules that are highly innovative in design,
yet that serve no purpose other than to regulate access to a computer or 
computer operating system. Copyright and patent analyses of the lock-
out problem highlight a fundamental tension between intellectual
property rights and considerations of public access, and so afford a 
useful vehicle for examining the scope of copyright and patent protec-
tion for computer programs generally. Second, lock-out may well be-
come a defining technology of the coming “Information Age.” Pundits 
have prophesied a “set-top box” in every home that affords a gateway 
to an “information superhighway” where goods and services may be 
purchased and information accessed.17 Whether or not the
manufacturer of the set-top box will be able to exclude unauthorized 
purveyors of goods, services, and information will significantly affect
both the structure of the emerging market in information services and 
the nature of individual participation in that market.18
The purpose of this Article is twofold.   First, I argue  that  neither 
the  copyright  laws  nor the patent laws preclude duplication of pro-
tected program features, including “lock” and “key” features, to
whatever  extent  necessary  to  achieve  full compatibility with an
unpatented computer system.  Second, and more generally, I address 
inconsistencies and conceptual flaws in the current understanding of
copyright and patent protection for computer programs that emerge
during  the first inquiry, and  propose  doctrinal  modifications  to
resolve them. Although computer programs have been protected by
both copyright and patent regimes for years, the precise contours of the 
protection these  regimes  afford  remain unsettled. For that reason, 
some scholars, computer lawyers, and computer industry professionals 
have urged the adoption of sui generi protection  for  computer pro-
grams,19 but the question of sui generis protection may have become 
17 See, e.g., Screen Test, THE ECONOMIST , Sept. 17, 1994, at 17.
18  Among the leading contenders for development of a viable set-top box are none other 
than the video game giants Sega and Nintendo, whose attempts to enforce lock-out protection 
for their video game consoles are discussed below. See, e.g., George Gilder, Telecosm: The 
Bandwidth Tidal Wave, FORBES, Dec. 5, 1994, at 162 (“If the personal computer cannot handle 
these [data] streams, [TCI chief executive] John Malone's set-top boxes, Sega or Nintendo 
game machines or [Microsoft chief executive] Bill Gates = new communications technology 
will.”); Ken Yamaha, Standards Time. New Set-Top-Box Technology Key to Interactive TV, 
COMPUTER RESELLER NE W S, Dec. 5, 1994, at 55.
19 See, e.g.,Menell, Tailoring Legal Protection, supra note 8, at 1371-72; Samuelson, 
CONTU Revisited, supra note 16, at 762-69;Samuelson,Benson Revisited,supra note 3,at 1148-
-53; Pamela Samuelson et al., A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer Pro-
grams, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2308, 2342-64 (1994) [hereinafter Samuelson et al., Manifesto].
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largely irrelevant. The United States has convinced many other coun-
tries to follow its lead in “tending both copyright and patent protection
to computer programs and is unlikely to change course .20 For better or 
worse, it seems we are stuck with the existing modes of intellectual
property protection for computer programs. However, this Article
argues that certain adjustments to the copyright and patent doctrines 
governing the protection of computer programs are necessary if the 
intellectual property laws are to continue to serve both their new and 
their traditional functions.
Part I of this Article describes the facts and outcomes of two recent
cases: Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc.21 and Atari Games Corp. 
v. Nintendo of America, Inc.,22 both of which involved attempts to 
enforce intellectual property rights in lock-out programs. The re-
mainder of the Article takes those cases as a starting point for discus-
sion of the interoperability question and what it reveals about the scope 
and structure of copyright and patent protection for computer
programs. Parts II and III explore the copyright implications of reverse
engineering interface specifications and lock-out programs and of
using the information gained thereby to create and market a compatible
program. Part II focuses on the copyright issues resulting from
intermediate copying during the reverse engineering process. Part III 
considers whether the reverse engineer may create a program that
duplicates the “key” to the “lock” and other functional features of
interoperability-related routines. Part IV addresses issues bearing on
the validity of a lock-out patent. Finally, Part V considers whether, in 
light of the analyses in Parts II, III, and IV, attempts to enforce patents
and copyrights against competitors who crack the code for a lockout
program constitute patent or copyright misuse. The Article concludes
with some general reflections on the efficacy and viability of the
copyright and patent models for intellectual property protection of
computer programs.
20 See, e.g., Samuelson et al., Manifesto, supra note 19, at 2313 & nn.7-8 (summarizing
recent international developments).
21  785 F. Supp. 1392 (N.D. Cal.), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 
1992). as amended, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 78 (9th Cir. 1993).
22  18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1935 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (granting preliminary injunction), aff'd.
975 F.2d 832 (Fed. Cir. 1992), after remand, 30 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1401 (N.D. Cal. 1993); 30 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1420 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
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I. THE SEGA AND ATARI CASES
Both Sega and Atari involved attempts to gain access to, and to 
create interoperability with, video game consoles developed by indus-
try giants. Sega Enterprises Ltd. manufactures the Sega Genesis, a
video entertainment console system that accepts video game car-
tridges.23 Nintendo of America, Inc. distributes the Nintendo En-
tertainment System (“NES”), a similar device.24 Both companies are 
leaders in the home video entertainment market.25  Both license the 
rights to create games compatible with their consoles to independent 
developers of video game programs, but only under agreements that 
withhold from the licensees the actual information needed to achieve
interoperability. Instead, the agreements require that the licensor (Sega 
or Nintendo) be the exclusive manufacturer of the games developed by 
the licensee. The licensor supplies the missing information during the 
manufacturing process, and then resells the completed games to the 
licensee for commercial distribution.26 Neither Sega nor Nintendo
holds a U.S. patent on its console.27
A. SEGA V. ACCOLADE
Both factually and legally, Sega is the simpler case. Accolade, an 
independent developer of home computer game software for a variety 
of computer systems, wanted to expand its product line to include
games compatible with the Genesis console, but was unwilling to cede 
control over manufacturing the games to Sega.28 To discover the re-
quirements for interoperability with the Genesis console, Accolade's
engineers “reverse engineered” the microcode contained in several
Sega video game cartridges by using a process known as “decompila-
tion” to translate the binary object code into human-readable form.29
23 Sega, 977 F.2d at 1514.
24 Atari, 975 F.2d at 835-36.
25  In 1994, they each controlled approximately 50% of the U.S. home video game 
market. See, e.g., Merrill Goozner, Rivals Nose in on Nintendo, CHI. TRIB ., June 12, 1994, ' 7 
at 1.
26 Sega, 977 F.2d at 1514; Atari, 30 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1403.
27 Sega, 977 F.2d at 1526; Atari, 30 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1401-02.
28 Sega, 977 F.2d at 1514.
29 Id. at 1514-15. Initially, computer programs are written in human-readable form 
known as source code. In order to be functional, however, a computer program must be trans-
lated from source code into machine-readable form, or object code. See Johnson-Laird, supra
note 12, at 856-59. Object code cannot be translated back into source code, but can be 
translated into a lower-level human-readable form, known as assembly language, by 
decompilation. See id. at 872-79, 896-97.
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Ultimately, the engineers successfully identified the interface specifi-
cations for the Genesis console and released Accolade's first Genesis-
compatible game.30 In the process, however, they had made numerous
copies of Sega's copyrighted microcode.
While Accolade's reverse engineering efforts were in progress,
Sega began manufacturing its consoles to include a trademark security 
system (“TMSS”),31 a lock-out device that operated by searching each 
game cartridge inserted into the console for four bytes of data present 
at a particular location in all Sega-produced game programs.32 If the 
console did not find the “TMSS initialization code” at the necessary
location in the game program, it would not allow the game to operate.33
When Sega introduced the Genesis III console, the first to include the 
TMSS, at a consumer electronics show, Accolade observed that its 
reverse engineered games would not operate on the Genesis III.34
Further study of the decompiled Sega programs revealed a small
segment of code, containing approximately twenty-five bytes of data, 
which Accolade's engineers had determined to be unnecessary for
interoperability with the original Genesis console, and so had omitted 
from their summary of specifications for a Genesis-compatible game. 
After studying the segment, which contained the TMSS initialization
code, Accolade “added the code to its development manual in the form 
of a standard header file to be used in all games.”35  Shortly thereafter, 
Accolade released several games for use with the Genesis III.
Sega filed suit for copyright infringement against Accolade in the 
Northern District of California.36        The  district  court  granted  Sega's
30 Sega, 977 F.2d at 1515.
31  According to Sega, the TMSS was adopted solely as a response to software pirates 
who had discovered a way to produce copies of Sega's video game cartridges without the 
initial screen display of Sega's trademark. The TMSS was designed both to “lock out” 
unauthorized cartridges and to “lock in” an initial screen display of Sega's trademark, thereby 
protecting Sega's ability to prosecute pirates for trademark infringement. Id.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Id. at 1516. Unbeknownst to Accolade, the “standard header file” that rendered its 
games compatible with Sega's new console also triggered a screen display that stated “PRO-
DUCED BY OR UNDER LICENSE FROM SEGA ENTERPRISES LTD.” Id. at 1515.
36  Sega also asserted claims for trademark infringement and false designation of origin in 
violation of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. '' 1114(l)(a), 1125(a) (1988). Arguing that the TMSS 
enabled Sega to falsely pass off Accolade=s games as its own, Accolade counterclaimed for 
false designation of origin.  The district court found accolade, not Sega, responsible for the 
misleading screen display of the Sega trademark message.  Sega Enters, Ltd. v. Accolade Inc., 
785 F. Supp. 1392, 1400 (N.D. Cal.) aff=d in part and rev =d in part, 977, F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 
1992), as amended 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 78 (9th Cir. 1993).   
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motion for a preliminary injunction. It found that Accolade had
infringed Sega's copyrights in its video game programs by making
unauthorized copies and translations of Sega's microcode during the
reverse engineering process.37 The court further ruled that Accolade's 
conduct could not be considered a fair use, because its motive in re-
verse engineering Sega's games was commercial and had resulted in
the creation of a competing product.38 Accordingly, the court barred 
Accolade from further disassembly or use of Sega's video game pro-
grams and from selling its reverse engineered games.39
The Ninth Circuit reversed.40 The court agreed with the district
court that Accolade's creation of copies and translations during the
reverse engineering process constituted infringement under the literal
terms of the Copyright Act.41 However, it held that decompilation of
computer object code is a fair use privileged by the Act when there is 
no other way to gain access to the functional requirements for inter-
operability, which are not protected by copyright.42 Writing for the
court, Judge Reinhardt emphasized the uniquely opaque nature of
computer programs that are distributed for public use in object code 
form, readable only by machine.43 The court concluded that to deem 
Accolade's decompilation unfair would be to grant Sega a de facto
monopoly over access to the Genesis III, although it held no patent on 
the console.44
37 Sega, 785 F. Supp. at 1396-97. Section 106 of the Copyright Act reserves to the copy-
right owner the exclusive right to make or authorize copies or derivative works. 17 U.S.C. '
106(l), (3).
38 Sega, 785 F. Supp. at 1398. Section 107 of the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. ' 107, 
provides that otherwise infringing conduct may be considered a fair use of the copyrighted 
material, depending on the circumstances of the use. See infra note 81.
39 Id. at 1402.
40  Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992), as amended, 1993
U.S. App. LEXIS 78 (9th Cir. 1993).
41 Id. at 1518-20.
42 Id. at 1523-28. The court relied on section 102(b) of the Act, which provides that copy-
right protection does not extend “to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, 
concept, principle, or discovery.” 17 U.S.C. ' 102(b).
43 Id. at 1525-26.
44 Id. at 1526-27. The Ninth Circuit also rejected the district court's resolution of the 
trademark issues.  It held that Sega, not Accolade, bore primary responsibility for the 
confusing Sega trademark message display because Sega had intended the TMSS to produce a 
misleading screen display in some circumstances. Id. at 1528-30.
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B. ATARI V. NINTENDO
The basic fact pattern in Atari was similar to that in Sega. To
ensure that only video games developed by Nintendo or its authorized 
licensees would operate on the NES, Nintendo developed a “security 
system” for the NES .45 The system consists of two microprocessors: a 
“master” chip in the console and a “slave” chip in the video game
cartridge, each containing Nintendo's copyrighted 10NES program.46
When the cartridge is inserted into the console, the two 10NES pro-
grams generate and exchange a series of values based on an initial, 
randomly selected number. The master program then compares the
results. If the final digits of the two series are equal, the console is 
unlocked and the operator may proceed to play the game.47 If they are 
not equal, the console remains in a reset mode and the game will not 
operate.48
In its efforts to reverse engineer the NES security system, Atari
analyzed the output of the 10NES program and also chemically
“peeled” the security system chip to examine the 10NES microcode 
embedded in it.49 When these initial efforts failed, Atari decided to
become a Nintendo licensee.50 Unhappy with Nintendo's restrictive
license terms, however, Atari continued its reverse engineering efforts.
Ultimately, Atari's engineers produced the Rabbit program, a program 
that was “functionally indistinguishable” from the 10NES program.51
Atari then began marketing its own games for the NES.
Atari differed from Sega in two crucial respects. First, Nintendo 
had applied for and received a U.S. patent on the NES security sys-
tem.52   Atari's reverse engineering, therefore, raised questions of pat-
ent infringement as well as copyright infringement. Second, as part of 
its reverse engineering process, Atari committed fraud on the Copy-
right  Office.    Although  Atari's  engineers  were  able to decipher much
45  Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 836 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
46 Id.
47  Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 30 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1401, 1403 (N.D. 
Cal. 1993).
48 Id. at 1410-11. 
49  Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1935, 1936 (N.D. 
Cal. 1991). “Peeling” is a process by which successive layers of the circuitry embedded in a 
microchip are removed and studied. Because successful peeling reveals, at most, an object 
coded version of the program under study, it cannot substitute for decompilation. SeeJohnson-
Laird, supra note 12, at 863-64. 
50 Atari, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1936.
51 Id. at 1937.
52  U.S. Patent No. 4,799,635 (1989).
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of the code embedded in the NES “slave” microprocessor, they failed 
to produce a complete translation of the program.53 Atari's attorneys 
then applied to the Copyright Office for a copy of the 10NES program, 
stating that they needed the code because Atari was a defendant in 
infringement litigation involving the program.54 Since no lawsuit had
yet been filed, that was an outright misrepresentation.55
When Atari began producing unauthorized NES-compatible games, 
Nintendo filed suit for copyright and patent infringement.56 In support 
of its motion for a preliminary injunction, it argued that both Atari's 
final product and its intermediate copying of the 10NES program
during the reverse engineering process infringed the 10NES
copyright.57 In response, Atari argued that it had copied, and taken, 
only functional elements unprotected by copyright.58 The district court 
sided with Nintendo. It ruled that even if the doctrine of merger
excused some similarities between the Rabbit and 10NES programs, 
Atari had taken more than necessary to achieve interoperability.59 The 
court also found that Nintendo was likely to succeed on its inter-
mediate copying argument.60
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the prelim-
inary injunction.61    Regarding intermediate copying, it held that
Atari's  procurement  of  an  unauthorized  copy  of  the 10NES  program
53 Atari, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1936.
54  Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 836 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
55 Id.
56   Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 897 F.2d 1572,1574-75 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 
First, Nintendo sent letters to Atari's retailers threatening suit if sales of the unauthorized 
games continued, and Atari sued Nintendo for antitrust violations and unfair competition. 
Nintendo's subsequent copyright and patent infringement lawsuit was consolidated with 
Atari's. Id. at 1575. Atari requested, and the district court granted, a preliminary injunction
barring Nintendo from suing retailers of Atari's NES-compatible  games. However, the Court 
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed, ruling that Atari had not adduced sufficient facts 
on the issue of Nintendo's allegedly anticompetitive conduct. Id. at 1577-78. Atari's antitrust 
counterclaims and its related copyright and patent misuse defenses were subsequently severed 
for separate trial following trial of Nintendo's infringement claims. See Rex Bossert, Nintendo
Is Victorious in Patent Claim Against Foe, S.F. DAILY J., July 30,1993, at 1, 7.
57 Atari, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1938.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 1938-39. Under the doctrine of merger, “[w1hen there is essentially only one 
way to express an idea, the idea and its expression are inseparable and copyright is no bar to 
copying that expression.” Concrete Mach. Co. v. Classic Lawn Ornaments, Inc., 843 F.2d 600, 
606 (1st Cir. 1988); see also Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742 
(9th Cir. 1971) (holding that protecting expression that is inseparable from an idea would 
confer an impermissible monopoly on the idea).
60 Atari, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1939.
61  Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 832 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
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from the Copyright Office constituted infringement.62 It further held
that Atari's misconduct in obtaining the copy precluded any attempt by 
Atari to invoke the fair use defense to shield its other reverse
engineering efforts.63 Regarding Atari's final product, the Federal
Circuit agreed with the district court that Nintendo had made a
sufficient preliminary showing of substantial similarity between the
Rabbit and the 10NES by establishing that Atari's Rabbit program
“incorporate[d] elements of the 10NES program unnecessary for the
 chip's performance.”64
On remand, the district court granted summary judgment for
Nintendo on its copyright infringement claims. Examination of the
10NES and Rabbit programs revealed, and Atari did not dispute, that 
Atari had duplicated some 10NES functions that were unnecessary to 
achieve interoperability with the version of the NES then on the mar-
ket.65 Atari argued that it needed to create a program “functionally
indistinguishable” from the 10NES to preclude any attempt by
Nintendo to lock Atari's game cartridges out of future versions of the 
NES.66 The district court declined to extend the Sega rule to cover 
copying intended to achieve future interoperability “absent further
guidance from the Ninth Circuit or Congress.”67 The court ruled, in
essence, that those functional attributes of the 10NES unnecessary for 
current interoperability were expressive elements of the program's
structure, and so entitled to copyright protection.68
The court also granted Nintendo partial summary judgment on its 
patent infringement claims.   Although Atari had written a different
program to generate the results required by the  10NES,  the court 
ruled  that  Atari's  Rabbit  program  infringed  the  10NES   patent under 
62 Id. at 841-42. 
63 Id. at 843. In a lengt hy dictum, however, the court opined that absent fraud, reverse 
engineering based on copies of the copyrighted work would constitute a fair use. Id. at 843-44.
Ninth Circuit's opinion in Sega was released two months later.
64 Id. at 845.
65  Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 30 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1420,1423 (N.D. 
Cal. 1993).
66 See id.; Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 30 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1401,1406-08 (N.D. Cal. 1993). A future lock-out could be accomplished by reprogramming 
the master 10NES chip (in the console) to search for a different subset of functions in the slave 
10NES chip, unless the Rabbit chip also performed those functions. See id. at 1406-07; infra
text accompanying note 279.
67 Atari, 30 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1408.
68 Id. at 1407 n.14; Atari, 30 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) at 1423. However, the court ruled that 
Nintendo was not entitled to claim copyright protection for the signal stream generated by the 
10NES program. Atari, 30 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) at 1403-06. 
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the doctrine of equivalents.69 However, Atari had raised several chal-
lenges to the validity of Nintendo's patent. Among other things, Atari
argued that the use of a lock-out system in conjunction with a reset pin 
for disabling the console was obvious (or anticipated) in light of a
previously issued patent for an electronic security system, not cited to 
or discovered by the examiner who approved the 10NES patent, and a 
home computer system designed by the inventor of that patent that
included a reset pin and that was on the market when the 10NES sys-
tem was developed.70  The district court found Atari's arguments suffi-
cient to defeat summary judgment for Nintendo on the obviousness
issues.71 In July 1993, however, an eight-member jury rejected Atari's 
position.72
Success on its copyright and patent infringement claims would
not necessarily have guaranteed Nintendo victory in the litigation be-
cause Atari's misuse defenses and antitrust counterclaims still remained
to be tried.73  Had Atari prevailed at the second trial, Nintendo would 
have been barred from enforcing its infringement judgment . 74  Eight 
months after the conclusion of the infringement trial, however, Atari
and Nintendo settled the case.75  How the district court would have 
resolved the misuse and antitrust issues thus remains a matter for
speculation.
II. THE DECOMPILATION DEBATE:
FAIR USE OR FOUL PLAY?
As Sega and Atari illustrate, any debate over permissible uses of 
knowledge gained through decompilation becomes purely academic if
decompilation is not itself permissible. This part evaluates the Sega
court's resolution of that question .76   Although many commentators 
69 Id. at 1414-15. See infra note 310.
70 Id. at 1416-19. See 35 U.S.C. H 102, 103 (establishing requirements of novelty and 
nonobviousness for patentability).
71 Id. at 1418-19.
72   Bossert, supra note 56, at 1.
73 See supra note 56.
74 See infra part V.A.3.
75 See Nintendo, Atari Games Reach Settlement, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1994, at D2; Atari
and Nintendo End Court Battle, Begin Media Battle Fracas, COMPUTER LAW ., May 1994, at 
28.
76  Accolade also argued that section 117 of the Copyright Act, which allows copying of a 
computer program as an essential step in the utilization of the program, permits decompilation. 
Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1520 (9th Cir. 1992), as amended, 1993
U.S. App. LEXIS 78 (9th Cir. 1993). The Ninth Circuit rejected that argument, in my view 
correctly, on the ground that section 117 encompasses only the right to load a copy of a 
program into a computer in order to use it. Id.; see 17 U.S.C. ' 117(l); CONTU, FINAL
REPORT , supra note 4, at 13. Nonetheless, at least one commentator has suggested that section 
117 might be interpreted to allow decompilation. Charles R. McManis, Intellectual Property 
Protection and Reverse Engineering of Computer Programs in the United States and the 
European Community, 8 HIGH TECH. L.J. 25, 94-95 (1993) (discussing Vault Corp. v. Quaid 
Software, Ltd., 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988)). Discussion of that position is beyond the scope 
of this Article.
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have praised the Sega decision as forward-thinking,77  the fair use anal-
ysis adopted by the Sega court also has drawn some high-powered crit-
icism. Most notably, in his recent comprehensive review of computer 
copyright law, Professor Arthur Miller assails the Ninth Circuit's ap-
plication of the fair use doctrine as misguided and “singularly ill-suited
to vindicating the public interest.”78 Even a recent student note by an 
unabashed fan of thin copyright protection for software interface
specifications finds the court's analysis “strained.”79 This reception
doubtless would come as no surprise to the Sega court, which
acknowledged that the result it reached⎯allowing “wholesale copy-
ing” by a competitor intent on producing a competing product⎯ “may 
seem incongruous at first blush.”80 Are the critics' reactions warranted?
Careful consideration of the nature of computer programs and the
patterns of innovation and dissemination of new developments within
the computer industry suggests that they are not. Sega is faithful to 
both the letter and the spirit of the copyright laws.
In determining whether Accolade's copying was a fair use, the Sega
court engaged in a lengthy analysis of the four factors enumerated in 
the fair use provision, section 107 of the Copyright Act.81  The
77 See, e.g., Karjala, Computer Documents, supra note 6, at 993-94, 1015-16; McManis, 
supra note 76, at 55-74, Rice, Sega and Beyond, supra note 16; Pamela Samuelson, Fair Use 
for Computer Programs and Other Copyrightable Works in Digital Form: The Implications of 
Sony, Galoob, and Sega, 1 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 49, 86-102 (1993); S. Carran Daughtrey, Note,
Reverse Engineering of Software for Interoperability and Analysis, 47 VAND. L REV. 145, 172-
81 (1994). Even prior to Sega, many copyright scholars had advocated a fair use solution to the 
decompilation problem. See Donald S. Chisum et al., LaST Frontier Conference Report on 
Copyright Protection of Computer Software, 30 JURIMETRICS J. 15, 24-25 (1989) [hereinafter 
Chisum et al., LaST Frontier Conference Report]; Jessica Litman, Copyright and Information 
Policy, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1992, at 185, 196-201; J.H. Reichman, Computer
Programs As Applied Scientific Know-How: Implications of Copyright Protection for 
Commercialized University Research, 42 VAND. L. REV. 639, 694 n.288, 702 n.324 (1989). In 
Sega, eleven professors of copyright law submitted a brief arnicus curiae in support of 
Accolade. See Brief Amicus Curiae of Eleven Copyright Law Professors in Sega Enterprises, 
Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 33 JURIMETRICS J. 147 (1992).
78  Miller, supra note 16, at 1020. Professor Miller was a signatory to an amicus brief filed 
by the Computer and Business Equipment Manufacturers Association (ACBEMA@) on behalf 
of Sega.
79  Teter, supra note 6, at 1087.
80   Sega Enters. Ltd, v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1527 (9th Cir. 1992), as amended,
1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 78 (9th Cir. 1993).
81 See id. at 1522-27. Section 107 of the Copyright Act lists four nonexclusive factors for 
courts to consider in determining whether a particular use of a copyrighted work is fair:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether use is of a commercial 
nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted 
work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted 
work.
17 U.S.C. ' 107.
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application of these factors to computer programs raises several novel 
questions, and brings other unresolved issues concerning the scope of 
the fair use doctrine into sharp focus. Ultimately, the answers to these 
questions turn on, and require decisions about, the purpose and role of 
fair use in the overall scheme of copyright protection. This part
analyzes the individual statutory fair use factors as they relate to lock-
out, and then considers the implications of the decompilation debate, 
and the Sega court's resolution of it, for an overarching vision of fair 
use.
A. CHARACTERIZING COMPUTER PROGRAMS
Conceptually, the Sega court's analysis began and ended with the
second statutory factor: the nature of the copyrighted work. The court
observed that when computer programs are distributed in object code
form, the only means of access to their unprotected functional features,
even for trained programmers, necessarily involves preparing human-
readable copies or derivative works.82  Accordingly, core principles of 
copyright law would seem to require that reverse engineers be allowed 
to keep records of their progress; otherwise, “the owner of the
copyright gains a de facto monopoly over the functional aspects of his 
work⎯aspects that were expressly denied copyright protection by
Congress.”83
82 Sega, 977 F.2d at 1525-26. This unique characteristic of computer programs has been 
documented by many scholars, including a number who are familiar with the technical aspects
of computer programming. See, e.g., Gary R. Ignatin, Comment, Let the Hackers Hack: 
Allowing the Reverse Engineering of Copyrighted Computer Programs to Achieve
Compatibility, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1999,2001 n.6 (1992); Johnson-Laird, supra note 12, at 
890-95; see also Karjala, New Protectionism, supra note 6, at 37; Menell, Tailoring Legal 
Protection, supra note 8, at 1347 n.75. That humans cannot decipher object code unaided is 
not seriously disputed. The district court in Sega focused on this issue, but missed the point. It 
concluded that since reverse engineers can decipher object code by hand, without resort to an 
electronic decompiler, Accolade's time-saving decision to use a decompiler precluded a finding 
of fair use. See Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 785 F. Supp. 1392,1399 (N.D. Cal .), aff 'd 
in part and rev'd in part, 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992), as amended, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 
78 (9th Cir. 1993). The Ninth Circuit recognized that what is relevant for purposes of 
copyright is not the means of decompilation used, but the fact that decompilation is not 
possible at all without making some fixed record of one's progress. Sega, 977 F.2d at 1525-27.
83 Sega, 977 F.2d at 1526; see 17 U.S.C. ' 102(b).
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1.  “One of These Things Is Not Like the Others”: Computer
Programs as Literary Works
Professor Miller's objection to the Sega court's analysis of the
second statutory factor is that computer programs are “literary works” 
under the Copyright Act and therefore should be treated no differently
from other literary works for fair use purposes.84 That is, intermediate
copying of a computer program's creative content⎯an inevitable
consequence of decompilation because protected and unprotected
portions cannot be distinguished until they have been translated into 
human-readable form⎯should be prohibited, because such copying
would not be allowed for other literary works. The assumption implicit 
in this argument⎯that intermediate copying of a traditional literary
work's creative content can never be a fair use⎯is addressed below in 
the discussion of the first statutory factor.85  As to the second statutory
factor, the objection that computer programs are classified as literary
works, while accurate as a statement of positive law,86  is so broad as 
to be virtually meaningless as a guide for courts struggling to apply
section 107 in the computer software context. To the extent that
generalizations about the nature of “literary works” are possible,
however, what they reveal is that the statutory classification of
computer programs as literary works confuses more often than it
clarifies.
First, the classification of computer programs as “literary works” 
is staggeringly uninformative. As defined by the Copyright Act, “lit-
erary works” include all works “expressed in words, numbers, or other 
verbal or numerical symbols or indicia”87⎯in other words, not only
novels and essays, but also textbooks, reference works, directories,
greeting cards, and everything in between. The proportion of creative,
protectable expression in these works varies enormously.88 Thus, to 
state that a computer program is, legislatively speaking, a “literary
work” proves nothing about the scope of the protection courts should 
afford it. The copyright protection for which the work is eligible is a 
function of the work's relative proportions of creative and noncreative 
content.
84  Miller, supra note 16, at 1022.
85  See infra text accompanying notes 147-55.
86 See 17 U.S.C. ' 101.
87  17 U.S.C. ' 101.
88 See, eg., Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991) 
(holding that Athe copyright in a factual compilation is thin@); Karjala, Computer Documents, 
supra note 6, at 1005-06; Rice, Sega and Beyond, supra note 16, at 1169-70.
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Assuming for the moment that computer programs are properly
viewed as literary works,89  then to which types of literary work should 
computer programs be compared? Professor Miller acknowledges that 
“the scope of protection given to different types of literary works may 
vary.”90 Yet he consistently compares computer programs to works of 
literature such as “Steinbeck's [The] Grapes of Wrath, Hemingway's
The Sun Also Rises, or Miller's Death of a Salesman” without once 
explaining why they should not instead (or also) be compared to the 
Physician's Desk Reference or the Pacific Bell Yellow Pages.91 The
parallels between computer programs and literary classics are far from 
obvious. A computer program is, first and foremost, a series of in-
structions to the computer to execute a given task.92 The instructions 
themselves may be written or arranged with more or less creativity, but 
that is not their primary significance. In this respect, a successful
program is more analogous to a well-designed, easy-to-use directory of 
information, or to a cookbook, than to a novel or a play. Given this 
defining characteristic of computer programs, there is no logical basis 
for Professor Miller's conclusion that the scope of protection afforded 
computer programs under Sega differs from that afforded other literary
works not only in scope, but in kind.93 Traditional literary works exist 
on a continuum of protection; if computer programs are best
characterized as literary works, it certainly would be reasonable to
conclude that computer programs constitute a new endpoint on that 
continuum.
A far more reasonable conclusion, however, is that computer pro-
grams do not lie on the literary works continuum at all. Even among
highly utilitarian literary works, the barriers to access created by dis-
tribution of computer programs in object code form have no ana-
logue.94   Thus,  it  is  by  no means obvious that computer programs can
89  In my opinion, they are not. See infra text accompanying notes 94-105. 
90  Miller, supra note 16, at 1022.
91 Id. at 1020. Thus, Professor Miller argues that a proposal that intermediate copying be 
considered fair use Awould not be taken seriously if the copyrighted works were Steinbeck's Y,
Hemingway'sY,  or Miller'sY.@ Id. But of course, they are not; they are computer programs, 
and there is a world of difference.
92 See Karjala, New Protectionism, supra note 6, at 38; Samuelson, CONTU Revisited,
supra note 16, at 672-82. Indeed, the definition of “computer program” in the Copyright Act 
recognizes as much. See 17 U.S.C. ' 101 (defining “computer program” as Aa set of statements 
or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain 
result@).
93  See Miller, supra note 16, at 989, 1021.
94  Professor Miller implies that copying the program in the course of decompilation is no 
different, and therefore no less infringing, than unauthorized copying of a book in the course of 
translating it. Id. at 1029. Miller's argument ignores the fact that translation from one language 
to another need not entail the preparation of written, printed, or otherwise recorded copies. To 
access the ideas or functional principles contained in Vaclav Havel's essays or a cookbook 
published in Braille, one need only find a person fluent in the language to read the work aloud. 
No physical copies of either work, or portions of them, need be made. In contrast, to access the 
ideas contained in the “text” of the 10NES program or MS-DOS 5.0 requires pencil and paper. 
See supra note 82.
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or should be compared with literary works rather than with some other 
category of copyrightable works or viewed as sui generis in many
critical respects.95 As Professor Miller's commentary illustrates,
treating computer programs as literary works too easily complicates
the task of determining the scope of software copyright by importing
into the analysis preconceptions of marginal relevance. The Sega court,
in contrast, treated computer programs simply as “utilitarian works,” 
and so avoided that pitfall.96 Arguably, one of the lessons of Sega is
that the classification of computer programs as literary works is
inappropriate and breeds confusion.
The rationale for the statutory classification of computer programs
as literary works, which originated in the Copyright Act of 1976, is 
unclear. Apparently, neither Congress nor CONTU97 deemed it worthy 
of discussion.98  It appears that both Congress and CONTU simply
concluded that because they are written or typed (as opposed to
sculpted, drawn, or rendered in musical notes), computer programs are 
more similar to literary works than to works in the other categories of 
copyrightable works listed in section 102(a) of the Act. Both legally
and factually, that conclusion is dubious. 
95  Because comparison and analogy are the essence of legal reasoning, it would be futile 
to suggest dispensing with them entirely where computer programs are concerned. However, 
as the Sega court recognized, reconciling existing legal categories with new technologies 
requires great care to Aavoid the temptation of trying to force 'the proverbial square peg in[tol a 
round hole.@= Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1527 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting 
Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 712 (2d Cir. 1992)), as amended,
1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 78 (9th Cir. 1993).
96  Although this Article argues that the statutory classification of computer programs 
should be changed, the Sega court's approach did not do violence to the current language. As 
explained above at text accompanying notes 91-92, the broadly defined category of Aliterary
works@ includes works that are distinctly utilitarian. See, e.g., Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural 
Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340 (1991) (telephone white pages); Baker v. Selden, 101 U. S. 
99 (1879) (blank accounting forms); Sega, 977 F.2d at 1524 (citing Feist and Baker).
97  The National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works 
(ACONTU@) was established by Congress in 1974 to study, among other things, the 
applicability of copyright to computer programs. See Act of Dec. 31, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-
573, 88 Stat. 1873 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. ' 104 (1988)).
98 See H.R. REP.  NO. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 54 (1976), reprinted in 1976 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5667; CONTU, FINAL REPORT , supra note 4. Significantly, Congress did 
state that A[t]he term 'literary works' does not connote any criterion of literary merit or 
qualitative value: it includes catalogs, directories, and similar factual, reference, or
instructional works and complations of data.@ H.R. REP. NO. 1476 at 54.
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As a matter of copyright law, denominating computer programs
“writings” tells us nothing about how to categorize them, because
constitutionally every work protected by the copyright laws is a
“writing.”99 As a practical matter, a rule that all works expressed in
“numerical symbols or indicia” are “literary works” also encompasses 
audiovisual and musical works created and expressed digitally.100 In
terms of use, computer programs also exhibit similarities to works in
several of the other statutory categories.  To the extent that computer 
programs constitute a script for the computer to follow, they may be 
argued to resemble “dramatic works” that are “performed” by the 
computer.101 In other ways, computer programs are analogous to
“pictorial, graphic . . . or scrulptural works.”102 in that they constitute a 
map or set of blueprints for accomplishing a task.103
Compassion to other statutory categories is more than an exercise 
in semantics.  Each change in the statutory reference point conjures up 
a slightly different body of precedent and different variations on the
basic approach to identifying what the copyright in the work
protects.104 The difficulty of selecting the statutory category of
protected works to which computer programs are most analogous, and 
of finding a good fit in any category, suggests that computer programs 
may be most appropriately regarded as sui generis forms of creative 
expression.
That conclusion is not new; the unique nature of computer pro-
grams has long been a rallying cry for advocates of a wholly sui
generis system of intellectual property protection.105 My intent here is 
more modest; at minimum, sections 101 and 102(a) of the Copyright
Act should be amended to ensure that computer programs are properly 
viewed as unique⎯a ninth category of copyrightable works.  As the
debate over the Sega decision illustrates, the epistemological con-
sequences  of  the  current  classification  of  computer programs are not 
99  U.S. CONST . art. I, ' 8, cl. 8 (authorizing Congress A[t]o promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive 
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries@).
100 See 17 U.S.C. '101.   
101  17 U.S.C. ' 102(a)(3).
102 See 17 U.S.C. '' 101, 102(a)(5).
103 See Samuelson, CONTU Revisited, supra note 16, at 727-36.   
104 See Karjala, Computer Documents , supra note 6, at 986 (discussing Aseparability” test
for Apictorial, graphic and sculptural works@); Samuelson, CONTU Revisited, supra note 16, at 
727-36 (analyzing computer programs as Autilitarian@ sculptural works).
105 See, e.g., Menell, Tailoring Legal Protection, supra note 8, at 1364-71; Samuelson,
CONTU Revisited, supra note 16, at 762-69; Samuelson, Chip Law, supra note 16, at 530; 
Samuelson et al., Manifest, supra note 19, at 2315-56.   
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trivial.  Part III demonstrates that those consequences become even
more significant during evaluation of the alleged copier’s final product 
for substantial similarity to the copyrighted work.  By signaling courts 
to abandon preconceptions about “literary works” and to adopt a more 
flexible, open-minded approach to computer copyright cases, an
amendment acknowledging sui generis status would encourage more 
thoughtful decisionmaking regarding the scope of copyright protection
available.
2. Defining “Publication” in the Context of Machine-Readable
Works
For fair use purposes, the nature of the copied work is determined 
in part by whether it was published or unpublished when the copying 
occurred.106  Traditionally, courts have accorded unpublished works 
much greater protection and have been less willing to treat copying of 
such works as fair use.107 In an effort to turn the characteristics of
object code to its advantage, Sega argued that its program should be 
considered unpublished because they were distributed for public use 
only in object code form.  The Ninth Circuit summarily rejected that 
argument,108 but it deserves more than summary treatment.  Whether 
and when computer programs distributed in object code form become 
published works for purposes of copyright is a question of great
significance in assessing the level of protection that the Copyright Act 
affords them.  Once again, the search for answers suggests that a
traditional copyright concept developed in the context of artistic and 
literary works⎯here, publication⎯in unhelpful when analyzing
computer programs.
106 See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v Nations Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 564 (1985); 
Salinger v. Random house, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 950986 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 890 
(1987).  In professor Weinreb=s view, publication status should properly be considered a 
separate, fifth fair use factor.  Lloyd L. Weinreb, Comment, Fair=s Fair: A Comment on the 
Fair Use Doctrine, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1137, 1156 n. 74 (1990).  That view has some merit.
107  After the Supreme Court =s decision in Harper & Row, Congress amended section 107 
to specify that a work=s publication status is relevant, but not necessarily dispositive, in fair use 
decisions. See 17 U.S.C. ' 107 (Supp. 1992).  Judge Pierre Leval, in contrast, has argued 
against the publication factor and in favor of judging all uses of copyrighted material according 
to one criterion: whether the use of the material is in some way Atransformative.@  Pierre N. 
Leval, Toward A Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1111-16 (1990).  Judge Level=s
appraoch to fair use is discussed at greater length infra at text accompanying notes 217-219.
108  Sega Eners. Ltd. v.Accolade, Inc., 977F.2d 1510, 1526 (9th Cir. 1992), as amended, 
1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 78 (9th Cir. 1993).  The court relied on tis recdnt, equally summary, 
decision on this point in Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 964 F.2d 965, 970 
(9th Cir. 1992), aff=g 780 F. Supp. 1293 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
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The rationale for concluding that Sega's program was a published 
work was that once a program is distributed for public use it is pub-
lished for purposes of copyright.109 At first glance, classification of
computer programs distributed for public use in object code form as 
“published” works is entirely consistent with the treatment of other
machine-readable works under the Act. For example, musical works on 
record, compact disc, or cassette are deemed published when sold, 
even though the works cannot be played without stereo equipment.110
However, musical works distributed in machine-readable form and
computer programs differ in one significant respect. Playing a
machine-readable musical work discloses its substance, while using a 
computer program need not. Because computer programs are func-
tional rather than artistic works, they may be distributed to and used by 
the public without disclosing the manner in which they are written or 
the methods by which they operate. Conversely, computer programs in 
human-readable form cannot perform the functions they describe; thus, 
there would be no consumer market for them.
Professor Miller suggests that Congress was aware of the peculiar
problem posed by computer programs when it amended the fair use 
statute in 1992 to state that the fact that a work is unpublished will not 
automatically preclude a finding of fair use.111 The bill's sponsor, Sen-
ator Simon, noted that the amendment was “not intended to provide 
new fair use access” through decompilation, nor to “broaden the fair 
use of unpublished computer programs.”112 These statements are less 
significant than Professor Miller makes them seem. As is its wont
when considering section 107, Congress took a cautious approach to 
assessing the current state of the law.  It stated only that it did not 
intend to “alter” fair use access to unpublished works; it did not at-
tempt to state the current rule or dictate what it should be.113  More-
over,   nowhere   did   Senator  Simon,  or  anyone   else,   suggest   that 
109 Sega, 977 F.2d at 1526 n.9 (citing Lewis Galoob Toys, 780 F. Supp. at 1293).
110 See 17 U.S.C. ' 101 (defining Apublication@ to include the distribution of Acopies or 
phonorecords of a work@). For this reason alone, Professor Litman concludes that the question 
whether computer programs distributed in object code form are published is easily resolved. 
See Litman, supra note 77, at 200-01. 
111  Miller, supra note 16, at 1017 n.187.
112 See 137 CONG. REC. S5648 (daily ed. May 9,1991); 137 CONG. REC. S13,925 (daily 
ed. Sept. 27, 1991) (statements of Sen. Simon), quoted in Miller, supra note 16, at 1017 n.187.
113 See H.R. REP. No. 836, 102d Cong., 2nd Sess. 9-10 (1992), reprinted in 1992
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2553; see also H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 66, reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5680 (A[T]here is no disposition to freeze the doctrine in the statute, espe-
cially during a period of rapid technological change.... [T]he courts must be free to adapt the 
doctrine to particular situations on a case-by-case basis.@).
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publicly distributed object-coded computer programs are “unpub-
lished.”114  Thus, the legislative history simply returns us to the initial
problem.
A rule that public distribution in any form constitutes publication
makes sense given the rationale for heightened protection for unpub-
lished works. The unpublished work doctrine protects the author's right 
of creative control.115 Allowing the author to determine when a work is 
ready for release also protects the public, by assuring sufficient time to 
polish the work to the author's standards.116 A commercial (or not-for-
profit) distribution of the work signifies a decision that the work has 
met the author's standards and is ready for release. The greater
protection accorded to unpublished works also allows the author to 
reap the first commercial benefits from distribution of the work (or to 
elect to forgo those profits for not-for-profit distribution).117 All of
these rationales seem to apply with equal force to computer programs. 
It might be argued that computer programs are different from most
other copyrighted works that are distributed to the public, in that
versions released to customers often are subject to continuing upgrades 
and other revisions, both as the “author” deems necessary and in
response to customer complaints and requests. However, the mere fact 
that the programmer may have an ongoing relationship with the
program after its release should not call into question the program's
“published” status. Many textbooks, casebooks, and treatises also are 
updated on an ongoing basis, without thereby losing their unquestioned 
status as published works. And the rationale for considering such
works published applies even so, because the author's initial decision 
to release the work, and any economic benefit gained thereby, cannot 
be changed by later events.
Finally, a “public distribution equals publication” rule also is con-
sistent with other aspects of the copyright treatment of computer pro-
grams.     The bare fact that the copyright afforded a program extends to
114  Upon introducing the bill Senator Simon indicated only that it was not intended to 
provide access to Acertain unpublished scientific worksYsuch as computer source codes.@136
CONG. REC. S3550 (daily ed. Mar. 29, 1990) (statement of Sen. Simon) (emphasis added).
115  Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 551-52, 555 (1985); 
William W. Fisher 111, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1659, 1675 
(1988).
116  Fisher, supra note 115, at 1674-75. 
117 Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 555. 
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the object code mandates that pubic distribution of a program in object 
code form be considered a publication of the program.118 Any other 
rule would, in effect, confer heightened protection on object code⎯an
incorrect result, given that copyright protection only extends to the
zeros and ones of object code because they are derived from the human 
expression contained in the original source code.119  The Copyright Act 
should not be used to bootstrap de facto trade secret protection for 
publicly distributed works.
Still unaddressed by the foregoing discussion, however, is what
“public distribution” means. Both Sega and the case on which it relied,
Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of America, Inc.,120 involved
programs distributed to retail customers.121 As a result, neither court 
considered the variety of other ways in which computer programs are 
distributed and the application of section 107 to those programs.122
Whether the limited decompilation privilege established in Sega ap-
plies to programs not distributed directly to the general public is a
more difficult question. It is conceivable, for example, that a program 
with limited distribution to a small number of licensees, subject to
contractual restrictions on disclosure, could be considered unpublished.
Referring back to the purposes of the unpublished work doctrine,
however, the reasons that programs available for retail purchase should 
be considered published works apply with equal force to programs
distributed on a more limited basis. By definition, any distribution to 
customers or distributors, however small, still reflects the author's
choice and the author's decision that the program is suitable for release. 
Extending the Lewis Galoob Toys ruling to any distribution of a
copyrighted computer program thus would preserve both the author's 
right of control and the public's interest. By the same token, that
reasoning would not apply to releases known as “beta test copies,”
which are distributed on a trial basis with the understanding that they 
are unfinished, prerelease products.123
118 See Apple Computer, Inc, v. Formula Int'l Inc., 725 F.2d 521, 524-25 (9th Cir. 1984); 
Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1246-48 (3d Cir. 1983), 
cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984).
119 See CONTU, FINAL REPORT , supra note 4, at 21-22.
120  964 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1992).
121  Distributors of such programs have attempted to characterize these transactions as 
licenses rather than outright sales, by imposing so-called Ashrink-wrap licenses.@ The 
prevailing view has been that such Alicenses@ are unenforceable, but that may be changing. See
Mark A. Lemley, IntellecaW Property and Shrinkwrap Licenses, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1239 
(1995).
122  In this respect, the Sega decision is much narrower than its critics acknowledge.
123  Professor Rice concurs in this conclusion. Rice, Sega and Beyond, supra note 16, at 
1200.
1115
As a practical matter, however, limited distribution programs typ-
ically are licensed rather than sold,124 and the price of licensing a pro-
prietary program usually includes an agreement not to reverse engineer 
the program. A question that courts and litigants eventually must
confront is whether a contractual restriction on reverse engineering is 
valid. Contracts that alter the existing balance of common law property 
rights are commonplace, and license agreements for proprietary
computer programs that alter the balance of rights established by the 
Copyright Act follow in that tradition. Copyright's debt to common law 
property rights and the theories of ownership in which they are rooted 
is significant.125 However, modern-day copyright is substantially a
creature of public policy. Arguably, to the extent that private contracts 
frustrate that policy⎯for example, by divesting licensees of a right of 
access to unprotectable information⎯they are unenforceable.126 The
courts have yet to resolve this question. Their answer will determine 
whether the reverse engineering privilege established in Sega applies
to all computer programs, or only to some.
B. COMMERCIAL ACTORS AND ENABLING USES:
REFINING THE “COMMERCIAL PURPOSE” TEST
The first statutory fair use factor is the purpose and character of the 
use, “including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for 
nonprofit educational purposes.”127   Accolade is a commercial actor,
and its ultimate purpose in copying Sega's code was unquestionably
commercial.   For  the  district court in Sega, the fair use analysis 
began and ended there.128  The Ninth Circuit  rejected the district
court's  bright-line  approach  to  the  purpose  and character test in favor
124 See, e.g., MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993)
(involving licensing of proprietary operating system software).
125 See Wendy J. Gordon, An Inquiry Into the Merits of Copyright: The Challenges of 
Consistency, Consent, and Encouragement Theory, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1343, 1354-77, 1446-68
(1989) [hereinafter Gordon, The Merits of Copyright).
126 See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 121, at 1279-83; McManis, supra note 76, at 88-99;
David A. Rice, Public Goods, Private Contract and Public Policy: Federal Preemption of 
Sofiware License Prohibitions Against Reverse Engineering, 53 U. PITT. L REV. 543 (1992); 
Rice, Sega and Beyond, supra note 16, at 1195-1201; Pamela Samuelson, Comparing U.S. and 
E.C. Copyright Protection for Computer Programs: Are They More Different Than They 
Seem?, 13 J.L. & COMMERCE 279, 288 (1994). 
127  17 U.S.C. ' 107(l).
128   Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 785 F. Supp. 1392, 1398 (N.D. Cal.), affd in part 
and rev =d in part, 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992), as amended, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 78 (9th 
Cir. 1993).
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of a detailed, fact-specific analysis.129 Ultimately, the court concluded 
that this statutory factor weighed in Accolade's favor, because Acco-
lade had copied Sega's microcode solely in order to study its
unprotected elements.130
The Ninth Circuit's more circumspect approach to the purpose and 
character inquiry has since been squarely vindicated. In Campbell v. 
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,131 its first fair use opinion in nine years, the 
Supreme Court warned against “elevating commerciality to hard pre-
sumptive significance,” and cited Sega with approval.132 The Court's 
substantive analysis of the purpose and character test also tends to
support the Ninth Circuit's conclusion that Accolade's purpose in
decompiling Sega's copyrighted code was “legitimate [and] essentially
non-exploitative.”133  Together, Acuff-Rose and Sega suggest a con-
ception of the first statutory fair use factor that is less rigid than the 
simplistic commercial/noncommercial distinction and far better suited
to identifying permissible uses of copyrighted material within the
predominantly commercial field of computer programming.
The district court in Sega based its approach to the purpose and 
character inquiry on the Supreme Court's opinions in Sony Corp. v. 
Universal City Studios, Inc.134 and Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. 
Nation Enterprises. 135 In Sony, the first of the two decisions, the 
Court remarked that “every commercial use of copyrighted material is 
presumptively an unfair exploitation of the monopoly privilege that
belongs to the owner of the copyright.”136   This statement is notewor-
thy for two reasons.   First, because Sony did not involve a commercial 
use of copyrighted material, the Court's remark was dictum.   Second, 
the Court cited no authority whatsoever for the sweeping proposition
that  every  commercial  use  is  presumptively  unfair.      Indeed, section 
129  See Sega, 977 F.2d at 1522 (“[The district court's] analysis is far too simple and 
ignores a number of important considerations. We must consider other aspects of ‘the purpose 
and character of the use’ as well.”).
130 Id. at 1522-23. 
131  114 S. Ct. 1164 (1994). 
132 Id. at 1174 (citing, inter alia, Sega, 977 F.2d at 1522).
133   Sega, 977 F.2d at 1523.
134  464 U.S. 417 (1984).
135  471 U.S. 539 (1985).
136  464 U.S. at 451. 
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107 itself is to the contrary; several of the activities listed in its
preamble as examples of fair use⎯news reporting, comment, and
criticism⎯are generally viewed as commercial endeavors.137 The
following year, in Harper & Row, which did involve a commercial use 
of copyrighted material, the Court invoked the Sony dictum to support
its finding that the challenged use was unfair.138 invented out of whole 
cloth in Sony and then cited and reinforced in Harper & Row, the
Court's sweeping generalization about an entire class of uses became a 
lodestar of virtually every fair use decision handed down by the lower
courts over the next decade, Sega included.139
Copyright scholars were nearly unanimous in criticizing the com-
mercial/noncommercial distinction as both simplistic and inherently
ambiguous.140 Acuff-Rose signals the Court's response to a decade's 
worth of criticism: a full-blown retreat.   Writing for the Court, Justice 
Souter went to great lengths to characterize his analysis of the first fair 
use factor as entirely consistent with Sony and Harper & Row.141
However, the Acuff-Rose opinion owes far more to the dissents in those 
cases and to the scholarly  criticism that  followed  them.   In noting
the  commercial   nature  of  news   reporting,   criticism,  and  other  fair 
137  17 U.S.C. ' 107; Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 592 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“Many 
uses ' 107 lists as paradigmatic examples of fair use, including criticism, comment, and news 
reporting, are generally conducted for profit in this country, a fact of which Congress was 
obviously aware when it enacted ' 107.” (emphasis omitted)).
138  471 U.S. at 562. The Court further observed, delphically, that “[t]he crux of the 
profit/nonprofit distinction is not whether the sole motive of the use is monetary gain but 
whether the user stands to profit from exploitation of the copyrighted material without paying 
the customary price.” Id. Self-evidently, of course, “the customary price” (whatever it may be) 
will not be paid if a use is deemed fair; nonpayment is a consequence of fair use, not its 
determinant. Cf Fisher, supra note 115, at 1674 n.66 (observing that “the existence of a 
customary priceYcannot determine whether the use violates the Act”). But see American
Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 37 F.3d 881 (2d Cir. 1994) (“[I]t is not unsound to 
conclude that the right to seek payment for a particular use tends to become legally cognizable 
under the fourth fair use factor when the means for paying for such a use is made easier.”). Id.
at 898. In any event, the existence of a “customary price” has more to do with the fourth fair 
use factor, the effect on the market for the copyrighted work, than with the purpose and 
character of the use made of the work.
139  Some courts unquestioningly invoked the “presumption” of unfairness. See, e.g., 
United Tel. Co. of Missouri v. Johnson Publishing Co., Inc., 855 F.2d 604, 609 (8th Cir. 1988); 
Telerate Sys., Inc. v. Caro, 689 F. Supp. 221, 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Original Appalachian 
Artworks, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 642 F. Supp. 1031,1034-35 (N.D. Ga. 1986). 
Others devised elaborate rationales to “rebut” it. See, eg., Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral 
Majority, Inc., 796 F.2d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 1986).
140 See, e.g., Fisher, supra note 115, at 1673-74; Leval, supra note 107, at 1111-16;
William F. Patry & Shira Perlmutter, Fair Use Misconstrued: Profit, Presumptions, and
Parody, 11 CARDOZO AR T S & ENT . LJ. 667, 676-87 (1993). Among other things, these 
commentators observe that Acommercial” may be defined in several different ways.
141   Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1164,1174 (1994). Justice Souter 
noted that “Sony itselfYemphasized the need for a ‘sensitive balancing of interests.’” Id.
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uses enumerated in section 107, Justice Souter relied on Justice Bren-
nan's dissent in Harper & Row.142 Following Justice Brennan's lead, he 
expressly acknowledged that whether a use is, broadly speaking,
“commercial” in nature is not the sole determinant of its purpose and 
character. The new standard the Court set forth for evaluating purpose
and character derives from the writings of Judge Pierre Leval, one of 
the fair use doctrine's most thoughtful critics. The Court observed that 
the statutory distinction between “commercial” and “noncommercial”
uses is, to a considerable degree, intended as shorthand for uses that do 
or do not promote the purposes of copyright. Borrowing Judge Leval's 
terminology, it reasoned that “the more transformative the new work, 
the less will be the significance of other factors, like commercialism,
that may weigh against a finding of fair use.”143  
Acuff-Rose's treatment of the first statutory factor signals a sea
change in the jurisprudence of fair use. However, the copying in Sega
raises issues that Acuff-Rose did not address. First, there is a far more 
complex relationship between commercial activity and innovation in
the realm of creative expression than most courts have yet acknowl-
edged. For some types of copyrightable works, including computer
programs, creativity and commercial endeavor are inextricably inter-
twined. Developing computer programs is expensive. Research and
development efforts may require significant investments of equipment,
personnel, and time. Those costs can only increase when product
development must be expedited to beat a close competitor to the
market. As a result, many of the most creative computer programming
innovations come from the corporate sector.144 In recent years,
research consortia, “technology transfer” programs, and other joint
ventures sponsored  by  corporate  investors  have  become the preferred
142 Id.
143 Id. at 1171 (citing Leval, supra note 107, at 1111). This is true to the intent of 
copyright protection, but does not go far enough. See infra text accompanying notes 156-58.
144 See, eg., Tom Foremski, Eye on the Future, S.F. EXAMINER, Mar. 13,1994, at C5 (dis-
cussing the Xerox Palo Alto Research Center's development of graphical user interface 
technology). As federal and state research budgets decline, that trend may be expected to 
continue. As one industry commentator recently noted: “Innovative new products don't usually 
come out of government research projects. Just look at the most successful companies in the 
PC businessY. If we had waited for a government-funded think tank to come up with the idea 
for the first personal computer, we would still be waiting.” Ed Foster, Clinton High-Tech Plan 
Walks Dangerous Protectionist Line, INFOWORLD, Mar. 8, 1993, at 41.
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methods of innovation.145 In this environment, the commercial purpose
and character test is more than inapt. Applied without an understanding
of the unique constraints inherent in a form of creative expression that
requires a research and development budget, the test threatens to
remove the protection of fair use from an entire class of copyrightable 
works, and so undermine incentives for further innovation. In short, the 
first statutory factor cannot be applied to all types of copyrightable 
works in the same way. In Sega, the Ninth Circuit implicitly
acknowledged this.146 With respect to the first statutory fair use factor, 
the first lesson of Sega is that a fair use analysis must take into account 
the mechanisms by which new works of a particular type are ordinarily 
created.
Second, the “particular use” challenged by Sega was an interme-
diate, not an ultimate, one—copying as an essential but preliminary
step to developing a competing but hopefully noninfringing product.147
While Accolade's ultimate purpose was unquestionably commercial, its 
intermediate purpose was to gain knowledge and understanding of
certain functional principles.148   The case thus required the court to 
answer a novel question:  To which of Accolade's purposes does the 
first statutory factor refer—or, can the intermediate step of copying
solely to gain understanding be viewed as a fair use? Doctrinally
speaking, it is in this respect that Sega was a case of first impression. 
While  other  cases  had  considered  whether  intermediate  copying is 
an  infringement, no previous case had considered the fair use defense 
in the context of intermediate copying.149   The Ninth Circuit
concluded, largely without discussion, that Accolade's immediate
purpose was dispositive, rather than its ultimate, unquestionably com-
mercial one.150 Professor  Miller,  in contrast, focuses entirely on
Accolade's long-term commercial goal of  competing  with  Sega  in 
the market for Genesis-compatible games.      He argues that the copier's 
145 See, e.g., Hugh Aldersey-Williams, Inventors With Time To ThinkCA Look at the Po-
tential of Independent Projects, FIN. TIMES, July 21, 1994, at 18; Foremski, supra note 144; 
John Markoff, Will Video Game Machines Turn Into PC Killers?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8,1995, '
3, at 7.
146  Similarly, the Second Circuit's recent decision in American Geophysical Union v. 
Texaco, Inc., 37 F.3d 881 (2d Cir. 1994), acknowledges that the user's status as a for-profit
company will not necessarily dispose of the question of whether the particular use is 
commercial. Id. at 889.
147  Sega Enters. Ltd v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1522 (9th Cir. 1992), as amended, 
1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 78 (9th Cir. 1993).
148 Id.
149 See Walker v. University Books, Inc., 602 F.2d 859 (9th Cir. 1979). No fair use 
defense was raised in Walker.
150  Sega, 977 F.2d at 1522-23. 
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long range commercial goals should determine the outcome, even if
the final product is noninfringing.151 Yet his consideration of Acco-
lade's intermediate purpose is as cursory as the Ninth Circuit's consid-
eration of its ultimate purpose.
The language of section 107 is instructive in this regard. The first 
statutory fair use factor seems to require only that a court evaluate the 
purpose and character of the use that is challenged as infringing—here,
the intermediate use.152 The preamble further suggests that, in general, 
privileged uses will be those that are intermediate in some fundamental 
sense.153 To the extent that criticism, comment, news reporting,
teaching, scholarship, and research all involve the use of copyrighted 
materials, they do so as a means to a different end, whether that end is 
the creation of a new work or simply the attainment of new
understanding that may lead to the creation of new works in the future. 
In each case, the copier does not profit or benefit from distribution of 
the chosen portions of the copied work, but rather from the original
contribution added or from the knowledge gained, which may then be 
applied to the copier's own creative projects. The copied work serves 
as raw material for both endeavors. 
Self-evidently, not all intermediate uses will be fair ones.  Some 
intermediate uses involve no more than steps toward unauthorized
cutting and pasting of another's creative material; in that case, the
copied work is both the raw material and, essentially, the final product.
Thus, for example, the use of a scanner to scan works into a computer
for redistribution would not, standing alone, be a fair use, but simply
an unauthorized appropriation.   However, as  the  foregoing  dis-
cussion illustrates, a rule that privileges only transformative uses is too 
narrow. Under the transformative use standard as outlined by Judge 
Leval, to be fair, a use must seek to comment on the copied material in 
some meaningful way. Yet the inclusion of teaching and research
among uses that are presumptively fair establishes that pedagogical
uses of copied material can be protected and that no new work incor-
porating portions of the copied work need be created.154  Thus, the 
language of section 107  suggests  that  in  appropriate  circumstances,  a
151 See Miller, supra note 16, at 1018-19 & n.193. According to Professor Miller, Sega
threatens to Aconsume the rule against intermediate copying.@ Id. at 1019 n.193. Properly 
speaking, there is no Arule against intermediate copying,@ per se. There is a rule against 
copying; in some cases, fair use carves out exceptions to that rule.
152  17 U.S.C. ' 107. 
153 Id.
154  17 U.S.C ' 107. 
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use that simply enables understanding of the copied material may also 
qualify as a fair use.155
How does Accolade's use of Sega's copyrighted work fare under 
the “enabling use” standard I have suggested? Assuming that Accolade
conformed to prescribed procedures for reverse engineering (we will
later consider ways to ensure that the copier adheres to those pro-
cedures), Accolade sought only to understand Sega's work, not to
comment on or “transform” it. That motivation cannot be a reason to 
hold Accolade's use unfair. Logically, whether a fair use has occurred 
cannot turn solely on whether a new work is created that comments on 
protected portions of the copied work. It would be odd if a use that 
does not seek or rely on copyrighted material at all, other than to 
understand it, were penalized more harshly than uses that do seek and 
rely on creative material.156
Logic aside, the copier's motive is centrally relevant to considera-
tion of the purpose and character of its use. Although it is hornbook
law that neither the copier's motive nor the nature of the use is relevant
to a determination of whether the copying has infringed the owner's 
exclusive rights under the Copyright Act,157 fair use requires a
different, inherently equitable analysis. Motive alone will not deter-
mine whether a transformative or enabling use has occurred, but it is 
indisputably relevant to any analysis conducted according to an “equi-
table rule of reason.”158 Equity may consider whether a copyrighted 
material was intended to transform, to gain access to knowledge not 
otherwise available, or merely to exploit.
Returning to Accolade's motive, we must consider whether the
motive of gaining access is legitimate in the eyes of the copyright laws. 
Professor Miller argues that “the law imposes no duty on authors to 
provide  access  to the ideas in a copyrighted work.”159       His views on 
155 Cf. Weinreb, supra note 106, at 1143 (arguing that a nontransformative use that makes 
copied material available may be fair). Thus, contrary to the conclusion reached in American 
Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 37 F.3d 881, 888 n.7 (2d Cir. 1994), copying done to assist 
with future research would meet that standard.
156  “Creative,” as used here, is a term of art that refers to original expression protected by 
copyright under section 102(a) of the Copyright Act. While Sega's system interface might have 
been “creative” in the sense that a management information system is creative or a 
mathematical proof elegant, the creativity of systems or procedures is not the sort of creativity 
that the Copyright Act encompasses. See 17 U.S.C. ' 102(b); infra part III.B.
157  See Walker v. University Books, Inc., 602 F.2d 859, 863-64 (9th Cir. 1979); 17 
U.S.C. '' 106, 501. 
158  See H.R. REP. No. 1476,94th Cong.,2d Sess. 65 (1976), reprinted in 1976 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,5679.
159  Miller, supra note 16, at 1022.
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access are rooted in his belief that “the base objective of copyright is 
for society to benefit from the availability of creative works—that the
progress of science and the useful arts be ‘promoted’—whether or not 
the literal expressions or underlying ideas of those works are directly
available to the public.”160 As a practical matter—and the Copyright 
Act is nothing if not practical in intention—this view ignores the fact 
that access to existing works by authors is closely related to the con-
tinued availability of new works to the public.161 Inspiration does not 
occur in a vacuum. As the Supreme Court has recognized, the freedom
to build on the public domain elements of existing works promotes
copyright's overall purpose of promoting innovation.162 By necessary
implication, the Constitution and the Copyright Act mandate a right of 
access to those elements.163
Professor Miller is, of course, correct that the Copyright Act con-
tains no express provision mandating the accessibility of ideas. Before 
the advent of computer programs, such a provision would have been 
meaningless.164 However, whether the law mandates accessibility and 
whether it allows access are separate questions. Permission to gain
access is implicit in the statutory provision that copyright protection
will not, under any circumstances, be granted to facts, functional prin-
ciples, or ideas—so that the flow of new works will stimulate, not pre-
clude, further innovation. 165 Allowing copying to gain access to a
program's functional elements thus does not frustrate the purpose of
copyright, but furthers it. 
160 Id. at 1029.
161 See Karjala, Computer Documents , supra note 6, at 1007-09.
162 See, e.g., Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
163 See Samuelson, CONTU Revisited, supra note 16, at 706-12; Daughtrey, supra note 
77, at 177-79. Thus, Professor Rice correctly notes that the Sega court's treatment of this issue 
does not go far enough, because the court required that the copying be both necessary and for a 
legitimate purpose. Rice, Sega and Beyond, supra note 16, at 1183-92. The constitutional re-
quirement of access to public domain principles dictates that this precautionary language be 
read broadly. Anthony Clapes suggests that, at most, there is a right of access only to the ideas 
and expression Asought to be imparted,@ which in the case of computer programs would include 
only those features visible to the user during operation. Anthony L. Clapes, Confessions of an 
Amicus Curiae: Technophobia, Law, and Creativity in the Digital Arts . 19 U. DAYTON L. REV.
903, 943 (1994) (emphasis omitted). There is nothing in the language of the Copyright Act to 
support such a distinction, and it is flatly inconsistent with a purpose of promoting the 
continuing creation of new programs.
164 See Samuelson, CONTU Revisited, supra note 16, at 676; supra text accompanying 
notes 106-11 (discussing the unique difficulties posed by machine-readable object code for 
access to the ideas and principles expressed in copyrighted computer programs).
165 See 17 U.S.C. ' 102(b); Samuelson, CONTU Revisited, supra note 16, at 670 (arguing 
that access to the contents of a copyrighted work is of constitutional significance).
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Professor Miller's final criticism with respect to the purpose and 
character of decompilation is a practical one. He argues that under the 
regime established by Sega, courts will be unable to detect and punish 
thefts of creative material in the competitor's final product, because a 
competitor could “electronically massage the copy until every trace of 
that illicit reproduction is obscured.”166 This observation betrays a
telling unfamiliarity with the actual process of computer
programming.167 Even if Professor Miller is right, however, the “mas-
saging” process would not obviate the need for creative effort. Because
elements of a computer program's structure, sequence, and
organization may be protected by copyright, it is likely that a great deal 
of effort would be required to remove all traces of creative expression
and idiosyncratic style.168 Moreover, the incentives to “overmassage” 
the copy, and thereby avoid a judgment of infringement, are
considerable.
Arguably, however, a competitor who uses a copyrighted computer
program as a template for producing a program with the same
functionality is no different from an aspiring suspense novelist who
writes with the works of John LeCarre, Robert Ludlurn, and Tom
Clancy arrayed on the desk, or a romance novelist who consults Dani-
elle Steele and Judith Krantz in the course of developing an “original” 
plot line.  The only difference, once  again, is that the programmer 
must decompile the program to understand what it is doing.  The
quantum of originality  required  to  bring  a work within the ambit of 
the Copyright Act is very small.169  A work may be “derivative,” criti-
cally speaking, without  being  a derivative work.   In short, even if
computer programs are properly classified as “literary works,” there 
are many more Danielle  Steeles  among  programmers than Ernest 
Hemingways. More to the point, a pre-existing program, like a pre-
existing novel, may be consulted for ideas, systems, procedures, and 
methods of operation—elements that copyright does not protect.170
The second programmer  who also imitates protected expression  might
infringe,  but   to   bar   programmers   from   consulting  the  copyrighted
166  Miller, supra note 16, at 1026.
167  Reverse engineering is not a substitute for hard work. See Michael A. Jacobs, Copy-
right and Compatibility, 30 JURIMETRICS J. 91, 102 (1989); Johnson-Laird, supra note 12, at
895901; Daughtrey, supra note 77, at 151-52. 
168 See infra part III.A.
169 See, e.g., Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951).
170 See 17 U.S.C. ' 102(b); CONTU, FINAL REPORT , supra note 4, at 20 (noting that 
“programmers are free to read copyrighted programs and use the ideas embodied in them in 
preparing their own works”).
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 program at all would confer more protection on computer programs 
than on other copyrighted works.
Assuming, however, that allowing the competitor continued access
to the copied work creates too great a risk, there is a simple enough 
solution: make “clean room” programming a precondition for a finding 
of fair use. Under a clean room protocol, the task of decompiling the 
copyrighted program and that of developing a new program are carried 
out by two different teams of programmers. The second team, charged 
with program development, is provided with the functional
specifications extracted from the decompiled program by the first
team, but no more .171  Accolade used clean room procedures, and that 
fact weighed heavily in its favor.172 Courts assessing decompilation
could easily require that clean room procedures be followed and
documented; the burden would then shift to the copyright owner to
show, as it must for a finding of infringement with respect to the cop-
ier's final product, that protected material was taken.
C. HOW MUCH DECOMPILATION IS TOO MUCH?
The Ninth Circuit in Sega agreed with the district court that the 
third statutory factor, the amount and substantiality of the copying,
weighed against Accolade.173 However, the court noted that the factor 
was “of very little weight” given the limited nature of Accolade's
ultimate use of Sega's code.174 The court's dismissive treatment of the 
third factor is consistent with the case law, which indicates that the 
amount copied is perhaps the least critical factor of the four.175  How-
ever, as Professor Miller notes, the court's sudden focus on ultimate 
use is inconsistent with its approach to the purpose and character in-
quiry.176  Where the use alleged to be fair is intermediate, the court 
should consider the amount and substantiality of the copying done at 
the intermediate stage.
As the Sega court observed, evaluation of the amount and sub-
stantiality  of  Accolade's  intermediate  copying  did  not  bode  well  for 
171 See Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510,1526 (9th Cir. 1992), as 
amended, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 78 (9th Cir. 1993).
172 Id. at 1522.
173 Sega, 977 F.2d at 1526-27. 
174 Id.
175 See, e.g., Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 449-50 (1984); 
Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1353 (Ct. Cl. 1973), aff=d without 
opinion by an equally divided Court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975).
176 See Miller, supra note 16, at 1018.
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Accolade, because it had copied Sega's entire game program during the 
course of its reverse engineering efforts.177 However, to hold that
Accolade had copied “too much” would overlook the fact that until
Accolade had decompiled the entire program it could not know
whether it had all the information necessary to produce Genesis-com-
patible games. The object-coded representation of a computer program
produced by a decompiler lists program steps in the order in which
they are coded, not the order in which they are executed.178  For 
example, a series of interoperability-related instructions performed
during the startup of a game program may be dispersed throughout the 
program microcode, linked by “jump” commands that tell the
computer to skip to a different portion of the microcode.179 The reverse 
engineer must decompile the entire program to locate those
instructions. Other interoperability-related instructions may be
performed while the game program is running, and those also may
proceed via “jump” commands. Once again, the reverse engineer can-
not know whether all steps necessary for interoperability have been
located without checking the entire program. Thus, decompiling Sega's 
entire program was not an indulgence, but a necessity.
Generally speaking, legal scholars have agreed that courts evalu-
ating claimed fair uses should consider the amount and substantiality
of the copying in light of the nature of the use and the other statutory 
factors.180 The foregoing analysis is consistent with this consensus.
The third statutory factor still weighs against the reverse engineer who 
uses decompilation to discover interoperability requirements, but given 
the other characteristics of that use, the fact that it entails copying the 
entire program should not preclude a finding that the use is a fair one.
D. DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN MARKET
USURPATION AND LAWFUL COMPETITION
The Sega district court's analysis of the  fourth  statutory  factor, 
the effect of  the  unauthorized  copying  on  the  market  for  the 
copied work,181  paralleled its analysis of the first. Judge  Caulfield 
read Harper & Row to establish a presumption  that  heavily  favored the
177 Sega, 977 F.2d at 1526.
178 See Johnson-Laird, supra note 12, at 875-78. 
179 See id. 
180 See Leval, supra note 107, at 1122-24; Weinreb, supra note 106, at 1146.
181 See 17 U.S.C. ' 107(4).
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copyright owner, Sega.182    Again,  the Ninth Circuit indicated that 
fair use requires a more fact-specific approach,183 and again, the Acuff-
Rose Court later agreed.184 This time, however, Acuff-Rose does less to 
dispel the prevailing confusion about how courts should evaluate the 
market effects flowing from “commercial” uses.
Judge Caulfield relied on the Harper & Row Court's statement that
“[f]air use, when properly applied, is limited to copying by others
which does not materially impair the marketability of the work which
is copied.”185 Many fair use decisions by lower courts subsequent to 
Harper & Row have read “materially” out of this test, finding chal-
lenged uses unfair if they would have any effect at all on the market for 
the copyrighted work.186 Literally, of course, any use of a copyrighted
work has some effect on the market for that work. However, just as 
section 107 does not require that every use with a commercial purpose 
be found unfair, neither does it require that any market effect preclude 
a finding of fair use. It merely instructs courts to consider that effect as 
one factor among many.187 In particular, as the Supreme Court
recognized in Acuff-Rose, the fact that a work is used in a commercial
or for-profit setting does not create a presumption of market harm.188
The question remains, as always, at what point—short of every use, or 
every “commercial” use, of copyrighted material—to draw the line.
The Acuff-Rose Court distinguished between “potentially remedi-
able displacement and unremediable disparagement” in the form of
criticism.189  Defendants' parody of the plaintiffs' copyrighted song fell 
into the  latter  category,  and  was  held  potentially  fair,  pending fur-
ther factfinding.  In light of the high intellectual and First Amendment 
values  placed on criticism in all its forms, the Court's conclusion
seems  unimpeachable.   However,  Acuff-Rose  should  not  be  read  to
182  Sega Enters. v. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 785 F. Supp. 1392, 1398 (N.D. Cal.), affd in 
part and rev'd in part, 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992), as amended, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 78 
(9th Cir. 1993).
183 Sega, 977 F.2d at 1523.
184  Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1164,1177 (1994).
185 Sega, 785 F. Supp. at 1398 (quoting Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 
471 U.S. 539, 566-67 (1985)).
186 See, e.g., New Era Publications Int'l v. Henry Holt & Co., 973 F.2d 576, 583 (2d Cir. 
1989); Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 99 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 890 
(1987); Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 642 F. Supp. 1031, 
1035 (N.D. Ga. 1986).
187 See 17 U.S.C. ' 107. 
188 Acuff-Rose, 114 S. Ct. at 1177.
189 Id. at 1178.
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indicate that every instance of “potentially remediable displacement” is 
unfair: First, as a technical matter, that question was not before the 
Court. Given the Court's express rejection of the Eleventh Circuit's
attempt to read Sony and Harper & Row as establishing bright-line
rules for separating fair from unfair uses, reading its remarks on dis-
placement to create such a rule would amount to willful misunder-
standing.190 Second and more important, the “transformative use”
criterion adopted by the Court implicitly broadens the category of
permissible uses. There are many conceivable commercial uses of a
work (including research and news reporting) that do not necessarily
constitute “disparagement” in the sense of parody or unfavorable crit-
icism. Finally, as a matter of logic, the fact that a particular use is
“potentially remediable” cannot alone be grounds for a finding of un-
fairness; many fair use disputes have arisen precisely because a license 
to use the work has been denied.191
The question left unresolved by Acuff-Rose, but directly addressed
in Sega, is: Under what circumstances is a use that occasions
displacement of the copyrighted work fair? The Sega court held that 
analysis of market effect must include consideration of the extent to 
which a given use simply enables a competitor to enter the market with 
another work of the same type.192  For Professor Miller, that con-
clusion is tantamount to sanctioning piracy.193 However, as discussed 
above, the connection between use of the copyrighted work and com-
petition with the copyright owner is indirect.194 As the Sega court rec-
ognized, simple common sense dictates that the absolute rule applied 
in Harper & Row, which involved a “scoop” of the heart of a copy-
righted work that threatened to supplant the market for the work en-
tirely, cannot logically be extended to works that are “the same” only 
to the extent that both are compatible with the same computer operat-
ing system.195  To exclude those competitors from the market for that 
reason would effectively protect not only the copyrighted work's ex-
pression,  but  the  underlying  ideas  as well.  Of course, allowing access
190 Id. at 1174, 1177.
191 See generally Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure. A Structure and 
Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600 (1982) 
(advocating a market approach to fair use that includes consideration of Aantidissemination
motives@ on the part of the copyright owner).
192   Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1523 (9th Cir. 1992), as
amended, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 78 (9th Cir. 1993).
193 See Miller, supra note 16, at 1026-27. 
194 See supra text accompanying notes 147-58 (discussing intermediate uses).
195 Sega, 977 F.2d at 1523.
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to interoperability requirements affects the market for the copyrighted
work, because it facilitates increased competition in that market.
However, the purpose of copyright—to encourage the production and 
distribution of creative works—is best served by allowing such
competition, not by blocking new market entrants.196
If a use that enables production of a competing product is unfair, 
then the result of the fair use analysis would have been very different if 
Accolade had simply decompiled Sega's operating system rather than
its games. In that case, disassembly would have resulted in the
development of a complementary product rather than a competing one. 
Accolade's final product, however, would be the same, as would its 
effect—whatever that may have been—on the market for Sega's
games. Moreover, as applied to computer programs, the term “dis-
placement” may be misleading. As a result of the interdependence
among applications programs and operating systems, the consequences
of a “displacing” use are by no means one-sided. At the very least, it is 
possible that the increased availability of compatible games translated 
into increased sales of Sega's console, which in turn would translate 
into increased demand for all Genesis-compatible games. If so, the 
work created through copying complements and supplements the
original. This does not justify holding all such uses fair, but it is reason 
enough to hold that not all such uses are unfair per se.197
For Professor Miller, the Sega court's emphasis on access to un-
protected functional principles is, “at bottom…an argument for
standardization.”198 This conclusion mistakenly conflates two quite
different concepts.     As  at least one commentator  has  observed,  there
196  The decompilation privilege established in Sega does not leave the copyright owner 
without a means of protecting its name and reputation. If, after decompiling a copyrighted 
computer program, the copier appropriates the copyright owner's good name for purposes of 
marketing its program, the trademark and unfair competition laws afford a remedy.
Conversely, if those laws do not reach the copier's conduct, as in both Sega and Atari, no 
misappropriation or unfairness has occurred. See Sega, 977 F.2d at 1528-30; Atari Games 
Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., Nos. C-88-4805, C-89-0027, slip op. at 9-20 (N.D. Cal. May 
5,1993). If that is the case, the copyright laws should not be stretched to reach conduct that the 
trademark laws do not.
197   It is worth repeating that the Sega court did not hold that Sega's games had lost their 
copyright protection; far from it. The court emphasized that Sega might still prevail if it could 
establish that Accolade's final product infringed. Sega, 977 F.2d at 1528. The court held only 
that as a matter of law Sega's copyright could not be allowed to bar access to the principles on 
which the unpatented Genesis operates. Id at 1527-28. 
198  Miller, supra note 16, at 1019.
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is a world of difference between removing legal barriers to compatibil-
ity and making system incompatibility illegal.199 While mandated
standardization would foreclose, or at least inhibit, the development of 
new computing methods and operating systems, its polar opposite, the 
complete absence of interoperability, also would prove detrimental to 
innovation, and to consumers.200  Taken to extremes, complete
acompatibility would require consumers to buy a different computer
system—or, in the future, install a different set-top box—for each ap-
plication desired. More realistically, selective licensing would make
available a limited number of preselected combinations of copyrighted
products, depriving consumers of the opportunity to mix and match
individual applications according to their individual tastes. Only two
parties will have the power to determine what combinations of
copyrighted applications will be made available: the manufacturer of
the uncopyrighted, and in most cases uncopyrightable, hardware
system, and (in the case of the set-top box) the telecommunications 
provider. Although some manufacturers of computers and operating
systems release interoperability-related information, it has become
clear that others will not. The video game industry, which is im-
mensely profitable, is simply the most egregious and the earliest ex-
ample.201  Clearly, the effective monopoly over functional principles
that results from such a policy is not a situation anticipated by Con-
gress or by the members of CONTU. However, given that copyright 
does not protect functional features, such a monopoly cannot be what 
Congress would have intended.202
199  Teter, supra note 6, at 1062 & n.13. It is for this reason that proposed federal 
legislation regarding the so-called Clipper Chip standard for communications encryption 
required federal contractors to use the new standard. Otherwise, purveyors of communications 
technologies would have been free to develop their own competing encryption standards that 
competed with the government's standard.
200 See Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 819-21 (1st Cir. 1995) 
(Boudin, J., concurring); Karjala, Computer Documents, supra note 6, at 1016-18, Daughtrey, 
supra note 77, at 173-74, 180.
201 See supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text.
202  In fact, there is evidence that it did not so intend. See H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 
2d Sess. 57 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5670: 
Some concern has been expressed lest copyright in computer programs should 
extend protection to the methodology or processes adopted by the programmer, 
rather than merely to the Awriting@ expressing his ideas. Section 102(b) is intended, 
among other things, to make clear that the expression adopted by the programmer is 
the copyrightable element in a computer program, and that the actual processes or 
methods embodied in the program are not within the scope of the copyright law. 
See also CONTU, FINAL REPORT , supra note 4, at 20 (observing that Ain the absence of a 
patent a programmer “is always free to make a machine perform any conceivable process@).
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E. TOWARD AN OVEREACHING VISION OF FAIR USE
As the foregoing discussion makes clear, the controversy over
Sega's application of the fair use doctrine to the reverse engineering of 
computer interoperability requirements concerns more than just a
narrow and highly technical subject. It is also a debate about the pur-
poses of copyright protection and the role of the fair use defense within 
the larger statutory scheme. The task of crafting copyright doctrines
that are responsive to the needs of new technologies, as well as to those 
of more traditional forms of creative expression, cannot proceed
without a clear and shared understanding of what copyright protection
seeks to accomplish, and how the particular rule at issue furthers that 
agenda.
Professor Fisher identifies four objectives of “copyright law in
general and the doctrine of fair use in particular” that emerge from
Sony and Harper & Row:
(a) advancing social utility by increasing the supply of intellectual
products and facilitating their distribution; (b) enforcing an author's 
natural right to a reasonable portion of the fruits of his labor; (c)
protecting an author's interest in controlling the way in which his
creations are presented to the world; and (d) aligning the law with 
custom and popular conceptions of decent behavior.203
Certainly, to varying degrees all four are objectives of copyright law. 
With respect to fair use in particular, however, the list is overinclusive.
A finding of fair use effects a contraction of the scope of copyright
protection.  With each successful assertion of the defense, a use of a 
copyrighted work that ordinarily would constitute infringement
entitling the copyright owner to redress is held, instead, to be lawful.204
The second and third objectives identified by Professor Fisher, in
contrast, are reasons for according copyright protection broader, not 
narrower, scope.  Natural rights justifications for copyright and
theories  of   “moral rights”  or  “artistic integrity”205  are  not  concerned 
203  Fisher, supra note 115, at 1668-69. 
204  Section 107 provides: ANotwithstanding the provisions of section 106, the fair use of a 
copyrighted workYis not an infringement of copyright.@ 17 U.S.C. ' 107. 
Professor Patterson has argued that as originally conceived by Justice Story, the fair use 
doctrine worked an expansion of copyright protection from the original, very limited grant to 
publishers to a broader, natural rights-based concept. L. Ray Patterson, Understanding Fair 
Use, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1992, at 249. However, the modem conception of fair 
use is as a tool for limiting author's rights when the larger public interest, however defined, 
requires it. See Leval, supra note 107, at 1110; Weinreb, supra note 106, at 1141-42. 
205  Although Article 6 bis of the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and 
Artistic Works, to which the United States is a signatory, accords authors such rights, United
States law generally has not recognized a moral rights basis for copyright. But see Note,
An Author's Artistic Reputation Under the Copyright Act of 1976, 92 HARV. L REV. 1490 
(1979) (arguing that the 1976 act creates a limited right of artistic reputation).
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with questions of larger social utility, in particular the increase in so-
cial utility that might result from allowing access to and limited fair
use of copyrighted works.206 Accordingly, natural rights concepts can 
never be affirmative justifications for a finding of fair use. They are
important only in the negative sense, as reasons for declining to find 
fair use in particular cases.207
The fourth objective, tailoring the scope of copyright protection to 
custom or community standards of acceptable conduct, may favor
either expanding or contracting the scope of copyright protection, de-
pending on the circumstances. Unlike natural rights and moral rights
theories, therefore, custom is a plausible underpinning for the fair use 
doctrine. A community standards or “fairness” approach also is con-
sistent with the fair use doctrine's equitable origin and intent.208 A
legislatively sanctioned element of “gut instinct” lies, at the core of
every fair use determination.209 Finally, to a significant degree, a fair 
ness justification for fair use reflects reality. Professor Weinreb, in
particular, has shown that custom and community standards go a long 
way toward explaining what judges actually do in fair use cases.210
However,  recourse  to community standards of fairness can re-
solve  only those cases in which the community standard or “custom-
ary practice” invoked truly is a shared one and transcends the
particular commercial interests and agendas of those involved in the
case. Sega is a case in point.  In some sectors of the computer pro-
gramming industry, reverse engineering is an accepted method of in-
novation and competition. In others, it is viewed as barely one step 
above industrial espionage.211   In general, at least in this country, the 
smaller  software  companies  are  of   the  former persuasion,  while  the
206  Such theories are, of course, concerned with social utility in the indirect sense that 
more of it may result from strong protection for individuals. See, e.g., Gordon, The Merits of 
Copyright, supra note 125, at 1388-93. 
207 Cf. Leval, supra note 107, at 1111 (observing that the justification for finding fair use
Amust overcome factors favoring the copyright owner@).
208 See supra text accompanying notes 157-58. 
209 See H.R. REP.  NO. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 65-66 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5679.
210   Weinreb, supra note 106, at 1152-53.   
211 See, e.g., Graerne Browning, Code Breakers, 26 NAT 'L J. 594 (1994); James Evans, 
Intellectual Property Bar Protests Letter on Software, S.F. DAILY J., Nov. 23, 1993, at 1; 
T.R. Reid & Peter Behr, A Software Fight's Blurred Battle Lines, WASH. POST , Jan. 11, 1994, 
at D1. Another area in which subcommunities with radically different notions of fairness are 
fighting for control over the copyright law concerns some musicians' practice of Asampling@
other recorded works in the process of creating their own compositions. See, e.g., Richard
Harrington, U2s Obscure Distraction, WASH. POST , Feb. 10, 1993, at B7.
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larger, established manufacturers of hardware and operating systems—
those with the strongest interest in keeping operating systems
proprietary—espouse the latter.212 Had the Ninth Circuit attempted to 
resolve Sega based solely on the parties' representations as to accepted
practice, its task would have been impossible. Moreover, a choice
between values advanced by competing business lobbies smacks of
mere politics, and lacks legitimacy. If considerations of accepted
practice are the primary factor motivating judicial decisionmaking in
the area of fair use, the results may be perceived as unprincipled and, 
to both authors and would-be infringers, readily manipulated. In cases 
where a real, widely shared consensus exists, that consensus can assist 
judges in evaluating claims of fair use.213 In cases where
representations regarding accepted practice simply reflect the
commercial agendas of the parties, notions of custom and fair play
cannot supply enduring and principled rules for determining when the 
boundaries of copyright protection should contract.
Of the four objectives of the copyright laws identified by Professor
Fisher, only the first—increasing the supply of creative works and
facilitating their distribution to the public—remains as a potentially
viable unifying justification for fair use. In a very real sense, therefore,
the debate over fair use reduces to a debate over how this goal is best 
achieved.214 As a threshold matter, we must consider whether
protecting authors' exclusive rights does not in itself accomplish this
goal. Clearly, it does—that is the rationale for according authors
copyright protection in the first place.215   However, the existence of 
the fair use privilege reflects an implicit consensus that protecting au-
thors' rights to the hilt is not always enough to ensure adequate supply 
and distribution of creative works.    If  it  were,   the  scope of copyright
212  In Sega, the American Committee for Interoperable Systems, an association composed 
mostly of smaller and mid-sized computer companies, filed an amicus brief on behalf of Acco-
lade, while the Computer and Business Equipment Manufacturers' Association, which includes 
among its members large computer manufacturers such as IBM and Apple, weighed in on 
behalf of Sega. See Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510,1513 (9th Cir. 1992), as
amended, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 78 (9th Cir. 1993).
213 Sony, for example, involved a conflict between community notions of fairness and the 
letter of the law. See Weinreb, supra note 106, at 1154-55. 
214 See Leval, supra note 107, at 1110; Rice, Sega and Beyond, supra note 16, at 1178. 
Indeed, most of the scholarly literature dealing with the fair use doctrine can be viewed as ad-
dressing this question. 
215 See U.S. CONST . art. I, ' 8, cl. 8.
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protection with the fair use doctrine would be coextensive with the
scope of copyright protection without it.
Thus, the fair use doctrine represents a determination that affirm-
ative measures to increase the supply and distribution of creative works 
may occasionally be necessary. The forms taken by these exceptions to 
the general rules governing infringement will depend on how “supply” 
and “distribution” are conceived. As discussed above, commentators 
differ as to whether the Copyright Act (and the Copyright Clause) were 
intended only to secure the widespread availability of creative works to 
the public or also to secure access to the expressive and nonexpressive 
building blocks used to create them.216 I have argued that particularly 
in the case of computer programs, access and public availability are 
inseparably related. If interoperability-related information is denied to 
programmers, the flow of new creative works into the market may
slow to a trickle. Fair use thus must promote access to creative works 
as well as their distribution for public consumption.
The “transformative use” criterion developed by Judge Leval and 
adopted by the Acuff-Rose Court serves this dual purpose, for it re-
wards the use of copyrighted works as raw material in the creative 217
process. However, I have argued for a broader conception of fair use 
than either Judge Leval or the Acuff-Rose Court recognized. It appears 
that Judge Leval would not privilege an “enabling use” aimed only at 
understanding a work unless that use could be directly traced to the 
production of a new creative work.218 Yet, section 107's enumeration 
of teaching and research as presumptively fair uses suggests that
exploration alone, without more, may be fair, and that interpretation
makes sense.219 Privileging the acquisition of knowledge, even without 
a close temporal connection to new expression, creates a society in 
which authors and the creative process can flourish.220 New creative 
output, however  remote  in time, still must meet the standard
for noninfringement.        Fear of  hypothetical future infringement cannot
216 See supra text accompanying notes 161-67. 
217 See supra text accompanying notes 140-43. 
218 See Leval, supra note 107, at 1126-28. 
219   As Professor Weinreb trenchantly observes, there is no compelling need to restrict
fair use to uses that satisfy the Atransformative@ standard. Weinreb, supra note 106, at 1141. 
Similarly, in those cases where a broad consensus as to fairness exists, that should suffice to 
support a finding of fair use. Id. at 1158-61. 
220 Cf. Fisher, supra note 115, at 1744-83 (adumbrating a vision of fair use as promoting 
a societal vision of the good life).
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justify limiting access to the information and expression contained in
existing works.
Of course, fair use should privilege enabling uses only to the extent 
that it does not thereby undermine the other objectives of the copyright 
law so greatly that it produces a net disincentive to create and
disseminate new works.221 Once again, this is a slippery standard.  As a 
matter of logic, whenever the fairness of a particular use is disputed, it 
is likely that a finding of fair use will undermine at least one of the 
other goals to some degree.  If fair use is to have any scope at all, there 
must be occasions when the other goals of copyright should give way, 
but it is important as well to identify those occasions when they should 
not.  Although fair use is inherently irreducible to general rules, certain 
broad parameters suggest themselves.
    First, the use should not offend fundamental, universally shared
community standards regarding commercial fair play.  In contrast,
community standards of fairness should play a lesser role when there is 
significant, pervasive disagreement—or no widespread public opinion
at all—on the commercial fairness of the use.222
     Second, to be fair, a use should not strike at the core of the author’s 
“natural right to a reasonable portion of the fruits of his labor.”223
Thus, for example, an incorporation of any of an author’s creative
expression into a final product should not constitute an attempt to
appropriate the heart of the original work and supplant market demand 
for that work.  However, as the debate over decompilation and
interoperability demonstrates, the same rule should not extend to a use 
of creative material that enables creation of a new work that simply
competes with the original in the market for works of its type.  In
particular, where copying is necessary to gain access to and
understanding of the ideas and principles embodied in a work, copying 
solely to gain understanding should be deemed fair use.
221 See Fisher, supra note 115, at 1700; Leval, supra note 107, at 1107-08.
222  There is an important distinction, however, between notions of commercial fair 
playCdefinable, loosely, as consensus regarding how much creative expression may fairly be 
takenCand notions of morality and decencyCdefinable as opinion about the genre or 
substantive content of new creative works in which that expression “should” be used.  As in 
the case of the parody in Acuff-Rose, such uses may have pronounced First Amendment 
implications and the fair use doctrine has a crucial role to play in shielding them.  See 
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1164, 1172 (1994).  Discussion of those 
implications is beyond the scope of this Article.
223  Fisher, supra note 115, at 1669.
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III. ARE COPYRIGHT AND INTEROPERABILITY
 COMPATIBLE?
      The Sega court’s decision to sanction decompilation was based on 
its belief that the program attributes that dictate interoperability
requirements are functional features that copyright does not protect and 
that reverse engineers have a right to copy.224  It follows that the
freedom to decompile established in Sega must be accompanied by the 
right to produce a final product compatible with the desired computer 
system.  The same principles and policies govern both inquiries.  At 
each stage, the court must weigh considerations of functionality, public 
access, and creatorship.  The balances reached, and the incentives that 
result, should be consistent.  It makes little sense to allow intermediate 
copying where necessary to understand the requirements for
interoperability, only to withhold permission to incorporate the copied 
work’s functional features to the extent necessary to make the reverse 
engineered produce interoperable.  Both types of conduct should be 
allowed, or disallowed, to the same extent and in the same manner.225
     What, then, to make of Sega and Atari?  Are they consistent—as I 
have defined that term—with each other and with the language and 
overall purpose of the copyright laws?  They are not.  Atari’s
misconduct aside, the result of the copyright inquiry in Atari should 
have been no different from that in Sega.  The same principles that 
dictated that Accolade be allowed to disassemble Sega’s programs also 
dictated that Atari be allowed to design a program that incorporated all
of the functional characteristics of the 10NES.  Instead, the Atari court 
relied too heavily on doctrinal formulations developed for analyzing
traditional literary works, and in doing so lost sight of exactly which
aspects of computer programs copyright does not protect.  This part 
explores the application of the “idea-expression” distinction and its
offshoots, the doctrines of merger and scènes à faire, to lock-out
routines and other interoperability-related features of computer
programs.
224 See Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1526 (9th Cir. 1992), as
amended, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 78 (9th Cir. 1993); supra text accompanying notes 42-44.
225  Recognizing the logical connection between the two, Professor Miller concludes that 
Sega could presage the disintegration of copyright protection for computer works. See Miller, 
supra note 16, at 1026-27.  In fact, as this part demonstrates, the right to create a compatible 
program like the decompilation privilege recognized in Sega, follows from the literal language 
of the Copyright Act.
1136
A. COMPUTER PROGRAMS AND THE
“IDEA-EXPRESSION” DISTINCTION
Whether the Copyright Act permits duplication of the functional
features necessary for interoperability has been said to depend on
where the boundary between protected expression and unprotected idea 
is drawn.226 The location of the boundary between protectable and
unprotectable subject matter is, of course, the central project of
copyright. Drawn too narrowly, copyright protection will provide in-
sufficient incentives to invest creative effort; drawn too broadly, copy-
right in existing works may impoverish future creative efforts.227 Lost 
in the formulation of the boundary-drawing project as an idea-expres-
sion distinction, however, is the fact that copyright also does not pro-
tect systems, processes, procedures, or methods of operation—much
more relevant and analytically useful concepts in the computer pro-
gramming context .228 In part because of the idea-expression formula-
tion, early cases concerning the scope of copyright protection for
computer programs swept too much within copyright's scope. Recent 
decisions have begun to correct that imbalance. However, considerable
uncertainty remains among courts as to which program elements
copyright protects, and how to approach the tasks of describing and 
identifying them.
At first, beginning with Whelan Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental 
Laboratory, Inc.,229 courts defined originality in computer program-
ming largely without reference to external constraints. The “idea” of   a 
program  was defined with  reference to the  program  as  a  whole,  such
226 See, e.g., Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 703-06 (2d Cir. 
1992); Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222,1236 (3d Cir. 1986), 
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987). Copyright does not protect ideas, but only original 
expression. See 17 U.S.C. ' 102; Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 
345-46 (1991).
227  A too-expansive conception of copyright protection jeopardizes future creative efforts 
by removing from the public domain material on which those works might otherwise be based. 
See Feist, 499 U.S. at 345-50. The recognition that copyright seeks a middle ground has deep 
roots in Anglo-American law. More than two hundred years ago, Lord Manfield observed that 
Awe must take care to guard against two extremes equally prejudicial; the one, that men of 
abilityYmay not be deprived of their just merits, and the reward for their ingenuity and labour 
the other, that the world may not be deprived of improvements, nor the progress of the arts be 
retarded.@ Sayre v. Moore, 102 Eng. Rep. 138, 140 n.6 (1785). 
228  17 U.S.C. ' 102(b); see Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879); Samuelson, Critique of 
Paperback, supra note 16; Pamela Samuelson, The Nature of Copyright Analysis for Computer 
Programs. Copyright Law Professors' Brief Amicus Curiae in Lotus v. Borland, 16 HASTINGS
COMM. & ENT . LJ. 657 (1994) [hereinafter Samuelson, Nature of Copyright).
229  797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
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as, for example, the idea of a word processing program.230 Most
industry commentators and legal scholars argued that efficiency
considerations and interoperability requirements, properly understood, 
operate as functional constraints, and that program subroutines or
processes designed to satisfy those constraints therefore should not be 
considered part of the programmer's creative expression.231 However, 
although subsequent courts criticized or rejected various aspects of
Whelan, few questioned its basic premise that the creative content of a
computer program could be assessed without looking beyond the pro-
gram itself,232 and none undertook a major reformulation of the Whe-
lan court's approach to evaluating the “substantial similarity” of
nonliteral program elements.233
Not until May 1992, less than two months before oral argument in 
Sega, did  a  federal appellate court systematically attempt to dismantle 
and replace the Whelan paradigm.  In Computer Associates Interna-
tional, Inc. v. Altai, Inc.,234 the  Second  Circuit  held  that program
features  dictated  by  efficiency  or  interoperability  constraints  must  be
230 Id. at 1236 (A[T]he purpose or function of a utilitarian work would be the work's idea, 
and everything that is not necessary to that purpose or function would be part of the expression 
of the idea.@ (emphasis omitted)). But see Plains Cotton Coop. Assn. of Lubbock v. Goodpas-
ture Computer Serv., Inc., 807 F.2d 1256, 1262 (5th Cir.) (holding that program elements dic-
tated by external constraints imposed by Amarket factors@ may Aconstitute 'ideas' in a computer 
context @), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 821 (1987). Although later Fifth Circuit decisions have 
declined to read Plains Cotton broadly enough to deny copyright protection to all Anonliteral@
aspects of computer programs, they have reaffirmed its rejection of Whelan as to program 
elements dictated by external constraints. See Kepner-Tregoe, Inc. v. Leadership Software, 
Inc., 12 F.3d 527, 536 n.20 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 82 (1994); Engineering
Dynamics, Inc. v. Structural Software, Inc., 26 F.3d 1335, 1346-47 (5th Cir. 1994) (remanding, 
pursuant to Plains Cotton, for consideration of whether industry standards dictated program 
input and output formats), modified, 46 F.3d 408 (5th Cir. 1995). 
231 See, e.g., Kajala, New Protectionism, supra note 6, at 64-66; Menell, Tailoring Legal
Protection, supra note 8, at 1361-63; Chisum et al., LaST Fronder Conference Report, supra 
note 77, at 20-21. 
232  In Plains Cotton, the Fifth Circuit recognized that conventions followed within an in-
dustry can significantly constrain a programmer's creative options, but did not address 
interoperability-related issues. Plains Cotton, 807 F.2d at 1262. The Ninth Circuit and two 
district courts acknowledged existence and effect of interoperability constraints, but did not 
address other limi tations. See Data East USA, Inc. v. Epyx, Inc., 862 F.2d 204 (9th Cir. 1988); 
Manufacturers Technologies, Inc. v. Cams, Inc., 706 F. Supp. 984 (D. Conn. 1989); Q-Co
Indus., Inc. v. Hoffman, 625 F. Supp. 608 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
233  The Ninth and Fifth Circuits, which never adopted Whelan, also never made any at-
tempts to develop a more compelling paradigm that might persuade other circuits to abandon 
it. See infra text accompanying notes 252-55. 
234  982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992). 
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 “filtered” out of the substantial similarity analysis in software
infringement cases.235   In so holding, it  became  the  first  appellate 
court to  treat  computer  programs as fundamentally interdependent 
and highly utilitarian works, with at least some features driven by
functional  constraints  rather  than creative choice.236   Professor
Miller has suggested that Altai's “abstraction-filtration-comparison”
test  does  not constitute  a  philosophical  departure  from Whelan,
but merely  fleshes out issues identified in Whelan.237 As discussed
below, Altai, like Whelan, framed  the  problem  as  one  of
demarcating “idea”—as opposed to “system” or “process”—from
“expression.”238   However,  one  may  search Whelan in  vain  for
any  recognition  that a computer program is dependent, to a degree, 
upon the functional constraints imposed  by  its  operating
environment.  Under Whelan, every program element is  presumptively
protected  by  copyright   to the extent  that  it conveys  information—
which,  of  course,  is  what program elements do.239    As a result of
this  inclusive  approach, comparison of the challenged and
copyrighted works sweeps broadly, encompassing program  elements 
that  are  substantially  similar  by  necessity  rather  than  by  design.    In 
235 See id. at 707-10. Drawing on Professor Nimmer's treatise, the Altai court set forth a 
three-part Aabstraction-filtration-comparison@ test for the analysis of allegedly infringing com-
puter programs. Id. at 706-11 (citing, inter alia, 3 M ELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER,
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT ' 13.03 (1991)). As the first step, the structure of the program is ana-
lyzed at different levels of abstraction. Altai, 982 F.2d at 706-07. AOnce the program's abstrac-
tion levels have been discovered, the substantial similarity inquiry moves from the conceptual 
to the concrete.@ Id. at 707. At each level of abstraction, unprotectable material—that is, 
material dictated by efficiency, industry demands, or interoperability requirements—is filtered 
out, leaving an identifiable “‘core of protectable material.’” Id. (quoting NIMMER & NIMMER,
supra, ' 13.03[F][51, at 13-72). Finally, the challenged program and the copyrighted program 
are compared to determine whether any of this protectable core has been copied. Altai, 982
F.2d at 71011. 
236  Based on surveys of programmers, Anthony Clapes has argued that the Afunctional
constraints@ argument is a myth. See, e.g., Clapes, supra note 163, at 926-28 & n.100; Sympo-
sium, Copyright Protection: Has Look and Feel Crashed?, 11 CARDOZO AR T S & ENT . L.J. 
721, 746-50 (1993) (remarks of Mr. Clapes). I suspect that, like the blind men who disagreed 
about the elephant's shape, the programmers who emphasize creativity and those who 
emphasize constraint are focusing on different program features. Certainly it is no myth that 
the chosen operating environment for a program imposes constraints that must be met if the 
program is to function at all.
237 See Miller, supra note 16, at 1001-02, 1006-10. In the narrowest sense, this is true. 
The defendant in Whelan essentially translated many aspects of the copyrighted program into a 
different progranuning language. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1226. Thus, even applying the AltaiAab-
straction-filtration-comparison@ test, the result in Whelan might have been the same. But it was 
not the result in Whelan that software experts and legal scholars found untenable so much as 
the broad rule that a program could have only one Aidea@ or unprotected aspect.
238 See infra text accompanying notes 273-77. 
239 Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1243.
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contrast, under Altai, it is presumed that many elements of a copy-
righted program will not be protected because although they convey
information, they do so in a way that is necessary to the operation of 
the program and cannot be expressed in a substantially different man-
ner; “filtration” of these elements must precede any comparison of the 
challenged work.240  The upshot is that the comparisons undertaken by
Altai and Whelan are materially different. The inclusion of inevitably
similar unprotected elements cannot help but affect the degree of
perceived similarity between the copyrighted program and the
allegedly infringing one.241
Drawing once again on an analogy to traditional literary works, 
Professor Miller cautions against reading Altai to require only thin
copyright protection for nonliteral program elements. He notes that
“the mere fact that the expression is efficient should not, without more, 
bar protection for original authorship in the programming context any 
more than it does in prose works. An uncritical application of Altai's
language would penalize the most effective (and in some senses the
most artistic) programmers.”242 As an initial matter, Altai did not hold 
that efficient programs would be unprotected, but only that sequences 
dictated by considerations of efficiency might be.243  The two concepts 
are quite different. For example, a program routine for calling a lookup 
table during a complex calculation is a sequence dictated by
considerations of efficiency that might be unprotected under Altai.
Lookup tables are the prevailing industry method for performing
complex calculations quickly with minimum memory, and there are
only so many ways for a program to call one.244 In contrast, a relational 
database might be an efficient solution to the problem of storing and 
retrieving data pertaining to bank loans, but that does not mean that 
relational database programs are not protected by copyright. There are 
a number of different ways to write such programs, and several leading 
programs are available for purchase.245
More important, the Copyright Act does not protect efficiency  per 
se.      It  protects   “original expression,”   a  term  of  art  that  refers  to 
240 Altai, 982 F.2d at 707, 710.
241 See Clapes, supra note 163, at 920-21 (criticizing Altai for this reason).
242  Miller, supra note 16, at 1004-05. 
243 Altai, 982 F.2d at 708-09. 
244 See generally Stem, supra note 16, at 382 (discussing the value of lookup tables for 
performing complex calculations).
245 See, e.g., Yael Li-Ron & John Montgomery, Double-Duty Databases, PC
COMPUTING, Mar. 1995, at 146; Kim S. Nash, Informix Fights Also-Ran Image.
COMPUTERWORLD, Mar. 20, 1995, at 1.
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the particular instantiation given to an idea or theme.246 That instan-
tiation may be efficient, but efficiency is not synonymous with origi-
nality, and the expression as a whole may be efficient and original for 
different reasons. An effective surgeon may be considered an artist
within the medical profession, but the procedures the surgeon has de-
veloped and perfected are not protected by copyright. If the procedures
are novel enough, they may qualify for patent protection; otherwise,
they belong in the public domain—even if the surgeon writes a book 
about them that details how they are to be performed.247 The fact that 
other surgeons may describe the procedures as “creative” or “elegant” 
is beside the point. In the copyright context, those words are terms of 
art, and section 102(b) of the Act makes clear that they do not apply to 
systems, procedures, or routines.248
In other cases, a programmer may be efficient, in the sense of
getting a task done, without being at all creative, if the most efficient
way to perform the various steps needed to complete the task is well -
known and standard within the industry. The fact that the programmer
accomplishes the task by writing should not occasion a quantum leap 
in the level of protection afforded the work. Here again, the treatment 
of computer programs as literary works obscures the issue; to the
extent that industry-standard efficient routines are comparable to
literary works at all, they are comparable to the alphabetical ar-
rangement of entries in a telephone directory or dictionary, a conven-
tion so commonplace that it has been held uncopyrightable as a matter 
of law.249 If the programmer incorporates some idiosyncratic features 
into the efficient routine, copyright may protect those features, but not 
the routine itself. Even if the efficient routine is what gives the
program its commercial value, copyright does not permit the
programmer to complain when the routine is duplicated.250
246 See 17 U.S.C. ' 102(a) (ACopyright protection subsistsYin original works of author-
ship fixed in any tangible medium of expression.@).
247   This is exactly the scenario proposed, and rejected, in Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 
(1879). The description of a system or procedure may be protected if sufficiently original, but 
the system or procedure itself may not be.
248 See 17 U.S.C. 11 102(b); Karjala, Computer Documents , supra note 6, at 997-98 & 
nn.66, 67. Thus, the argument that programmers view their creations as Acreative@ misses the 
point. See Clapes et al., supra note 16, at 1510-11.
249  Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340,356-57 (1991) (holding 
that the telephone white pages lack the constitutionally required minimum originality).
250  As the Court explained in Feist, free riding may not be used to bootstrap an infringe-
ment claim. Id. at 349-50, 357.
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The Sega court invoked Altai as a prelude to its fair use analysis,
and listed as unprotected program elements those “dictated by the
function to be performed, by considerations of efficiency, or by exter-
nal factors such as compatibility requirements and industry de-
mands.”251 For the Sega court, however, approval of the Altai approach
was almost a foregone conclusion. The Ninth Circuit, which as the
“Silicon Valley court” has assumed a central role in the evolution of 
computer copyright law, had never adopted Whelan, although that fact 
went largely unnoticed in the academic community. Instead, in
previous computer program copyright cases, the court had applied the 
idiosyncratic “intrinsic-extrinsic” test it had developed for evaluating
similarity of all types of challenged and copyrighted works.252 In
Brown Bag Software v. Symantec Corp,253 decided several months 
before Altai, the Ninth Circuit explained that the first, or “extrinsic,” 
part of the test requires “analytic dissection” of the copyrighted work 
to identify the core of protectable expression.254 In Altai, the Second 
Circuit relied on Brown Bag to support its “filtration” and
“comparison” steps.255 Thus, although Sega was a literal copying case, 
not a substantial similarity case, and although the Sega court did not 
cite Brown Bag to support its approval of Altai, Altai was wholly
consistent with Ninth Circuit law.
Although the Third Circuit (the Whelan court) has yet to comment
on Altai, every other court  to  consider  the issue has endorsed  at
least some aspects  of  the Altai approach  to  substantial similarity.256
In the formal sense, Whelan has become a whipping boy, the artifact of 
an  earlier,  less  technologically sophisticated era.    However,  that  does
251   Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1524 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing Com-
puter Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992)), as amended, 1993 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 78 (9th Cir. 1993).
252 See Brown Bag Software v. Symantec Corp., 960 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 
113 S. Ct. 198 (1992); Data East USA, Inc. v. Epyx, Inc., 862 F.2d 204 (9th Cir. 1988); Sid & 
Marty Krofft Television Prod., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977).
253  960 F.2d 1465.
254 Id. at 1475-76. 
255 Altai, 982 F.2d at 707, 710.
256 See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435,1445 (9th Cir. 1994); 
Engineering Dynamics, Inc. v. Structural Software, Inc., 26 F.3d 1335,1341-43 (5th Cir. 1994), 
modified, 46 F.3d 408, 409 (5th Cir. 1995); Kepner-Tregoe, Inc. v. Leadership Software, Inc.,
12 F.3d 527 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 82 (1994); Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. 
Indus., Ltd., 9 F.3d 823 (10th Cir. 1993); Autoskill, Inc. v. National Educ. Support Sys., Inc., 
994 F.2d 1476 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 307 (1993); Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, 
Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1524 (9th Cir. 1992), as amended, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 78 (9th Cir. 
1993); MiTek Holdings, Inc. v. Arce Eng'g Co., Inc., 864 F. Supp, 1568, 1577-79 (S.D. Fla. 
1994); Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 799 F. Supp. 203, 211-17 (D. Mass. 1992).
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not necessarily reflect a new unanimity on the question of how to de-
termine which features of a computer program constitute protected
expression. To the contrary, the application of Altai's abstraction-fil-
tration-comparison test has proved extremely malleable. As a recent 
district court decision (now reversed) from the Tenth Circuit illustrates,
it is possible to craft a test that, though derived from Altai, nonetheless
looks suspiciously like Whelan.
In Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando American, Inc.,257 which involved
two computer programs for calculating the dimensions and capacities 
of industrial belts, a Colorado district court attempted to apply a ver-
sion of the Altai test.  Relying on expert testimony, the court com-
pared the programs and found them substantially similar in many
respects.258   It then applied what it termed the “abstractions” test to 
determine whether the similarities were excused, and found that many 
were not.259   Like the Whelan approach, the court's analysis put the
cart before the horse, with predictable result. Because the two pro-
grams contained common errors and there was evidence of deliberate 
copying, the outcome—a judgment of infringement—probably was
warranted.260    However, the court also found infringement in the use 
of mathematical constants necessary for performing the calculations,
and in the engineering modules that performed those calculations using 
published formulas.261 It rejected Bando's argument that the formulas 
and constants could be protected, if at all, only under patent laws, on 
the ground that “[s]uch a holding would tend to fragment further the 
rather tenuous continuity found in copyright law concerning computer 
programs.”262  But on that point Bando, copier though it was, was
absolutely right; copyright does not protect formulae or processes.263
Fear  of discontinuity is  insufficient reason to ignore the plain
language of the Copyright  Act and is ultimately beside the point;
discontinuity  is  inherent   in   the statutorily  mandated  task of separating
257  798 F. Supp. 1499 (D. Colo. 1992), affd in part and rev'd in part sub nom. Gates Rub-
ber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., Ltd., 9 F.3d 823 (10th Cir. 1993). 
258 Id. at 1514-16. 
259 Id. at 1516-18. 
260  Johnson-Laird suggests that common errors should not necessarily be read to denote 
theft of protectable expression. Johnson-Laird, supra note 12, at 900. Certainly, the question 
whether a reverse engineer has duplicated an error of logical function should be separated from 
whether the engineer has taken protected expression. The prevalence and significance of com-
mon errors may, however, be relevant to that determination.
261 Gates Rubber, 798 F. Supp. at 1518.
262 Id. at 1518 (citing Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 
1222,1229 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987)).
263  17 U.S.C. ' 102(b).
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protected expression from unprotectable ideas and processes, and in
the constitutionally mandated separation of subject matter protected by 
copyright from subject matter protected by patent. The Tenth Circuit
reversed, and directed the lower court to reevaluate the two programs
after filtering out unprotected matter.264 However, the district court's 
opinion demonstrates that a mandate to conduct “filtration” is useless 
without an understanding of what elements must be filtered out, and 
why.
It is still too early to determine with precision Altai's impact. It is 
certain that after Altai, however broadly or narrowly applied, the uni-
verse of protected programming elements has shrunk, while that of
unprotected elements has expanded. In individual cases, however, the 
basis for distinguishing between creative and functional programming
elements is imperfectly defined, as Gates Rubber illustrates. Without 
question, some of this imprecision is inherent in the test itself, however
formulated. As Judge Learned Hand concluded over sixty years ago, 
“[n]obody has ever been able to fix that boundary, and nobody ever
can.”265 For software engineers concerned with creating interoperable
programs, however, pinpointing the location of that boundary is of
critical importance, and a matter of commercial survival. And some of 
the uncertainty regarding which program elements are subject to
filtration is neither necessary nor desirable. We turn now to Atari and
the interoperability question, and attempt to develop a clearer test.
B. PROCESS-EXPRESSION AND INTEROPERABILITY:
A FUNCTIONALITY-BASED APPROACH
Technically, the Atari court did not hold that Atari was barred from 
duplicating the features of the 10NES that were necessary for
interoperability with the NES console; in light of Sega, it could not.266
The court simply held that Atari had duplicated more than was re-
quired to achieve that goal. However, what Atari had duplicated too 
much of, according to the court, was  functionality.   The court  was 
unpersuaded  by  Atari's  contention  that  the  functionality   in   question
264  Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., Ltd., 9 F.3d 823 (10th Cir. 1993).
265  Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 
282 U.S. 902 (1931).
266  Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 30 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1420,1422-23
(N.D. Cal. 1993) (citing Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1524 (9th Cir. 
1992), as amended, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 78 (9th Cir. 1993), and Computer Assocs. Int'l, 
Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992)).
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would materially affect interoperability with future versions of the
NES.267 Essentially, Atari stands for the proposition that “surplus”
functionality at the program-to-program interface—functionality not
needed for current compatibility with the target system—constitutes
protectable, and protected, expression. In light of the fact that the
Copyright Act does not protect functionality at all, that result seems 
curious.268 This section considers how the court came to reach it, and 
how the idea-expression distinction both illumines and obscures copy-
right issues relating to interoperability.
Before Altai, the only significant appellate decision that dealt with 
the question of copying to achieve interoperability was Apple
Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp,269 decided three years 
before Whelan. Franklin Computer copied Apple's operating system so 
its own computers would support Apple-compatible applications
programs. To justify the copying, Franklin argued, among other things, 
that the idea of a computer operating system merged with its
expression because of the multitude of functional constraints imposed 
by existing applications programs.270 Finding Apple's operating system
protected and infringed by Franklin's verbatim copying, the court
observed: “Franklin may wish to achieve total compatibility with inde-
pendently developed application programs written for the Apple II, but 
that is a commercial and competitive objective which does not enter 
into the somewhat metaphysical issue of whether particular ideas and 
expressions have merged.”271 Altai represents a major reassessment of 
that view.272
In Altai, the Second Circuit clearly and unambiguously held that 
interoperability-related  features  must  be  filtered  out  of  the substantial
267 Id. at 1423-24. See supra text accompanying notes 66-67. 
268 See 17 U.S.C. ' 102(b); Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 101 (1879); Karjala, Computer
Documents, supra note 6, at 976-83. 
269  714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984).
270  Id. at 1253; see supra note 59.
271 Franklin Computer, 714 F.2d at 1253; see also Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback 
Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 69 (D. Mass. 1990) (“The desire to achieve ‘compatability’Y
cannot override the rights of authors to a limited monopoly in the expression in their 
intellectual 'work.’”). However, a district court in the Fourth Circuit held, without citing 
Franklin Computer, that copyright could not be invoked to protect the protocols that governed 
access to a secure facsimile machine system developed under contract to the Department of 
Defense. Secure Serys. Technology, Inc. v. Time & Space Processing, Inc., 722 F. Supp. 
1354,1354-55 (E.D. Va. 1989).
272   The Altai court did not cite the Franklin Computer dictum, Paperback, or Secure
Services in its discussion of compatibility. Franklin Computer involved verbatim copying and 
so may be distinguishable on its facts. See infra text accompanying notes 280-81. 
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similarity analysis.273 However, the court reached that conclusion in a 
fashion that should have struck industry observers as nothing short of 
bizarre. It invoked the doctrine of scènes à faire, a rule developed to 
aid in the substantial similarity analysis of fictional and theatrical
works. Under the scènes à faire doctrine, “standard” literary elements 
or devices are not copyrightable if they are viewed as virtually
indispensable to a literary treatment of the subject matter.274 The Altai
court reasoned that interoperability-related features are indispensable 
to a program written for a particular computing environment, and so 
should be treated as scènes à faire for purposes of copyright.275
The analogy between interoperability-related routines and “stock” 
literary devices is-rather far-fetched. The two types of expression serve 
very different conceptions of necessity, and are valued for different
reasons. Stock literary devices function as a sort of shorthand for the 
communication of perceived cultural truths; they are deemed
“necessary” because they greatly facilitate audience recognition of a 
particular cultural or historical milieu.276 The value of scènes à faire 
lies in the particular expressions of the ideas that they represent. It is 
entirely conceivable that a work that omitted them might nonetheless 
be extremely effective. Interoperability-related routines, in contrast, are 
necessary in the most literal sense possible: Without them, the program 
will not function. Such routines are valued, in short, not for the
expression they contain, but for the result they produce.
Although the Altai court set forth a rigorous, systematic method for 
identifying and excluding interoperability-related program elements,
the test it devised does not appear to be rooted in a firm understanding
of why those elements are unprotectable in the first place. The reason 
is deceptively simple. Program elements necessary for interoperability
with another computer program are unprotectable not because they
represent “ideas,” but because they are systems, procedures, or
methods of operation—in short, functional things—and so, under
section  102(b)  of  the  Copyright Act,  unprotectable just  as  ideas
are unprotectable.277     The  Copyright  Act  does not prohibit, but rather
273 See Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 709-10 (2d Cir. 1992).
274 See, e.g., Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 979 (2d Cir.) 
(holding that scines d faire are uncopyrightable as a matter of law), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 841 
(1980).
275 Altai, 982 F.2d at 709-10. 
276  Thus, among the literary elements determined to be scènes à faire by the Hoehling
court were representations of beer halls in Nazi Germany and the use of particular Nazi-era
songs to convey, presumably, Germanness. Hoehfing, 618 F.2d at 979.
277 See 17 U.S.C. ' 102(b); Kajala, Computer Documents, supra note 6, at 976-83. 
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expressly allows, the creation of an exact functional analogue of a
copyrighted utilitarian work. To take a well-known example, the lamp 
in Mazer v. Stein,278 the copyright protected only the design of the 
lamp base. It did not protect the lighting mechanism, or the on-off
switch, or the method of using a lampshade to reduce glare.
Atari is proof that the “why” of unprotectability matters. The
“surplus” functions in the 10NES program did not become expression 
by virtue of their surplusage. They were designed to perform particular 
functions at the interface between console and cartridge, whether or 
not those functions were necessary in the sense of scènes à faire to 
unlock a particular version of the NES. There is no reason that a
competing program that merely duplicated those functions—not the
programming sequences by which they were expressed—should be
deemed to contain expression substantially similar to the original. In a 
sense, Atari's characterization of the issue as a question of present
versus future interoperability, with the attendant emphasis on
competitive positioning, was a tactical error that confused the court. 
Atari argued that if copyright permitted only duplication of those
functional features that were currently necessary for interoperability,
Nintendo would be free to reprogram the NES master chip to look for 
other functional features of the slave chip, thereby freezing out all of 
Atari's previously released products with each new release of the NES 
console.279 However, nothing in the Copyright Act prohibits a
copyright owner from altering the expression in its copyrighted work 
to gain a competitive advantage. Copying to achieve future
interoperability is entirely consistent with the language and purpose of 
the Copyright Act, not because an applications developer has any
suprastatutory right to preempt changes in another's proprietary
technology, but because all functionality at the interface between
computer programs is unprotectable ex ante.280
Here it is worth returning, briefly, to the Franklin Computer
problem. Franklin Computer involved the opposite situation from
Sega and Atari.  Accolade and Atari produced game programs that 
were  compatible with  their  competitors’  operating   systems;   Franklin
278  347 U.S. 201 (1954) (upholding expressive features of statuettes intended for 
functional use as lamp bases copyrightable).
279  Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 30 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1420,1423 (N.D. 
Cal. 1993).
280 Altai's scènes à faire approach lends further weight to the argument that the 
interoperability dilemma is best resolved by abandoning the Aliterary work@ classification 
altogether, and treating computer programs simply as a sui generis category of utilitarian work 
containing copyrightable elements.
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sought to create an operating system that would support applications 
originally developed for Apple’s operating system. Under Altai’s
scènes à faire approach to interoperability, as applied in Atari, Franklin 
would have no right to do so, because the interoperability-related
routines necessary to run a particular application could not be
considered virtually indispensable to any functioning operating system. 
Under a functionality-based approach to interoperability, the out come 
is quite different. An operating system that duplicates the systems and 
procedures necessary to run particular preexisting applications does not 
infringe. Although that rule still would not excuse Franklin's outright
copying of Apple's entire operating system, Franklin could not be
barred from designing its own operating system that provided the
required functional base for Apple II-compatible programs.281
Nor does the doctrine of merger afford sufficient basis for
determining the degree to which interoperability-related program
features should be excluded from the substantial similarity analysis.
Like scènes à faire, merger is a tool for identifying instances in which 
expression otherwise protectable by copyright is not protected. As the 
name implies, merger excuses copying when the expression taken is 
the only way, or one of a very few ways, to convey the underlying
idea.282 The merger doctrine does not tell us how to identify those
aspects of a copyrighted work that are ineligible for copyright protec-
ion  in the first instance.     The Atari  court  understood  the  limited  role
281  The interesting question raised by the Franklin Computer situation is whether 
Franklin would be permitted to duplicate the systems and procedures necessary to support 
interoperable applications even if verbatim copying were the only way to achieve that result. If 
so, the necessary implication would be that operating systems contain insufficient original 
expression to qualify for copyright protection. The Franklin Computer  court held that 
operating systems did merit copyright protection, but it did not consider this test; it merely 
observed that neither CONTU nor Congress had drawn a distinction between operating 
systems and other types of programs. Franklin Computer , 714 F.2d at 1252. Because 
originality of expression is the sine qua non of copyright protection, that analysis was 
misdirected. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991). However, 
the Franklin Computer  opinion suggests that verbatim copying was not the only way to 
achieve interoperability. Franklin Computer argued that it had explored the possibility of 
writing its own routines, but had concluded that it would be too much work. Under the 
copyright laws as currently written, Atoo much work@ is not a sufficient excuse.
282  Concrete Mach. Co. v. Classic Lawn Ornaments, Inc., 843 F.2d 600, 606 (1st Cir. 
1988); Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742 (9th Cir. 1971). Both 
the merger doctrine and the seeds of its confusion with copyrightability originate in the 
Supreme Court's decision in Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879). As Professors Reichman and 
Samuelson have demonstrated, although in recent years Baker has been read narrowly to 
address only the merger question, its larger holding addresses, and rejects, the copyrightability 
of systems and processes. Reichman, supra note 77, at 693 n.288; Samuelson, Critique of
Paperback, supra note 16, at 228-34 & nn.81-82. 
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that merger plays in the analysis of utilitarian works.283 However,
several courts that have subsequently considered the Altai test have 
not. The Fifth and Tenth Circuits, in applying Altai's “filtration” step to 
computerized diagnostic and training systems, found the categories and 
subcategories within each system to be protectable expression because 
there were other ways to design diagnostic and training Systems.284
Both ignored the fact that the Copyright Act expressly excludes
systems from the subject matter it protects, regardless of whether or 
not other possible systems exist.285
Judge Keeton's much publicized “Key Reader” opinion in Lotus 
Development Corp. v. Borland International, Inc.,286 recently reversed 
by the First Circuit, illustrates the consequences of confusing the
doctrine of idea-expression merger with more fundamental principles 
that govern copyrightability. The “Key Reader” dispute in Borland
involved two spreadsheet programs, Lotus 1-2-3 and Borland's Quattro 
Pro. Key Reader, a module of Quattro Pro, was designed to read and 
execute users’ short programs, or “macros,” written using the Lotus 1-
2-3 command hierarchy. To that end, it duplicated the Lotus command 
structure, including the first letters of the commands.287 Judge Keeton 
likened the arrangement of commands chosen by Lotus to the
arrangement of facts in a compilation, in which the organizing
principle may be protected if sufficiently creative—in other words, if it 
is one of many possible organizing principles, and so does not merge 
with the underlying information.288  Relying on his earlier rulings in
the Borland dispute289  and in Lotus Development Corp. v. Paperback 
Software International290 that the Lotus 1-2-3 menu structure was only 
one of many possible ways to organize spreadsheet commands, he
characterized the organization of the command hierarchy as protected 
expression.291
283  Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 707-09 (2d Cir. 1992).
284  Kepner-Tregoe, Inc. v. Leadership Software, Inc., 12 F.3d 527, 535-37 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 82 (1994); Autoskill Inc. v. National Educ. Support Sys., Inc., 994 F.2d 
1476, 1494 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 307 (1993).
285 See Karjala, Computer Documents , supra note 6, at 988 (AThe systems and processes 
described in a copyright-protected work are unprotected no matter how many other possible 
systems or processes may exist to accomplish the same result and regardless of whether they 
accomplish that result less, equally, or more efficiently.@).
286  831 F. Supp. 223 (D. Mass. 1993), rev'd, 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995).
287 Id. at 226-27.
288 Id. at 231.
289  Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 799 F. Supp. 203 (D. Mass. 1992); Lotus Dev. 
Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 788 F. Supp. 78 (D. Mass. 1992).
290  740 F. Supp. 37 (D. Mass. 1990).
291 Borland, 831 F. Supp. at 231.
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In support of this reasoning, Judge Keeton observed only that a 
novel could be characterized as a system for communicating ideas, and 
that “the ability to describe a work as a ‘system’ is not decisive of
whether the work is a ‘system,’ or instead is protected expression,
under copyright law.”292 Of course, the same is true of the ability to 
describe a utilitarian work as an exercise in the arrangement of facts 
and ideas. The fact that metaphor may part company with reality does 
not excuse inability (or refusal) to tell the difference.293 Given the
division between copyrightable and uncopyrightable subject matter set 
forth in section 102(b) of the Copyright Act, the fact that it is possible 
to describe a novel as a system for communicating ideas and the fact 
that it is possible to describe a computer program as a compilation of 
information are equally irrelevant.294
The First Circuit's opinion recognizes the lesson of Baker v. Sel-
den, codified in section 102(b), that a system is not copyrightable sub-
ject matter, and that its designer may not invoke the copyright laws to 
prevent others from practicing it even if other possible systems ex-
ist.295  Only the expression of a system, method, or procedure impli-
cates the copyright laws, and then only to the extent that there are 
many possible methods of expression, rather than just a few.296   At 
that point doctrines such as merger and scènes à faire become relevant. 
Another well-known example, the jeweled bee pin in Herbert
Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian,297 illustrates this distinction.
The issue in Kalpakian  was whether the defendant's bee pin duplicated 
protected expression in the plaintiff's pin, or only expression that was 
necessary to the idea of a bee.  In contrast, interoperability concerns 
infrastructure, not appearance.  Kalpakian  would be analogous to 
Atari or to Borland if  the  jeweler  had sued  its  competitor  for  using 
a  pin  to  attach  its  bee  to  the wearer's clothing.   Had  it  done  so,  it
292 Id.
293 See also Miller, supra note 16, at 1030 n.244 (suggesting that Shakespeare may be 
characterized as Auseful@).
294  As in Paperback, Judge Keeton did not discuss the history of section 102(b) or cite 
Baker v. Selden and its progeny. Borland, 799 F. Supp. at 230-34. This omission is all the 
more egregious in light of the thorough and well-supported criticism that followed the 
Paperback decision. See Samuelson, Critique of Paperback, supra note 16, at 232-42. 
295  Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 816-17 (1st Cir. 1995); see H.R. 
REP. NO. 1475, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 57 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5670 
(explaining that section 102(b) is intended to exclude Aprocesses or methods embodied in the 
[computer] program@ from the scope of copyright).
296  Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 104-05 (1879). Thus, Professor Rice's suggestion that 
section 102(b) simply codifies the merger doctrine appears to be ill-considered. Rice, Sega and
Beyond, supra note 16, at 1139.
297  446 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1971).
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would have been laughed out of court. The result for a party who
attempts to bar others from practicing a system that happens to be 
embodied in a computer program should be no different.
It is worth noting that using the merger doctrine to identify
unprotected program elements also risks erring too far on the side of 
underprotection. If interoperability may be defined as an idea with
which particular program routines are deemed to have merged,298
there is no reason that any other functional attribute of a program may 
not be similarly characterized. Taken to its logical extreme, that
approach could sanction outright copying of all arguably functional
program features.299 Sega and Atari illustrate the shortcomings of this 
approach to interoperability.
The security system used by Sega was relatively simple: a twenty 
to twenty-five byte “header file” containing object-coded
representations of the letters S-E-G-A.300 Strictly speaking, Accolade's 
decision to incorporate the header file into its final product was not at 
issue in the appeal because Sega challenged only Accolade's
intermediate copying.301 However, Sega specifically argued that
Accolade's duplication of its header file was not a fair use.302 The 
Ninth Circuit rejected this suggestion. Among other reasons, the court 
noted that the sequence was “probably unprotected under the words 
and short phrases doctrine.”303 Even from a strict protectionist
perspective, the court's conclusion seems unimpeachable. There is only 
one way to express the “S-E-G-A” sequence in object-coded
representations of ASCII characters. Accordingly, even though the
letters spelled Sega's name, copying them could not take protected
expression from Sega. In copyright parlance, the idea—the name
“Sega”—and its expression had merged. In that respect, Sega was not a 
difficult case.
The difficulty with holding that the merger doctrine excuses
copying  of  all  interoperability-related  features arises in cases like Atari
298 See, e.g., Teter, supra note 6, at 1072-87. 
299  For this reason, although he argues that nonliteral program elements are wholly 
unprotectable by copyright, Professor Kajala believes that copyright protection for computer 
software should extend to literal code. See Kajala, Computer Documents , supra note 6, at 
984-86; see also Samuelson, CONTU Revisited, supra note 16, at 769 (arguing against 
copyright protection for computer programs but recommending that courts apply 
misappropriation, unfair competition, or trade secret law to pirates).
300  Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1515 (9th Cir. 1992), asamended,
1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 78 (9th Cir. 1993).
301 Id. at 1526.
302 Id. at 1524 n.7.
303 Id.
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when more complex code sequences are at issue. Nintendo's 10NES 
program was considerably more complex than the Sega header file.304
Accordingly, in an attempt to avoid infringing the expressive elements 
of the 10NES, Atari devised new programming sequences that would 
generate the same results as the 10NES at the required points in
time.305 The result was the “Rabbit” program, which Nintendo ac-
knowledged was not a literal copy.306 If the object-coded version of the 
10NES embodied a complete merger of idea and expression, Atari
could simply have copied it, just as Accolade copied Sega's header file. 
As applied to Atari, however, that approach is flawed. As I have
explained, “merger” is not simply a term employed to register the
presence of unprotectable functional or utilitarian matter. In the
copyright context, it has a specific, technical meaning. For idea and 
expression to merge, there must be only one or a few means of
expression available to the author, so that no real choice exists as to the 
manner of the expression.307 That is true of many, but not all, functions
that an operating system, or any computer program, performs. Atari's 
Rabbit program demonstrated that there were a number of ways to 
produce the mathematical results required by the 10NES. A simpler, 
and sounder, statement of the right to create a compatible program is 
that the reverse engineer may duplicate systems or procedures
necessary for interoperability, because copyright does not protect
them.308  
As applied to the 10NES program, or to any other complex
program element, the use of the merger doctrine to justify duplication 
of interoperability-related program elements simply resurrects the
reductionist fallacy of Whelan. Under Whelan, all was expression, no 
matter how utilitarian. If the merger doctrine is construed broadly to 
excuse copying of literal code whenever that code is “functional,” all is 
utilitarian, no matter  how  expressive.     Neither  approach  does  justice
304 See Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 30 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1420,1422 n.6 
(N.D. Cal. 1993); Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 30 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1401, 
1404 (N.D. Cal. 1993). 
305 Atari, 30 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1403.
306 Id.
307 See, e.g., Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742 (9th Cir. 
1971). In this respect, the Franklin Computer  court was rightCmerger is a Asomewhat
metaphysical issue.@ Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240,1253 
(3d Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984).
308 See Karjala, Computer Documents , supra note 6, at 976-83; Samuelson, Critique of
Paperback, supra note 16, at 235-42. Using the products of decompilation to generate clean
room specifications is the simplest and most satisfactory way to ensure that no original 
expression is taken during that process. See supra text accompanying notes 171-72. 
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to the unique blend of creativity and functionality present in most pro-
grams—even, however attenuated, in object—coded form—and
neither recognizes that copyright already allows complete functional
duplication of interoperability-related “systems,” “procedures,” or
“methods of operation.” Under the analysis set forth in Altai, the
concept of merger has a useful contribution to make to the analysis of 
functional similarities.309 However, merger is simply a tool for
ensuring that copyright does not inadvertently shield expression that
has assumed de facto functionality. As to whether others may practice 
a system, method, or series of procedures for achieving interoperability 
embodied in a copyrighted computer program, there should be no
doubt; those aspects of the program simply are not part of what the 
author's copyright protects.
IV. ENDGAME: PATENT PROTECTION FOR
LOCK-OUT PROGRAMS
Properly understood, copyright does not bar reverse engineering of 
lock-out routines and the programs they protect, nor does it bar the 
development of functional analogues to those lock-out routines and
other interoperability-related features. As Atari demonstrates, however,
in the real world that may be irrelevant. Under the doctrine of
equivalents, a reverse engineered product that substantially duplicates 
the functions performed by a patented lock-out program infringes the 
patent.310 On its face, Atari stands for the proposition that a patented 
lock-out program provides ironclad protection for the computer system
in which it is incorporated. What Atari did not consider is whether 
such a patent can—or should—be valid.311
Answering those questions in any meaningful way requires con-
sideration  of   both   the  theoretical   and  institutional  underpinnings  of
309  Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 707-09 (2d Cir. 1992). 
310  The doctrine of equivalents prevents competitors from appropriating the substance of 
a patented invention by designing around the literal language of the patent claims. Under the 
doctrine, a process or apparatus that performs substantially the same function in substantially 
the same way to accomplish substantially the same result as that claimed in a patent infringes 
the patent. See Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prod. Co., 339 U.S. 605 (1950). See 
generally 4 DONALD S. CHISUM, PATENTS ' 18.04 (1994) (discussing the doctrine's rationale 
and scope). Judge Smith relied on the doctrine of equivalents in granting Nintendo's motion for 
summary judgment of infringement of certain claims of the patent and denying Atari's 
summary judgment motion with respect to other claims. Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of 
Am., Inc., 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8864, *3-*6 (N.D. Cal. June 30,1993); Atari Games Corp. v. 
Nintendo of Am., Inc., 30 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1401, 1414 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
311  The question whether such a patent. if valid, is enforceable against the bona fide re-
verse engineer is addressed in Part V, infra. 
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the patent system. Doctrinally, the federal courts have failed to develop
a workable rule for distinguishing patentable from unpatentable
computer programs. Institutionally, the Patent and Trademark Office
(“PTO”), which functions as the initial gatekeeper and presumptive
expert on questions of patentability, has proved ineffective at dis-
charging its statutory mandate where computer programs are con-
cerned. Together, these systemic failures undermine the presumption
of validity that attaches to a duly approved patent, and on which the 
Atari court relied.312 Judged against a more rigorous standard of pat-
entability by a more demanding gatekeeper, the 10NES might well
have been found undeserving of patent protection. Such a standard has 
been proposed, but so far has received little scholarly or judicial
attention. The example of the 10NES patent makes a persuasive case 
for its adoption, and for changes in the organization and operation of 
the PTO to respond to the unique challenges posed by computer pro-
gram-related inventions.
A. A PROFUSION OF SLIPPERY SLOPES: THE FAILURE OF EFFORTS
TO ISOLATE PATENTABLE SUBJECT MATTER
While copyright scholars and computer programmers were debat-
ing whether computer programs constituted copyrightable subject
matter and whether CONTU had struck the right balance for protecting
them, an equally vigorous debate focused on the question whether
computer programs satisfied the requirements for patentable subject
matter.313 Over the past two decades, resistance to software patents by 
the PTO and the courts has all but vanished. Thousands of software 
patents have been issued and are routinely upheld.314 Within the
scientific, business, and academic communities, however, the debate
over whether computer programs are or should be statutory subject
matter continues.315 Regrettably, there is no indication that this debate 
informed the parties or the court in Atari.
312 See 35 U.S.C. ' 282 (1998); Atari, 30 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1409.
313 See Samuelson, Benson Revisited, supra note 3, at 1032-99.
314 See Simson L Garfinkel, Patently Absurd, WIRED, July 1994, at 104,106 (stating that 
over 12,000 software patents have been issued); John T. Soma & B.F. Smith, Software Trends: 
Who's Getting How Many of What? 1978 to 1987, 71 J. PAT . & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 415, 
419-21, 428-32 (1989).
315 See, e.g., Chisum, supra note 16, at 977-92; Allen Newell, Response: The Models Are 
Broken, The Models Are Brokent, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 1023 (1986); Oddi, supra note 16, at 
41022; Samuelson, Benson Revisited, supra note 3, at 1103-32; Stern, supra note 16, at 397-
89; Garfinkel, supra note 314. This Article argues that debate over whether computer 
programs are patentable or Ano more than@ expressions of unpatentable mathematical principles 
is best approached via the requirements of novelty and nonobviousness. See infra Part IV.B.
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As provided in section 101 of the Patent Act, any new and useful 
process or machine is potentially patentable subject matter.316 On its 
face, this provision encompasses computer programs. However, long-
standing judicially developed doctrines prohibit patent protection for 
mathematical formulae and mental processes, on the ground that
“processes” that simply describe existing natural laws (whether as ba-
sic as 2 + 2 = 4 or as complex as e = mc2) or recite steps performable 
by the human mind do not fall within the category of “useful arts” and 
are not statutory subject matter.317 Some commentators have argued 
that many computer programs are simply mathematical formulae or
mental processes made concrete.318 Others have argued that the
“machine-like” nature of computer programs brings them squarely
within the class of potentially patentable inventions.319  A principled 
basis for evaluating whether computer program-related claims recite
statutory subject matter has proved elusive.
1. From Freeman-Walter-Abele to Alappat: The Corruption of the
    “Otherwise Statutory Process or Apparatus” Standard
Although the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (“CCPA”)
decided a number of cases dealing with computer program-related ap-
plications in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the history of the current 
approach begins with Gottschalk v. Benson.320 In that case, the
Supreme  Court  rejected   under  section  101  an  attempt  to   patent  a
316 See 35 U.S.C. ' 101 (1988). 
317 See, e.g., Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948) 
(A[P]atents cannot issue for the discovery of the phenomena of natureY. [T]hese are part of the 
storehouse of knowledge of all men.@ (citation omitted)); In re Shao Wen Yuan, 188 F.2d 377 
(C.C.P.A. 1951); Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Walker, 146 F.2d 817, 821 (9th Cir. 
1944), rev’d on other grounds, 329 U,S. 1 (1946), Don Lee, Inc. v. Walker, 61 F.2d 58 (9th 
Cir. 1932). See generally 1 CHISUM,, supra note 310, ' 1.03 (discussing the scope and 
boundaries of the statutory class of processes). The Patent Clause of the Constitution 
authorizes the grant of exclusive rights Ato promote the progress ofYuseful Arts.@ U.S. CONST.
art. 1, ' 8, cl. 8. The term Auseful arts@ has been construed to encompass Athe realm of 
technological and industrial improvements.@ Samuelson, Benson Revisited, supra note 3, at 
1033 n.24; see also id. at 1112; 1 CHISUM, supra note 310, ' 1.01. As Professor Samuelson 
details, however, no coherent, satisfactory explanation or model has been offered for the 
exclusion of mathematical formulae and mental processes. Samuelson, Benson Revisited,
supra note 3, at 1036 n.34.
318 See, e.g., Newell, supra note 315, at 1028-31; Samuelson, Benson Revisited, supra 
note 3, at 1063, 1122-24. 
319 See, e.g., Chisum, supra note 16, at 980-81; Irah H. Donner & J. Randall Beckers, 
Throwing out Baby Benson With the Bath Water: Proposing a New Test for Determining 
Statutory Subject Matter, 33 JURRMETRICS J. 247 (1993); cf Oddi, supra note 16, at 416-20
(criticizing analogy of computer programs to Amental steps@). This view has gained ascendancy 
in recent cases. See infra text accompanying notes 346-58. 
320  409 U.S. 63 (1972).
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computerized process for converting binary-coded numerals to pure
binary form, on the grounds that the patent covered no more than a 
mathematical formula, and if granted would preempt its use.321  Six
years later, in Parker v. Flook,322 the Court rejected for similar reasons
an attempt to claim patentability for a computerized method for
continuously recalculating the “alarm limit” during a chemical
conversion process.323 Nonetheless, in both cases the Court stopped 
conspicuously short of precluding patentability for all computer
programs.324 The Benson Court indicated that it was concerned less 
with patentability per se than with the potentially preemptive reach of 
claims based on “mathematical algorithms.”325  Ultimately, the Court 
made good on its implicit guarantee that a sufficiently narrow patent 
would be upheld. In Diamond v. Diehr,326 it held that a process for 
continuously monitoring the temperature inside a synthetic rubber
mold, using a computer and the well-known Arrhenius equation for 
measuring cure time as a function of temperature and other variables, 
was patentable subject matter. Central to the Court's decision was that 
the inventor did not claim all rights to future uses of the Arrhenius
equation, but only to the particular application that he had invented in 
the context of an “otherwise statutory” industrial process.327
In  the wake of the Supreme Court's decisions in Benson, Flook, 
and Diehr,  the  CCPA and its successor, the Federal Circuit, elabo-
rated a two-part test for assessing the patentability of computer pro-
gram-related inventions under section 101. Known as the Freeman-
Walter-Abele test, after the three cases from which it emerged,328 the 
test  first  asked  whether  the  invention  directly  or  indirectly  recited  a
321 Id. at 71-72. 
322  437 U.S. 584 (1978).
323 Id. at 589-91.  The Court reasoned that if it ignored the mathematical algorithm the 
applicant had developed for updating the alarm limit, the claimed invention contained nothing 
new or inventive.  For further discussion of this aspect of the Court =s reasoning, see part IV.B, 
infra.   
324 Flook, 437 U.S. at 595 (ANeither the dearth of precedent, nor this decision, should 
therefore be interpreted as reflecting a judgment that patent protection of certain novel and 
useful computer programs will not promote the progress of science and the useful arts, or that 
such protection is undesirable as a matter of policy.@); Benson, 409 U.S. at 71 (AWe do not hold 
that no process patent could ever quality if it did not meet the requirements of our prior 
precedents.  It is said that the decision precludes a patent for any program srvicing a computer. 
We do not so hold.@).
325 Benson, 409 U.S. at 72-73.   
326  450 U.S. 175 (1981).
327 Id. at 187.
328 In re Freeman, 573 F.2d 1237, 1245 (C.C.P.A. 1977); In re Walter, 618 F.2d 758 
(C.C.P.A. 1980); In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
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mathematical algorithm.329 If so, it directed the court to inquire
whether the claimed invention was no more than the algorithm itself, 
or whether instead the algorithm was applied as part of an otherwise 
statutory process or apparatus claim.330 If the former, patent protection
should be denied.331 In theory, this test appeared to provide a means for 
limiting patent protection to advances within the “useful arts.”332  In
practice, the Federal Circuit's decisions under Freeman Walter-Abele
strongly suggested that that court had little interest in recognizing any
meaningful limitation on the patentability of computer program-related
inventions. A trio of decisions issued in 1994 has confirmed just that. 
These decisions establish that the “otherwise statutory process or
apparatus” requirement may be satisfied by the simple expedient of
drafting claims to include a general purpose computer or standard
hardware or memory element that would be necessary for any useful
application of the algorithm.333 As explained below, that course of
action ignores constitutional limitations that separate patentable
inventions from public domain science, and so threatens the continuing 
vitality of the patent system.334
As developed by the PTO and the Federal Circuit prior to 1994, the 
“otherwise statutory process or apparatus” limitation of Freeman -
Walter-Abele was not much of a limit at all. Nearly any physical ele-
ment or step would suffice to render statutory a claim that recited a 
mathematical or “mental process” algorithm. That held true even if the 
physical element or step was well-known or an industry standard, and 
the mathematical algorithm was the heart of the invention. As a result, 
although the rule was designed to satisfy the Benson Court's concerns 
about algorithm preemption, it was incapable of doing so.
The case that best exemplified this problem was In re Iwahashi,335
which concerned a system for voice pattern recognition. Broadly
speaking, the claim in Iwahashi recited a novel pattern recognition
algorithm and “a read only memory” (“ROM”) device as elements of a 
claimed  apparatus.336    For  the  Federal  Circuit, the  presence  of   the
329 Abele, 684 F.2d at 905.
330 Id. at 905-07. 
331 Id.
332 See supra text accompanying note 317.
333 See infra text accompanying notes 346-58. Richard Stem has termed this the Anominal
hardware@ limitation. See Stern, supra note 16, at 379-87. 
334 See infra text accompanying notes 369-81. 
335  888 F.2d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1989). 
336 Id. at 1373. A ROM is a memory device, such as a semiconductor chip, in which 
information is stored to be read by the computer as needed. See Samuelson, CONTU Revisited,
supra note 16, at 673 n.32. The ROM in lwahashi was a Alook-up ROM,@ a device for storing a 
list of data representing mathematical correlates of possible input from the program. SeeStern,
supra note 16, at 379 & n.16. The patent application contained only one claim. lwahashi, 888 
F.2d at 1371.
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ROM was sufficient to qualify the claimed invention as a statutory
“machine” or “manufacture.”337 As has been elegantly demonstrated, 
however, the ROM limitation is meaningless because a ROM is a basic
component found in all general purpose computers and is necessary
whenever complex calculations involving lookup tables, such as the
calculation required by the Iwahashi algorithm, are performed.338  The 
real innovation claimed in Iwahashi was the new pattern recognition
algorithm. By upholding the patent, the court effectively preempted its 
use—exactly the result it maintained was avoided by the ROM
limitation.339
Iwahashi was not an aberration. Subsequently, in Arrhythmia Re-
search Technology v. Corazonix Corp.,340 the Federal Circuit upheld a 
patent for a computerized method of analyzing electrocardiograph
(“ECG”) patterns to detect persons at risk for certain heart diseases. 
The Arrhythmia patent also clearly preempts the algorithm it contains. 
The Federal Circuit's opinion briefly raised its application of the
“otherwise statutory process or apparatus” limitation to the level of the 
absurd.
Although the invention claimed in Arrhythmia had a number of
steps, those can be grouped into three stages.  First, it converted the 
analog  signals  obtained   using  the  ECG  into  digital  signals.     It  then
337  Relying on Freeman- Walter-Abele, the court reasoned:  
The claim as a whole certainly defines apparatus in the form of a combination of 
interrelated means and we cannot discern any logical reason why it should not be 
deemed statutory subject matter as either a machine or a manufacture as specified in 
' 101. 'The fact that the apparatus operates according to an algorithm does not make 
it nonstatutory.
Id. at 1375.
338  Stern, supra note 16, at 381-84. Realizing this, the PTO immediately sought to mini-
mize lwahashi's impact by issuing a notice limiting lwahashi to its facts and promising a case-
by-case approach to future applications. See Notice Interpreting In re Iwahashi (Fed. Cir. 
1989), 1112 Off. Gaz. Pat. Office 16 (Mar. 13, 1990). For discussion of the PTO's initial 
resistance to the Federal Circuit's expansive approach to the patentability of computer 
program-related inventions in the post-Benson era, see Samuelson, Benson Revisited, supra
note 3, at 1062-94. According to Professor Samuelson, after Diehr, the PTO capitulated and 
fell in line with the Federal Circuit. Id. at 1093-94 & n.256. In fact, the PTO's actions 
regarding lwahashi and In re Alappat, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1340 (Bd. Pat. App. 1992), rev=d,
33 F.3d 126 (Fed. Cir. 1994), discussed infra at text accompanying notes 346-53, indicate that 
a spark of resistance remained. However, the new guidelines recently proposed for evaluating 
software patents represent the PTO's unconditional surrender. See 60 Fed. Reg. 28,778 (June 
2,1995), discussed infra note 369.
339 1wahashi, 888 F.2d at 1374-75. 
340  958 F.2d 1053 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
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applied a well-known digital filtration technique to analyze the wave 
characteristics of the digitized ECG data. Finally, it performed addi-
tional mathematical analysis of the filtered ECG data to identify par-
ticular patterns and values, using a new mathematical model.341 In
holding the invention statutory, the court reasoned: “These claimed
steps of ‘converting,’ ‘applying,’ ‘determining,’ and ‘comparing’ are
physical process steps that transform one physical, electrical signal into 
another.”342 But the conversion of analog signals to digital ones is a 
well-known process, as is the operation of a digital computer to
transform one set of digital signals into another.343  And if digital-to-
digital transformation of electrical signals constitutes a physical limita-
tion sufficient to establish otherwise statutory subject matter, then any 
computer-driven algorithm is statutory subject matter anyway, and no 
additional “otherwise statutory process or apparatus” need be shown. 
More recently, the Federal Circuit has clarified that it did not mean to 
go that far, and that the signals must correspond to some underlying
physical steps.344 According to the court, the manipulation of ECG
output counts as such a physical process.345 Nevertheless, in Arrhyth-
mia, as in Iwahashi, the real innovation was not any physical process 
or structure, but the mathematical model developed by the inventor for 
predicting heart failures based on ECG patterns. The discovery that 
certain naturally occurring ECG patterns are correlated with a
likelihood of later heart failure is not something that the patent system
can protect.
Finally, in In re Alappat,346 decided by the en banc court in July 
1994 after more than a year of deliberation, the Federal Circuit unam-
biguously  held  that  a  claim for  the  use of  general  purpose  computing
341 Id at 1059.
342 Id.
343  Nonetheless, Professor Oddi argues that regarding analog-to-digital or digital-to-
digital transformation as a sufficient Auseful arts@ limitation is consistent with the Supreme 
Court's definition of patentable subject matter, in a non-computer-program-related case, as 
Aanything under the sun that is made by man.@ Oddi, supra note 16, at 415-16 (quoting 
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 305, 309 (1980)). Even so, because both analog-to-digital
and digital-to-digital transformations are well-known prior art, the mere idea of computerizing 
a particular task, whether analog or digital input is required, cannot satisfy the threshold 
requirements that a patented invention be novel and nonobvious as well as manmade. See infra 
part IV.B.
344 In re Trovato, 42 F.3d 1376, 1380-81 (Fed. Cir. 1994); In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290, 
294 (Fed. Cir. 1994). The claims in Schrader, for a method for calculating competitive bids, 
and in Trovato, for a method for calculating the shortest, or Aleast cost,@ path between two 
points, were disallowed.
345 Trovato, 42 F.3d at 1380; Schrader, 22 F.3d at 294.
346  33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc).
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equipment to perform a mathematical operation recites a patentable
apparatus—namely, “a combination of known electronic circuitry ele-
ments to produce a specific new result.”347 Accordingly, the court
ruled, it need not even perform the two-part inquiry required by the 
Freeman-Walter-Abele line of cases.348  The PTO had rejected Alap-
pat’s claims, which covered a process known as a “rasterizer,” devel-
oped for controlling the illumination of pixels on a computer screen to 
minimize discontinuity and jaggedness.349 The PTO concluded that the 
applicant's claims were broad “process” claims that stated a math-
ematical algorithm for pixel control, and would preempt it.350 In an
opinion by Judge Rich, the author of Iwahashi and the court's leading 
advocate of an expansive approach to computer program patentability,
a majority of the Federal Circuit reversed. Citing Iwahashi, the court 
held that even though the claims were in process form, the application
“unquestionably” claimed a machine because it referred to circuitry
elements.351  Regarding the objection that those elements—used for 
performing mathematical calculations—would be present in any
general purpose computing system, the court observed that “a general 
purpose computer in effect becomes a special purpose computer once it 
is programmed to perform particular functions pursuant to instructions 
from program software.”352 In effect, then, Alappat establishes that a 
mathematical algorithm becomes patentable subject matter merely by
virtue of its being programmed into a general purpose computer.
The Alappat court paid lip service to the concerns about preemp-
tion of the “laws of nature” and “abstract ideas” stated by the Supreme 
Court in Benson and Diehr,353 but went on to reach a result that
ignored those concerns entirely.  The Federal Circuit's first significant
post-Alappat  decisions, In  re  Warmerdam354  and   In  re Lowry,355
347 Id. at 1541.
348 Id. at 1540-41. 
349 See id. at 1537-39. 
350 See id at 1539-40. 
351 See id. at 1541, 1543-44. 
352 See id. at 1545. Of course, that is nonsense. As the dissent explained, “[w1hether or 
not subject matter is a ‘new machine’ within ' 101 is precisely the same question as whether or 
not the subject matter satisfies the ' 101 analysisY. [A] player piano playing Chopin's scales 
does not become a 'new machine' when it spins a roll to play Brahms’ lullaby.” Id. at 1566-67
(Archer, CJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
353 See id. at 1542-45. 
354  33 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
355  32 F.3d 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
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illustrate just how facile the court's conception of the “otherwise stat-
utory apparatus” requirement has become. The court rejected the
claims in the Warmerdam patent that were drafted as process claims, 
on the ground that they recited no more than a mathematical al-
gorithm,356 but allowed the claims that were drafted to recite “a
machine having a memory which contains data…generated by” the
same algorithm described in the process claims.357 Together with
Alappat, Warmerdam teaches that if otherwise unpatentable computer
program-related claims are drafted in specific apparatus form, the
mathematical algorithm limitation will simply disappear.358
Lowry involved claims for a method of storing and managing data 
in a computer memory. The PTO had rejected the claims under the
“printed matter” doctrine, on the ground that the claims merely recited
the arrangement of data and did not define a new functional
relationship between the data and the computer memory that served as 
the substrate.359 The Federal Circuit held that “[t]he printed matter 
cases have no factual relevance where ‘the invention as defined by the 
claims requires that the information be processed not by the mind but 
by a machine, the computer.’ ”360 The court reasoned that electroni-
cally specified data hierarchies “impart a physical organization on the 
information stored in the memory.”361 Technically, the “printed mat-
ter” rejection was based on section 103 of the Patent Act, which re-
quires that an invention be nonobvious, and not on section 101.362 (As 
to section 101, the PTO found, and the court agreed without dis-
cussion, that a computer memory was a statutory “article of manufac-
ture.”363)  However, a section 103 “printed matter” rejection bears
close affinity to a “mental steps” rejection under section 101. In both 
cases, the objection to patentability is that the claimed invention does 
not  contribute  to  the  “useful arts,”  but  simply  restates  human thought
356 Warmerdam, 33 F.3d at 1358-60. 
357 Id. at 1360-61. 
358 But see In re Trovato, 42 F.3d 1376, 1382-83 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (rejecting computer 
program-related claims drafted in apparatus form where the claims merely recited a series of 
means that were Asimply software instructions” and did not disclose “a specific hardware 
embodiment@). The lesson of Trovato, apparently, is that maintaining the fiction of Aspecific
hardware@ is all-important.
359 Lowry, 32 F.3d at 1582-83. 
360 Id. at 1583 (quoting In re Bernhart, 417 F.2d 1395, 1399 (C.C.P.A. 1969)).
361 Id.
362 Id. at 1582; see 35 U.S.C. ' 103. 
363 Lowry, 32 F.3d at 1582; see 35 U.S.C. ' 101. 
1161
processes.364 In the context of computer program-related inventions, 
the question in both cases is whether the program steps merely mimic 
those processes. The Federal Circuit’s decision categorically rejects
any such implication. After Lowry, an algorithm for data arrangement,
expressed digitally, is patentable as long as (per Warmerdam) a
memory device is specified.
The Atari court did not subject the issued 10NES patent to the 
then-applicable Freeman-Walter-Abele test. Had it done so, the out-
come is a foregone conclusion, and affords yet another illustration of
just how nominal the physical limitation required under Freeman-Wal-
ter-Abele (and Alappat) need be to satisfy current standards for statu-
tory subject matter. Each of the 10NES claims, in essence, recites a 
mathematical algorithm for the synchronous generation of initial
numbers, followed by mathematical comparison of the results of arith-
metic operations performed on those numbers. The first claim recites 
the following physical limitations: “a main data processor unit for exe-
cuting a videographics software program” (a video game console); “a
main data processor unit for storing the videographics software pro-
gram” (a video game cartridge); “a first authenticating processor de-
vice”; “a second authenticating processor device”; and a reset
switch.365 The description of the inventor's preferred embodiment
makes clear that the first and second “authenticating processor de-
vices” are microprocessors, or computer chips.366 Just as it is “difficult 
to  imagine”  any  complex system  for pattern recognition  that  does  not
364 See Lowry, 32 F.3d at 1582-83, Samuelson, Benson Revisited, supra note 3, at 1033-
41, 1106-07 (describing the Amental steps@ doctrine and the CCPA’s eventual repudiation of it 
as a tool for evaluating computer program-related claims).
365  In full the first claim of the IONES patent reads as follows:
A system for determining whether a videographics software program is authorized 
for use in an information processing apparatus, comprising: 
a main data processor unit for executing a videographics software program;
an external memory for storing the videographics software program and for re-
movable connection to said main processor unit, said external memory and main 
processor unit together constituting the information processing apparatus for executing the 
videographics software program; 
a first authenticating processor device associated with said external memory for 
executing a first predetermined authenticating program to determine the authenticity of 
said external memory; 
a second authenticating processor device which is installed in said main data 
processor unit for executing a second predetermined authenticating program to determine
the authenticity of said external memory; and
control means for resetting said main data processor unit unless the execution of said 
first authenticating program by said first processor device exhibits a predetermined 
relationship to the execution of said second authenticating program by said second 
processor device. 
U.S. Patent No. 4,799,635, col. 11, ll. 8-33 (1989). 
366  U.S. Patent No. 4,799,635, col. 11, ll. 44-55 (1989). 
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incorporate a ROM,367 it is difficult to imagine any computerized lock-
and-key system for use with a video game cartridge and machine that 
does not incorporate microprocessors. In any event, the patent provides 
for that eventuality; the specification discusses adaptations of the lock-
and-key system for floppy disks and magnetic cards, and the claims 
cover use of the invention with both digital and analog processing
devices.368
In sum, there is no question that based on the then-applicable
standard for patentability, the 10NES patent reads on statutory subject
matter. Under Alappat, of course, the patent claims an apparatus
because it incorporates general purpose computing equipment. Alap-
pat, Warmerdam, and Lowry signal a new era for computer program-
related patents, in which anything, or virtually anything, goes.369  It is 
difficult to imagine a claim that would not pass muster under the
367  Stern, supra note 16, at 382.
368  U.S. Patent No. 4,799,635, col. 11, ll. 37-50 (1989).
369  After opposing the applications in all three cases, the PTO recently withdrew its oppo-
sition to an application that claimed a computer program embodied in a floppy disk. In re
Beauregard, 53 F.3d 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Shortly thereafter, it proposed new guidelines for 
the examination of computer program-related patent applications. See 60 Fed. Reg. 28,778 
(June 2, 1995). In essence, the proposed guidelines restate the holdings of Alappat (as to 
apparatus), Lowry (as to computer memory devices), and Arrhythmia (as to Aotherwise
statutory@ processes). They recite:
(i) A computer or other programmable apparatus whose actions are directed by a
computer program or other form of Asoftware@ is a statutory @machine.@
(ii) A computer-readable memory [defined to include compact discs and floppy 
disks] that can be used to direct a computer to function in a particular manner when 
used by the computer is a statutory Aarticle of manufacture.@
(iii) A series of specific operational steps to be performed on or with the aid of a 
computer is a statutory Aprocess.@
Id. at 28,778-79 (endnote omitted); see id. at 28,780 (endnote defining computer-readable
memory to include compact discs and floppy disks). The proposed guidelines exclude data 
structures “independent of any physical element,@ id. at 28,779, but this limitation is less a 
restriction on patentability than a reminder of the importance of proper claim drafting. Also 
excluded are Aprocess[es] that do [ ] nothing more than manipulate abstract ideas or 
concepts….” Id. In light of Arrhythmia's holding that the manipulation of ECG signals 
corresponded to physical steps, however, this language excludes only the most facially abstract 
claims. See supra text accompanying notes 341-45. Moreover, the proposed guidelines make 
clear that even an algorithm for manipulating abstract concepts may be saved by the recitation 
of Acomputer implemented steps.” 60 Fed. Reg. at 28,780. The PTO cautions that in some 
cases “a claim classified as a statutory machine or article of manufacture may define 
nonstatutory subject matter,” but notes that these situations will be “rare.” Id at 28,779.) In 
short, the proposed guidelines, like the Federal Circuit case law that they follow, fail to provide 
a meaningful rule for excluding nonstatutory claims.
It is worth noting that the PTO views its actions as a response to Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Bor-
land Int'l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995), and other recent cases (discussed in Part III, supra)
that have restricted the scope of copyright protection for computer programs. SeeJames Evans, 
Patent Office Works on New Rules for Software Protection, S.F. DAILY J., April 6, 1995, at 6 
(“ ‘We are focused on how best to serve our customers, and our customers are sending us the 
message that they need more protection for compute r-related inventions.’ ” (quoting PTO 
solicitor Nancy Linck)). Current PTO Commissioner Bruce Lehman, a former lawyer and
lobbyist for Lotus, is presumably well-acquainted with the issues raised in the Borland
litigation. See Teresa Riordan, Controversial Pick for Patent Chief: Clinton's Selection Called 
‘Political Debt,’ S.F. CHRON., May 8,1993, at A16. Nonetheless, the scope of copyright 
protection for computer programs is not within the PTO's purview, and the trend toward Athin@
copyright protection for nonliteral program aspects cannot, standing alone, constitute 
justification for changes in the PTO's position on the proper patent treatment of computer 
programs. Nor may the PTO interpret the patent laws solely to satisfy its Acustomers.@
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“nominal hardware” standard.370  However, there is something terribly
wrong with a system of decisionmaking that routinely produces exactly 
the result it claims to prohibit—the result that its highest court has
stated would vitiate the purpose of the patent regime. Unfortunately,
alternative proposed frameworks for assessing whether computer
program-related inventions constitute statutory subject matter are
equally unpromising.
2. Rethinking the Mathematical Algorithm Bar
One proposed solution, of course, is to abandon the mathematical 
algorithm bar altogether on the ground that a mathematical algorithm
in digital form constitutes a process like any other, and so is statutory 
subject matter under the literal language of the Patent Act.   Along with 
Judge Rich of the Federal Circuit, Professor Chisum has long been a 
leading advocate of this approach.371   In effect, Arrhythmia, Alappat, 
Warmerdam, and Lowry reach this result, while giving only the barest 
nod to the Supreme Court's clear intent to preserve some limitations on 
patentability.   Certainly, classifying all computer programs as
statutory subject matter eligible for patent protection would greatly
simplify the process of evaluating computer program-related patent
applications.   However, abandoning the rule against preemption of
mathematical  formulae would violate the fundamental requirement
that  patents  be granted only for the  application of scientific
principles, not for their development—that is, not for equations, cal-
culations, or formulations of natural laws.372   The resulting ease of ad-
ministration  would  come at too great  a social cost;  ultimately,  it  would
370  Stern, supra note 16, at 392-93. The patent bar has been quick to respond to the Fed-
eral Circuit's move away from Benson and Flook. See, e.g., David S. Benyacar, Mathematical
Algorithm Patentability: Understanding the Confusion, 19 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 
129, 196-97 (1993) (offering a primer on claim drafting to satisfy the standards set forth in 
Iwahashi and Arrhythmia).
371  Chisum, supra note 16, at 1009-10. 
372 See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (“instein could not patent his 
celebrated law that E=mc2; nor could Newton have patented the law of gravity. Such 
discoveries are 'manifestations of Y nature, free to all men and reserved exclusively to none.’ ” 
 (quoting Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127,130 (1948))); Mackay 
Radio & Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 306 U.S. 86, 94 (1939).
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frustrate the patent system’s constitutionally mandated goal of induc-
ing progress in the useful arts.
If mathematical algorithms are statutory subject matter, patents
may issue for computer programs that simply execute complex calcu-
lations and are not tied to any “industrial” process. It may be argued 
that a computer program is not a mathematical formula at all, but an
improved process for executing one.373 In the digital age, however, a 
rule premised on a distinction between mathematics and process is
facile. Complex physical and mathematical discoveries, such as
Mandelbrot's theory of fractals or Lorenz' theory of chaos, often see 
their first and only expression in digital form. To perform the required
calculations by hand would take decades, even centuries. The
distinction between silicon and paper is too slim a reed on which to 
hang satisfaction of the statutory subject matter requirement.374
The requirement that mathematical formulae be excluded from
patentability, moreover, is of constitutional stature. The Constitution
authorizes Congress to grant “inventors” the exclusive right to their
“discoveries” in order “[t]o promote the [p]rogress of…the useful
[a]rts. 375 Granting exclusive rights to mathematical formulae merely
because they have been expressed in digital form would have the op-
posite effect. That fundamental mathematical, chemical, and physical
principles may be termed “discoveries” is of no moment.376 A crucial 
premise of the patent system is that such principles remain in the pub-
lic domain for future inventors to use.377 Thus, the patent laws may
protect novel and useful applications of those principles, but not the 
373 See Chisum, supra note 16, at 1006.
374 The argument that computerized algorithms are merely expressions that “approximate” 
laws of nature, see Donner & Beckers, supra note 319, is unpersuasive, for it begs the question 
how such laws may ever be expressed Aexactly@ by humans.
375  U.S. CONST . art. 1, ' 8, cl. 8.
376 See In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526,1551 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (Archer, C.J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part) (quoting GEORGE CURTIS , A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENT'S
FOR USEFUL INVFNTIONS xxiii-xxv (4th ed. 1873)): 
In this inquiry it is necessary to commence with the process of exclusion; for although, in 
their widest acceptation, the terms Ainvention” and Adiscovery@ include the whole vast 
variety of objects on which the human intellect may be exercised, so that in poetry, in 
painting, in music, in astronomy, in metaphysics, and in every department of human 
thought, men constantly invent or discover, in the highest and the strictest sense, their 
inventions and discoveries in these departments are not the subject of the patent law. 
See also Samuelson, Benson Revisited, supra note 3, at 1112 (noting that A'discoveries…in
nontechnological arts, such as—theoretical mathematicsY are not patentable’ ” (quoting I 
CHISUM, supra note 310, ' 1.01)).
377 See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1966): 
The Congress in the exercise of the patent power may not overreach the restraints 
imposed by the stated constitutional purpose. Nor may it enlarge the patent monopoly 
without regard to the innovation, advancement or social benefit gained thereby. More-
over, Congress may not authorize the issuance of patents whose effects are to remove 
existent knowledge from the public domain…. Innovation, advancement, and things 
which add to the sum of useful knowledge are inherent requisites in a patent system 
which by constitutional command must Apromote the Progress of…useful Arts.@ This is 
the standard expressed in the Constitution and it may not be ignored.
See also Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980); Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 
How.) 156, 175 (1853). Thus, the applied science requirement for patent protection is 
analogous to the idea-expression distinction in copyright law, and serves the same purpose. See
Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346-47 (1991).
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principles themselves. If a mathematical discovery expressed digitally
is transmuted into a patentable process, more and more formerly un-
patentable discoveries will be removed from the public domain for the 
statutory seventeen-year term. According patent protection to com-
puterized mathematical algorithms in this indiscriminate fashion would
vitiate the terms of the constitutional grant.
The  world  would  be  a  very different place  if  Einstein  had  re-
ceived a patent on his discovery that e = mc2, or if  Millikan  or 
Schrödinger had patented their pathbreaking work in electromagnetism 
and particle physics, or if any of them had been required to license the 
principles they used along the way.378   The truly patentable inventions 
that these pioneering discoveries enabled might never have occurred, 
and certainly would have occurred more slowly, if those discoveries 
had not been freely available.379   Under a regime that makes
distinctions between mathematical formulae based on the mode in
which they are expressed, the future of research and development in
this country may strongly resemble that world.  While a robust public 
sector might still preserve a core of public domain science, ours may 
not be up to that task.    Even  nominally  public  research  is  increasingly
378  Erwin Schrödinger developed a wave equation for describing quantum mechanics and 
solving for Acharacteristics of atomic behavior.@ See DANIEL J. KEVLES, THE PHYSICISTS:THE
HISTORY OF A SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY IN M ODERN AMERICA 164 (1977). Robert Millikan de-
vised a method for measuring the precise charge of the electron. Id. at 89-90. 
379  Professor Chisum argues that A[t]here is every reason to believe that algorithm patents 
will be extensively licensed at reasonable royalty rates.@ Chisum, supra note 16, at 1017. In the 
context of closed proprietary computer systems such as the NES, that conclusion seems 
dubious. But even assuming that a license is offered, the cost to small software development 
companies (such as Accolade), especially those needing to license technology under more than 
one patent, may be prohibitive. See Garfinkel, supra note 314, at 106. The implications for the 
increasingly cash-strapped public sector, which includes many university research programs, 
are even worse. A university can license its own patents to fund its licenses of someone else's 
patents. The result, however, will be universities that Abehav[e] more and more like 
corporations,@ Reichman, supra note 77, at 718, and an atmosphere that Adivert[s] attention 
away from the teaching function and retard[s] the free and open exchange of knowledge that is 
a tenet of scientific progress,@ id. at 719.
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privatized; joint ventures, faculty consultancies, and technology trans-
fer agreements abound.380 The Balkanization of scientific knowledge
into competing accretions of proprietary rights will greatly weaken ex-
isting incentives to inventors.381
But to except only mathematical algorithms and their equivalents, 
such as the formal expression of a chemical reaction, from section
101's ambit is to return to the original problem: how to distinguish
those computer program-related inventions that are “no more than”
mathematical algorithms from those that are properly within the useful 
arts. The rejection of Professor Chisum's solution only underscores that 
dilemma.
3. An “Information Processing” Exclusion
Professor Samuelson’s proposed solution to the problem of when 
to treat computer program-related inventions as statutory subject
matter is the opposite of Professor Chisum’s. She argues that both the 
mathematical algorithm and mental process doctrines are directed at
“information processing,” rather than at the “industrial arts,” and ac-
cordingly proposes excluding information processing-related develop-
ments—including, it would appear, all computer programs—from the 
ambit of the Patent Act.382
An “information processing” limitation on patentability is prob-
lematic for two reasons. First, some information processing develop-
ments, such as pioneering advances in data compression technology or 
color reproduction, are true, qualitative departures from the prior art.383
Denying  patent protection to those inventions would weaken
incentives  for  development, and so would err too greatly on the side 
of  underprotection,  confirming   the   fears   of   Judge  Rich,   Professor
380  Reichman, supra note 77, at 708-10; supra text accompanying notes 144-45. 
381  Reichman, supra note 77, at 719. Professor Reichman suggests that patent and trade 
secret protection for computer programs may end cooperative Aacademic@ research as we know 
it. Id. at 715. Professor Chisum observes that the judicially developed Aexperimental use@ ex-
ception to patent infringement may be expanded to protect research uses of algorithm patents. 
Chisum, supra note 16, at 1017-19. However, he admits that the exception may not apply to 
Aresearch usage that has an ultimate commercial objective.@ Id. at 1018. It is unclear whether 
that would include research conducted pursuant to a university-sponsored joint venture or tech-
nology transfer program.
382  Samuelson, Benson Revisited, supra note 3, at 1148-49. Samuelson does not argue 
that computer program-related developments should go completely unprotected, but advocates 
adoption of a sui generis system for protecting and encouraging such innovation. See id. at
1148-53; Samuelson et al., Manifesto, supra note 19, at 2406-13. 
383 See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 4,500,919 (Schreiber, assigned to Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology); U.S. Patent No. 5,126,739 (Whiting, assigned to Stac Electronics).
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Chisum, and others who maintain that restricting the patentability of
computer program-related inventions will bring about the demise of
the patent system as we know it.384 Computer technology is, broadly 
speaking, a “useful art,”385  and innovations of appropriate stature
should be rewarded, and thereby encouraged, to the same degree as 
innovations in other fields. Whether the balance of incentives that
results from the current overinclusive approach to all computer
program-related developments is a healthy one is a separate
question.386
Second, and ultimately far more important, to the extent that an
“information processing” exclusion would preclude protection for all
computer programs, it would shortly render the patent system obsolete.
As the flood of software patents issued in recent years demonstrates,
industrial processes of all sorts are increasingly computerized.387 Once 
the commands required to execute such processes are expressed
digitally, each such process has a built-in “information processing”
component. If inventions are to be considered “as a whole,” as
Freeman-Walter-Abele and Alappat require,388 then no patents may be 
issued for any of those inventions. And if inventions are not to be
considered as whole, how are we to determine which computer
program-related inventions are not properly considered information
processing devices? The question whether a claimed invention reads
on an information processing device merely restates the question
whether the claims recite, in essence, no more than a mathematical
algorithm, and brings us no closer to answering it. In short, Professor 
Samuelson's answer to Professor Chisum takes us out of the frying pan 
and into the fire. While under Professor Chisum's solution to the
mathematical algorithm dilemma the patent system would consume the 
public domain, under Professor Samuelson's the public domain (or a 
sui generis scheme of quasi-patent protection for information
processing inventions) would consume the patent system. 
384 In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526,1542-45 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (Rich, J.); Chisum, supra note 
16.
385  U.S. CONST . art. I, ' 8, cl. 8. 
386  Professor Oddi, for example, has argued that the most important function of the patent 
system is the inducement of Arevolutionary-type@ inventions, and that the market may play a 
greater role in inducing other types of inventions. Oddi, supra note 16, at 375-78 (discussing 
the taxonomy of inventions developed in F.M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND 
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 444-54 (2d ed. 1980)).
387  Garfinkel, supra note 314, at 106, Soma & Smith, supra note 314, at 419-21.
388 Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1543; In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902, 907 (C.C.P.A. 1992).
1168
4. Claim Construction and the Particularity Requirement
Since Iwahashi, some commentators have suggested that the de-
bate over when computer programs constitute statutory subject matter
under section 101 is better understood, and more precisely resolved, as 
a debate over the particularity requirement imposed by section 112 of 
the Patent Act.389 Among other things, section 112 requires that the 
patent describe with particularity—and thereby limit—the claimed
invention.390 Adherents of the section 112 approach argue that the
particularity requirement serves as a built-in safeguard against
preemption of a particular formula, equation, or sequence of digital
steps.391
The security afforded against algorithm preemption by section 112 
is illusory, because, as demonstrated above, there is no assurance that 
the limitation proposed by the inventor and accepted by the PTO will 
be a meaningful one, and no guarantee for applicants that rejections for 
lack of particularity will be made in a consistent manner. Iwahashi,
Arrhythmia, Alappat, Warmerdam, Lowry, and Atari all involved very 
particularized, precise claims. In none was overbreadth a function of
vagueness; instead, it arose from the attempt to cast items of general 
purpose computing equipment as meaningful physical limitations. The 
inescapable conclusion is that while section 112 prevents the patentee 
from precluding all uses of a formula claimed as part of an invention, it 
does not prevent it from precluding all meaningful or practicable
uses.392 Thus, the particularity requirement cannot solve the statutory
subject matter problem.
B. POINT OF NOVELTY RECONCEIVED:
THE INNOVATIVE PROGRAMMER STANDARD
The absence of a principled basis under section 101 of the Patent 
Act for separating statutory inventions from claimed inventions that
are “no more than” nonstatutory mathematical algorithms is disturbing.
However, the intense focus on statutory subject matter ignores the
existence of other statutory requirements for patentability. In
particular,   the  requirements   set  forth in sections  102  and  103  of  the
389  35 U.S.C. ' 112 (1988); see, e.g., Charles E. Bruzga, The Benson Court's Approach to 
Computer SoftwareCor OtherCPatent Claims Reciting a Mathematical Algorithm, 74 J. PAT.
& TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 135 (1992). 
390  35 U.S.C. ' 112. 
391   Bruzga, supra note 389, at 142.
392 See Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1564 (Archer, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(AWhat is going on here is a charade.@).
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Patent Act, that a claimed invention be novel and nonobvious to those 
ordinarily skilled in the field,393 may be used to accomplish what the 
statutory subject matter inquiry cannot achieve: a rule that permits
analytic dissection of claims into statutory and nonstatutory elements
for purposes of identifying which computer program-related inventions
are patentable.
Intuitively, the most troubling aspect of many computer program-
related patents is that they appear to reward the inventor for recogniz-
ing the obvious—that a given function may be performed more effi-
ciently or more accurately if computerized—and using general purpose 
computer equipment and standard programming techniques to
computerize it. Other computer program-related patents simply reward
the programmer for developing otherwise unpatentable mathematical
formulas. In that sense, the objections to the lwahashi, Arrhythmia, and
Alappat patents, like the objection to the Lowry patent, are really based
on obviousness and lack of novelty. In each case, the new and
nonobvious element was not the physical apparatus, which was well-
known and widely used, but rather the otherwise unpatentable
mathematical algorithm developed to analyze the data and compute the
desired output.394
In response to Iwahashi, Richard Stern, former chief of the De-
partment of Justice's Intellectual Property Section, proposed recon-
ceiving the standard for nonobviousness for computer programrelated
inventions. His solution, which may be termed the “innovative
programmer” standard, adds a third step to the Freeman-Walter-Abele
test. If a claimed invention recites a mathematical algorithm, but
appears to be statutory subject matter when taken as a whole, the
examiner must ask whether the claimed invention would have been
obvious to “a person of ordinary skill…who: (a) knew the particular 
algorithm; (b) desired to accomplish the function or task to be per-
formed; and (c) desired to do so with the aid of a computer….”395 If 
not, it is nonobvious, and so patentable. By taking general purpose 
computer equipment and the mathematical algorithm as part of the
prior art for purposes of assessing nonobviousness, the innovative
programmer standard is intended to avoid the pitfalls described in Part 
IV.A, above.
393 See 35 U.S.C. '' 102, 103.
394 See supra text accompanying notes 335-52.
395  Stern, supra note 16, at 395
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The innovative programmer standard is similar to an approach
known as the “point of novelty” test, which has been disfavored by the 
courts. That treatment was ill-considered. The point of novelty test
offered a logically and doctrinally viable method for assessing the pat-
entability of computer program-related inventions. The innovative
programmer standard improves upon it, by tailoring the test to the
unique nature of computer software.
The point of novelty approach first surfaced in the early days of 
computer programming. As set forth in In re Abrams,396 it involved 
analytic dissection of the claimed invention to determine whether its
novelty resided in its physical elements or in “one or more of the so-
called mental steps.397 However, the court then confused the section
102 requirement of novelty with the section 101 requirement of statu-
tory subject matter. It held that if the novelty of the claimed invention
resided in “mental steps,” the claimed invention was not statutory
subject matter.398  In Application of Musgrave 399 Judge Rich rejected 
the Abrams approach as based on a logical fallacy. He reasoned:
[I]f [Abrams] were the law, a given process…could be statutory during 
the infancy of the field of technology to which it pertained, when the 
physical steps were new, and non-statutory at some later time after the 
physical steps became old, acquiring prior art status, which would be an 
absurd result. Logically, the identical process cannot be first within and 
later without the categories of statutory subject matter, depending on 
such extraneous factors.400
The Musgrave court concluded that because an invention cannot be 
considered statutory subject matter only at certain points in time, each 
claimed invention must be assessed as a whole for purposes of the 
inquiry required by section 101.401
Eight years after its rejection by the CCPA, the Abrams point of 
novelty analysis resurfaced in the Supreme Court's opinion in Parker v. 
Flook.402 Without citing either Abrams or Musgrave, the Court ob-
served that “the proper analysis for this case” was that “[t]he process 
itself,  not  merely  the  mathematical  algorithm,  must  be new and useful.
396  188 F.2d 165 (C.C.P.A. 1951).
397 Id. at 166.
398 Id.
399  431 F.2d 882 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
400 Id. at 889.
401 Id. at 889-90. That remains the rule under Freeman-Walter-Abele. See, e.g., In re 
Abele, 684 F.2d 902, 907 (A 'In the final analysis under ' 101, the claimed invention, as a 
whole, must be evaluated for what it is.'@  (quoting In re Sarkar, 588 F.2d 1330, 1333 
(C.C.P.A. 1978))).
402  437 U.S. 584 (1978).
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Indeed the novelty of the mathematical algorithm is not a determining
factor at all…. [I]t is treated as though it were a familiar part of the 
prior art.”403 The Court then went on to duplicate the fallacy of
Abrams, however. It ruled that if the novelty of the claimed invention 
resided in the mathematical algorithm, then the claimed process could 
not constitute statutory subject matter under section 101.404 In fact, 
properly stated, the ill-fated Abrams/Flook test for patentable subject 
matter turns entirely upon a novelty and nonobviousness analysis. A
slight reformulation of the test avoids Judge Rich's objection: A
claimed invention that, taken as a whole, is (or may be) statutory sub-
ject matter is nonetheless unpatentable if its novelty and nonobvious-
ness inheres in its nonstatutory elements. This reformulated test is
similar to the innovative programmer standard proposed by Stern in
that both would require the examiner to separate the mathematical
algorithm from the other elements of the claimed invention when
conducting the separate inquiry into novelty and nonobviousness.405
In Diamond v. Diehr,406 the Court recognized its error of logic. 
Adopting the CCPA rule, it held unambiguously that “ ‘novelty’…is of 
no relevance in determining whether the subject matter of a claim falls 
within the § 101 categories of possibly patentable subject matter,” and 
that the claim “must be considered as a whole” for that determi-
nation.407 After Diehr, then, it is undisputed that a claimed invention
may not be dissected into its component parts for purposes of the stat-
utory subject matter inquiry. However, the Court also rejected the
Flook point of novelty analysis on independent grounds. It opined that 
a rule requiring that mathematical algorithms be considered part of the 
prior art “would, if carried to its extreme, make all inventions
unpatentable because all inventions can be reduced to underlying
principles  of  nature  which,  once  known,  make   their   implementation
403 Id. at 591-92. 
404 Id. at 594. This reasoning was sharply criticized by the CCPA, thinly disguised as a 
criticism of the brief of the party that suggested it. In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 962-63
(C.C.P.A.), vacated sub nom. Diamond v. Bergy, 444 U.S. 1028 (1980); see also David A. 
Blumenthal & Bruce D. Riter, Statutory or Nonstatutory?: An Analysis of the Patentability of 
Computer Related Inventions, 62 J. PAT . & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 454, 484-87 (1980) 
(criticizing confusion of section 101 and section 103 requirements in Flook).
405 Cf. Alan P. Klein, Reinventing the Examination Process for Patent Applications 
Covering Software-Related Inventions, 13 JOHN M ARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 231 
(1995) (proposing that new mathematical algorithms be deemed abandoned into the prior art 
under ' 102(c) because they cannot be claimed separately as inventions in their own right).
406  450 U.S. 175 (1981).
407 Id. at 188-89. 
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obvious.”408 Although this analysis has received some critical sup-
port,409 it is in its own way as ill-considered as Flook’s confusion re-
garding section 101. 
As Professor Burk has noted, the Diehr Court's reasoning has its 
roots in Justice Frankfurter's concurrence in Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. 
Kalo Inoculant Co.410 The Funk Bros. Court disallowed a patent for a 
mixed culture of naturally occurring bacteria on the ground that it
claimed a preexisting phenomenon of nature411; Justice Frankfurter
objected that a “ ‘laws of nature’” rationale “could fairly be employed 
to challenge almost every patent.”412  The Diehr Court was also
influenced by its recent decision in Diamond v. Chakrabarty,413 which
established the patentability of laboratory-grown bacteria. Together,
Chakrabarly and Diehr might be read to establish that the touchstone 
for patentability must be the simple test of whether the claimed inven-
tion is “manmade,” and that the invention must be evaluated as a
whole for all purposes. In fact, there is no logical reason that analytic 
dissection may not be employed during the inquiry into novelty and
nonobviousness required under sections 102 and 103 of the Patent Act. 
To the contrary, such an analytic approach is a necessary part of the 
process of evaluating any claimed invention against existing prior art. 
The real question, dismissed in Diehr with a reference to “extreme[s],”
is whether the patent laws forbid examiners and courts from dissecting 
out newly discovered scientific and mathematical principles. Because, 
as I have discussed, the patent laws cannot reward new and nonobvious 
advances in mathematics, the answer must be yes.414  
Given the difficulties that attend any effort to separate unpatentable
principles from their patentable applications, the Court's “slippery
slope” argument is  unpersuasive.   As the “otherwise statutory process 
or apparatus” rule developed in Freeman-Walter-Abele illustrates,415
a   rule  requiring  isolation  and  exclusion  of  unpatentable elements 
is not  the   only  approach  to  patentability   that   poses   a   danger   of
408 Id. at 188 n.12.
409 See Dan L. Burk, Biotechnology and Patent Law: Fitting Innovation to the 
Procrustean Bed, 17 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 1, 26-33 (1991). 
410  333 U.S. 127 (1948); see Burk, supra note 409, at 27.
411  333 U.S. at 129-32. 
412 Id at 135 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
413  447 U.S. 303 (1980); see Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 181-82 (1981) (citing 
Chakrabarty).
414 See 35 U.S.C. ' 101; 1 CHISUM, supra note 310, ' 4.02 (1994); supra part IV.A.2.
415 See supra part IV.A.1.
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overbreadth. When carried to its extreme, as it has been by the Federal
Circuit, the “otherwise statutory” rule can be applied to render any
process that contains computer components patentable. Arguably, the 
danger of reduction to “phenomena of nature” is particularly acute in
the case of biological inventions, which may too frequently be viewed 
as black boxes that produce results based on their (naturally
determined) biochemical properties, even when those results did not
formerly exist in nature.416 Even so, however, generalizing that danger 
to all inventions is unwarranted. Although it is certainly possible to 
analyze computer program-related inventions in a way that reduces
them to bedrock principles of conductivity and electromagnetism,
computer programs as a class, unlike bacteria or proteins, do not exist 
in nature in any form. Rather, they are a wholly human-made class of 
articles that employ mathematical principles to accomplish results.
Thus, although in the abstract the boundary between mathematical
principle and application defies precise articulation,417 it should be
possible to separate the two in particular cases.
Ironically, Diehr is a case in point. The mathematical equation used 
in the rubber-curing process at issue in Diehr was the well-known
Arrhenius equation.418 The fact that the mathematical formula was “a 
familiar part of the prior art”419 did not preclude the Court from finding
the claimed application of the formula to be new and nonobvious, even 
as it rejected that test. Of course, isolating the mathematical formula 
component of a claim is not always so easy; if it were, the controversy 
over computer program-related patents would not exist. The advantage 
of a point of novelty approach over the “otherwise statutory process or 
apparatus” formulation developed in Freeman-Walter-Abele is that, 
unfettered by section 101's requirement that the claimed invention be 
taken as a whole, it allows courts and examiners to dissect principles 
and mathematical proofs, which are not patentable, from their
applications, which may be, and determine where the inventive act lies 
and whether it is the kind of inventive act the patent system can
reward.
416  Professor Burk=s support for Diehr=s rejection of Flook is based on this reasoning.
Burk, supra note 409, at 26-33, 42-43.
417  For one view on where that boundary lies, see Irah H. Donner, Two Decades of Gott-
schalk v. Benson: Putting the “Rithm@ Back Into the Patenting of Mathematical Algorithms, 5
SOFTWARE L.J. 418, 448-59 (1992). But see Newell, supra note 315, at 1024-38 (arguing that 
in computer science, no such boundary exists).
418  Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 177 (1981). See supra text accompanying note 327.
419  Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 592 (1978).
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The innovative programmer standard differs from the reformulated
Abrams/Flook test, however, in that it adds general purpose computing 
equipment to the list of givens.420 As the analysis in Part IV.A
demonstrates, that recommendation is sound and its adoption long
overdue. A mathematical principle expressed digitally, though not
patentable, may be new; general purpose computing equipment is not 
even that. We are fast approaching an era in which any industrial
function can be directed by a general purpose computer with the ap-
propriate software. As with any other useful art, the patent laws should 
reward only genuinely new and nonobvious advances in the
application of computer technology, not the comparatively mundane, 
though complex, process of adapting a general purpose computer to a 
particular use with existing programming techniques.
In light of Diehr and the Federal Circuit's aggressive stance on
software patentability, it is perhaps not surprising that the innovative 
programmer standard has drawn little response. For those who believe
that any mathematical algorithm expressed digitally is a patentable
process—or, with a “nominal hardware” or memory limitation, a
patentable apparatus or article of manufacture—a standard designed to 
narrow the rule and close the floodgates will not constitute much of an 
improvement. However, the innovative programmer standard should
satisfy those who concede that computerized mathematical formulae
are unpatentable, but worry that there is no reliable means of
identifying which claimed inventions fall into that category. The stan-
dard offers a doctrinally sound basis for dissecting out those elements 
of a claimed invention that alone cannot properly be considered pat-
entable, either because they are public domain building blocks avail-
able to all, or because the idea of using them would be obvious to 
anyone conversant with computers. Decisions about whether the in-
vention is sufficiently novel and nonobvious to qualify for patentability
can then be made based on what the dissection reveals.
Under the innovative programmer standard, the patents at issue in 
Iwahashi, Arrhythmia, Alappat, Warmerdam, Lowry, and Atari might
never have been granted. Atari is illustrative. Take away the two
microprocessors and the reset switch that constitute the “nominal
hardware” and all that remains is a specification for a series of mathe-
matical functions. Take those functions as part of the prior art and all 
that  remains  is  the relatively mundane  task  of  assembling  the  physical 
420  Stern, supra note 16, at 395.
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building blocks of the lock-and-key system. The question the examiner
should have asked was whether the combination of those physical
elements would have been obvious to any ordinarily skilled program-
mer who wished to devise an effective lock-out device.421  Because I 
am not an ordinarily skilled programmer, I do not attempt to answer 
that question. Instead, the next section examines the remaining factors
that would bear on whether the examiner reached the correct answer.
C. INSTITUTIONAL COMPETENCE
Developing a workable and doctrinally sound approach to assess-
ing the patentability of computer program-related inventions is only
half the battle. Because decisions on patentability are inherently fact
specific, the technical competence of the decisionmaker—the PTO—is
critical in determining whether the rules governing patentability will be 
applied correctly. Technical competence alone cannot cure the lack of 
a coherent standard, but it can significantly narrow the margin of error 
and reduce the number of erroneously granted patents. In the years 
since Diehr opened the floodgates to computer program-related claims, 
the PTO has failed in that respect because it lacked both the personnel 
and the resources to evaluate such claims for technical merit and to 
make informed judgments regarding nonobviousness. In response to
the howls of criticism that followed the issuance of a patent covering a 
standard industry method of multimedia data retrieval,422 the PTO has
set in motion several organizational and procedural changes designed 
to address its shortcomings. Those changes, though important, do not 
go far enough.
421  The price of patent protection is disclosure; a patent must provide sufficient informa-
tion to enable one ordinarily skilled in the field to practice the invention once it has passed into 
the public domain. 35 U.S.C. ' 112. If certain facts or principles are already well-known in the 
art, the inventor need not provide them. See, e.g., Loom Co. v. Higgins, 105 U.S. 580, 587 
(1881); Spectra-Physics, Inc. v. Coherent, Inc., 827 F.2d 1524, 1534 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 
484 U.S. 954 (1987).
422 See, e.g., Doug Bailey, CD-ROM Multimedia Patent Draws Fire, BOSTON GLOBE,
Nov. 17, 1993, at 49, 51; Steve Hamm, Patented Problems, 11 PC WK., Jan. 24, 1994, at Al; 
John Markoff, A High-Technology Outcry Against the U.S. Patent System, N.Y. TMES, Jan. 
3,1994, at Cl; Michael Schrage, Too-Broad Patenting of High Tech Points Up Patent Flaws In 
System, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 18,1993, at DI; Gina Smith, Lines Drawn In Patent Battle, S.F.
EXAMINER, Nov. 28, 1993, at E1.
1176
1. The Decisionmakers
In theory, the patent examination process consists of a rigorous
analysis of the claimed invention by an examiner trained in the same 
scientific field. Until 1994, however, the PTO's list of accepted techni-
cal backgrounds for patent examiners did not include computer sci-
ence, and the PTO did not hire computer scientists as examiners or 
technical staff members.423 It is impossible to overstate the conse-
quences of that policy, or lack of it, for the overprotection of computer
program-related developments. A duly examined and approved patent 
is presumed valid.424 To overcome this presumption in subsequent
infringement litigation, a challenger must present clear and convincing
evidence of some error by the patent examiner.425 This standard is a 
high one, often prohibitively so. Because I patent examination requires 
technical competence that most judges do not possess, judges are
reluctant to second-guess an examiner's decision. As a matter of logic, 
however, the presumption of validity is justified only if the examiner's 
qualifications warrant it.
Computer program-related applications are particularly difficult to 
evaluate because they may require knowledge of two different fields—
computer science and some other field, such as chemistry or medicine, 
in which the invention is intended for use.   For example, an
application for an improved method of processing and interpreting
seismic waves to detect the presence of fossil fuel deposits would be 
assigned to Class 367, for “Communications, Electrical: Acoustic
Wave Systems and Devices,” while the application for an improved 
method of analyzing electrocardiograph readings to predict and treat 
heart disease, at issue in Arrhythmia, was assigned to Class 128, for 
“Surgery.”426   What both inventions have in common, however, is that 
they are based in part on computer applications—applications that
neither the examiner trained as a geologist nor the examiner trained in 
the biological sciences is equipped to evaluate.  Moreover, the pros-
pecting application might rely in part on programming techniques
originally  developed  in  a  different  industrial  context  altogether,   such 
423 See Sabra Chartrand, Patents, N.Y. TIMES, July 4,1994, ' 1, at 36; James W. Morando 
& Christian H. Nadan, Silent Enemies, THE RECORDER, May 4,1994, at 10.
424 See 35 U.S.C. ' 282 (1988 & Supp. 1993).
425 See, e.g., Quad Envtl. Tech. Corp. v. Union Sanitary Dist., 946 F.2d 870, 872 (Fed. 
Cir. 1991).
426  U.S. DEPT . OF COMMERCE, PATENT OFFICE, MANUAL OF CLASSIFICATION (Rev. No. 3 
1994). 
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as chemistry or metallurgy. Yet the examiner trained in geology as-
signed to examine the prospecting patent would have no particular
knowledge of patents recently granted in those fields.
In 1994 the PTO revised its hiring criteria to include computer 
science among the accepted technical backgrounds and, in mid-1994,
hired nine individuals with computer science degrees to assist the ex-
aminer corps.427 Although this is an important step in the right direc-
tion, the PTO will not be fully equipped to handle computer program-
related claims until computer scientists have been accorded examiner 
status and can veto applications that are insufficiently novel or nonob-
vious to merit patent protection. Where appropriate, each such appli-
cation should be assigned two examiners, one to evaluate the claimed 
invention with respect to the intended field of use and one to evaluate 
it with respect to the state of the computer science-related prior art; the 
approval of both should be required before a patent may issue. As to all 
computer program-related patents issued before the addition of the new 
computer science personnel to the PTO's technical staff, courts
deciding issues of patent validity should discount the presumption of
validity, and give greater weight to expert testimony offered by the
parties.
2. Prior Art
The determination whether a claimed invention is novel and non-
obvious is based on examination of relevant prior art in the applicable 
technical field. The applicant must cite prior art that bears on the
claimed invention as part of the patent application, and the examiner 
also must look beyond what is cited before granting the patent.428 The 
presumption of validity that applies to an issued patent is based not 
only on the examiner's technical qualifications, but also on the exam-
iner's search of the prior art. Once again, that presumption is only as 
good as the resources that support it.
Within the last decade, many glaring defects relating to the organ-
ization and accessibility  of  the PTO's collection of prior art have been 
remedied. The PTO's database of issued patents has been automated, 
and   examiners   have    access    to    commercially    available    on-line
427 See Chartrand, supra note 423; Morando & Nadan, supra note 423.
428  37 C.F.R. '' 1.56,1.104(a), 1.107,1.98 (1994); U.S. DEPT . OF COMMERCE, PATENT
OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE ' 706.03 (5th ed. 1983 & Supp. 1993) 
(AThe primary object of the examination of an application is to determine whether or not the 
claims define a patentable advance over the prior art.”).
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databases as well.429 However, in the field of computers and computer
programs, much that qualifies as prior art lies outside the areas in
which the PTO traditionally has looked—previously issued patents and 
previous scholarly publications. Many new developments in computer
programming are not documented in scholarly publications at all.
Some are simply incorporated into products and placed on the market; 
others are discussed only in textbooks or user manuals that are not 
available to examiners on line.430 In an area that relies so heavily on 
published, “official” prior art, a rejection based on “common industry 
knowledge” that does not appear in the scholarly literature is
unlikely.431 Particularly where the examiner lacks a computer science 
background, highly relevant prior art may simply be missed. In the
case of the multimedia data retrieval patent granted to Compton's New 
Media, industry criticism prompted the PTO to reexamine the patent 
and ultimately to reject it because it did not represent a novel and 
nonobvious advance over existing technology.432 However, it would be 
inefficient, and probably impracticable, to reexamine every computer 
program-related patent, and the PTO is unlikely to do so.
Even when an examiner overlooks relevant prior art, the patent
remains clothed in the presumption of validity.   An accused infringer 
may offer the missed prior art to show invalidity, but the court must 
find the evidence of invalidity clear and convincing.433   In Atari, that 
hurdle  proved  too high.   A missed piece of prior art relating to a 
computer reset switch was a central element of Atari's defense against 
Nintendo's patent infringement claims.434  Judge Smith declined to
grant summary judgment in favor of Atari on the invalidity issue.  Af-
ter  examining the reset reference, the district judge ruled that she
could  not  conclude  as a  matter of  law  that  Nintendo's  application  of 
429 See D. Lee Antton & Theodore A. Feitshans, Is the United States Automating A 
Patent Registration System for Software? A Critical Review of Information Management in the 
U.S.P.T.O., 72 J. PAT . & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 894 (1990); Garfinkel, supra note 314, at 
109. 
430 See Antton & Feitshans, supra note 429; U.S. CONG., OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY
ASSESSMENT , COMPUTER SOFTWARE AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY—BACKGROUND PAPER 8-9
(1990); Garfinkel, supra note 314, at 109.
431   As Richard Stern explains, unless a rejection is based on official prior art or generally 
accepted principles, the examiner must file an affidavit stating the basis for the rejection and 
citing personal expert knowledge. See 37 C.F.R. ' 1.107(b) (1994); Stern, supra note 16, at 
38586 & n.30.
432 See, e.g., Morando & Nadan, supra note 423, at 10.
433 See, e.g., Quad Envtl. Tech. Corp. v. Union Sanitary Dist., 946 F.2d 870,872 (Fed. 
Cir. 1991).
434  Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 30 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1401, 1416 (N.D. 
Cal. 1993). See supra text accompanying note 70.
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the reset feature would have been obvious to a programmer of ordinary
skill.435 Subsequently, the jury also rejected Atari's invalidity ar-
gument. Absent the presumption of validity, the outcome could well
have been different at either procedural stage.
Before the PTO can evaluate computer program-related applica-
tions competently, its database of relevant prior art must be made
complete. Thus far, however, the PTO has taken no steps to do this. In 
response to the PTO's inaction, the Software Patent Institute in Ann
Arbor, Michigan has begun assembling “a database of computer
science folklore—techniques that are in use, but not widely pub-
lished.”436 As conceived, the database also will include computer sci-
ence textbooks and computer program-related magazine items.437 If
realized, such a database might constitute a significant step toward
eliminating the prior art problem, but only if the PTO uses it on a
regular basis. A more reliable alternative would be to place a database 
of computer program-related prior art within the PTO's control and 
require that it be used. Much of the raw material for such a database 
already is present in the archives of the Copyright Office and the
Library of Congress. Every computer science textbook and computer
system manual in which copyright is claimed must be deposited with
the Copyright Office as part of the copyright registration process, and 
textbooks published with notice of copyright are deposited with the 
Library of Congress.438 Under regulations adopted pursuant to the 1976 
amendments to the Copyright Act, every computer program that is the 
subject of a copyright registration also is deposited, at least in partial 
form, with the Copyright Office, and every computer program
“published” with notice of copyright is deposited with the Library of
Congress.439 It would be a relatively simple matter to amend the
copyright and patent statutes to require that a separate copy of every 
computer program, every piece of supporting documentation, and
every computer-related textbook or magazine deposited with the
Copyright Office or the Library of Congress also be filed with the
PTO. Accessing the knowledge contained in this prior art then would 
be a matter of hiring individuals with the requisite specialized knowl-
edge to index and maintain the collection.
435 Id. at 1418.
436  Garfinkel, supra note 314, at 142.
437 Id.  Garfinkel notes, however, that some publishers have been reluctant to authorize 
the inclusion of their works because they fear lost sales. Id.
438 See 17 U.S.C. '' 407, 408 (1988 & Supp. 1993).
439  37 C.F.R. '' 202.19, 202.20 (1994).
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3. Shifting the Burden of Production
In 1994, after the Compton’s New Media debacle, the PTO sup-
ported an additional change in its examination procedures that re-
flected a newfound lack of confidence in its ability to examine
computer program-related patent applications. The Patent Term and
Publication Reform Act, submitted to Congress but not enacted in
1994, would have required that patent applications be disclosed to the 
public eighteen months after the patent application is filed.440 Inter-
ested parties could then bring relevant prior art not contained in the 
PTO's database to the examiner's attention. A bill to require publication
after eighteen months has been reintroduced in the 104th Congress,441
as well as another bill that would afford third parties increased
opportunities for participation in patent reexamination proceedings.442
Both amendments would, in effect, shift the burden back to the
computer industry, the PTO's most vocal critic, to police itself. 
Ironically, the strongest opposition to publication at eighteen
months may come from inventors themselves, who risk losing trade
secret protection for their products if their patent applications are de-
nied.443 It might be argued that the disclosure provisions would deter 
inventors from seeking patent protection, with the result that many
valuable, patentable inventions would be kept from the public. This is 
a valid argument against the amendment only if the applicants turned 
away are worthy, however, and there is no empirical evidence to sug-
gest  that  this  would be  the case.  Absent such evidence, it is at least as
440 S. 1854, 103d Cong., 2d Sess (1994). Other terms of this bill, including patent term 
harmonization provisions, were subsequently enacted as part of the legislation implementing 
the Uruguay Round of the Global Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). See Pub. L. No. 
103465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994).
441  H.R. 1733, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). A different proposed bill would provide for 
publication after 60 months. See H.R. 359, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). In light of the short 
product lifespan and rapid pace of development in the computer software industry, see Karjala, 
New Protectionism, supra note 6, at 39-41, a 60-month lag before publication will do little, if 
anything, to cure the problem of Asubmarine@ patents like the Compton=s patent, which surface
after a lengthy examining period and take the industry by surprise. See, e.g., Garfinkel, supra
note 314, at 142.  The proposed regulations regarding reexamination suffer from the same 
defect; a patent cannot be reexamined until it has been issued.
442 H.R. 1732,104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). The PTO has also proposed regulations to 
this effect. See 60 Fed. Reg. 23,201 (May 8, 1995).
443  This argument was raised in opposition to the proposed Patent Term and Publication 
Reform Act. For testimony addressing it and arguing that the perceived threat to trade secret 
protection is not significant, see Patent Office Oversight: Hearings on S.1854 Before the Sub-
comm. on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the Senate Commn. on the Judiciary, 103d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) (statement of Gary L. Newton, President, American Intellectual 
Property Law Association).
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likely that the current system of nondisclosure encourages applications
of dubious merit, submitted on the off chance that a patent will issue. If 
a patent is denied, the innovation can still be held as a trade secret. 
Under a system that subjects each application to public scrutiny, the 
applicants who weed themselves out may well be the undeserving
ones. Weakening the incentives to seek patent protection for computer 
programs thus may yield results that are entirely consistent with the
purposes of the Patent Act and the criteria for patentability. The
proposed amendment regarding reexamination, a process that cannot 
be triggered until a patent is issued, will not produce a like effect.
However, neither publication of patent applications nor increased 
opportunities for reexamination will reduce the need for a qualified,
well-informed examiner corps. Even under a public comment regime, 
the examiner assigned to each computer program-related application
must be able to digest and evaluate the significance of materials sub-
mitted by interested members of the public, and must make the final 
decision as to patentability. The PTO cannot and should not cede that 
critical function to the public, particularly where, as a practical matter, 
the “public” will be made up largely of opponents of software patents 
and the prospective patentee's competitors. Accordingly, enactment of 
a provision for publication of patent applications should not foreclose
continued self-examination by the PTO.
V. LOCK-OUT AS MISUSE: TWO PARADOXES
So far, no court has considered the misuse defense as applied to 
claims of intellectual property in lock-out programs.   Misuse defenses 
were raised in Sega and Atari, but were not litigated in either case.444
In the context of lock-out, the concept of misuse is singularly apt.
From the copyright perspective, lock-out programs are creative works 
devised to bar others from utilizing ideas and functional principles that 
the Copyright  Act does not protect.    From the patent perspective, 
they are (or may be) novel and nonobvious inventions that operate to 
bar access to and use of unpatented computer systems and public do-
main principles and ideas.     In each case,  however,  application  of  the 
444  Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 785 F. Supp. 1392, 1399 (N.D. Cal.), affd in part 
and rev =d in part, 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992), as amended, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 78 (9th 
Cir. 1993). See supra note 56 (discussing misuse and antitrust allegations in Atari). In Sega, of 
course, there was no need to reach the issue of Sega's alleged misuse. Atari's misuse defenses 
were severed for later trial with Atari's antitrust claims against Nintendo, and the case settled 
before that second phase could occur. See supra text accompanying notes 73-75. 
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misuse defense results in a paradox. In the case of patent, the misuse 
doctrine as applied to lock-out threatens to nullify the patentee’s in-
tellectual property right. In the case of copyright, if functional dupli-
cation is permissible, as Part III argues, the copier who takes only
functionality does not infringe, and the copier who takes too much—
who duplicates protected expression in addition to unprotectable
functionality—can never complain of misuse. One result seems too
harsh; the other, not harsh enough. This part explores those results and 
the rules that produce them.
Part V.A addresses the application of the doctrine of patent misuse
to a lock-out patent such as the 10NES. It first considers—and
rejects—the suggestion that patents such as the 10NES simply should 
be disallowed for failure to satisfy the Patent Act's requirement of
usefulness.445  It then addresses the reach of the patent misuse doc trine 
in the lock-out context and argues that the doctrine should be
narrowed, but not abandoned altogether in favor of an antitrust ap-
proach, as some have suggested.446 Part V.B addresses the more in-
tractable difficulties posed by application of the misuse doctrine to
attempted enforcement of a copyright in a lock-out program. It argues
that despite the exclusionary intent behind a copyrighted lockout
program, denominating as misuse conduct that simply makes it more 
difficult for competitors to achieve interoperability would be in-
consistent with the purposes of copyright protection.
A. THE PATENT MISUSE DEFENSE AND
THE ENFORCEABILITY DILEMMA
The patent misuse doctrine affords an equitable defense to certain
claims of patent infringement.447   As articulated by the Supreme
Court,  the  doctrine  prohibits any attempt by the patentee to extend 
the lawful monopoly conferred on it by the patent laws to an area
outside the scope of the patent.448  Thus, Nintendo's use of the 10NES 
patent  against Atari appears to present the most straightforward case 
of misuse imaginable.    Nintendo's  patent  monopoly  extended  only  to 
445  35 U.S.C. ' 101. 
446 See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, The Economic Irrationality of the Patent Misuse Doctrine, 
78 CAL. L. REV. 1599 (1990) [hereinafter Lemley, Economic Irrationality]; see also Note,
Clarifying the Copyright Misuse Defense. The Role of Antitrust Standards and First 
Amendment Values, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1289 (1991). 
447 See generally 5 CHISUM, supra note 310, ' 19.04 (summarizing the law of patent 
misuse).
448 See, e.g., Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942); Motion Picture 
Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917). 
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the lock-out programs embedded in its console and cartridges, not to 
the console itself, nor to the console operating system. Manufacturing 
the console to include the later-developed lock-out program did not 
change that fundamental fact. Accordingly, under the Supreme Court's 
formulation of the misuse defense, Nintendo's subsequent use of the 
lock-out patent to ensure that only its licensees could gain access to the 
console was an unlawful extension of the patent grant.
The arguments against application of the patent misuse defense in
the context of lock-out are twofold. First, statutory restrictions on the 
defense limit its reach in that context to patentees with antitrust market 
power.449 By definition, however, a computer system manufacturer that 
adopts a lock-out regime has such power in the market for programs 
compatible with its system. The second argument is one of logic, and 
might be made, roughly, as follows: If the patent may not be invoked 
against those who gain access to the console using a functional
equivalent of the patented device, it is unenforceable, and the patent 
misuse defense may not be construed to render a duly approved patent 
unenforceable ex ante. Ultimately, this objection to the misuse defense 
fails for two reasons. First, if a patented lock-out device has no use 
other than to enlarge the scope of the patent grant, then the device 
lacks utility, the patent is invalid, and the question of its enforceability 
is moot.450 Second, lock-out devices for computer systems do have 
other, legitimate uses.451 However, the argument about enforceability
raises important questions about the contours and practical
consequences of the misuse doctrine in its current form.
1. The Patent Misuse Reform Act of 1988
The installation of a lock-out program in a computer system oper-
ates as a tie, by conditioning the initial sale of a system on the subse-
quent purchase of authorized programs developed by the system
manufacturer or its licensees.452 Thus, for example, installation of the 
10NES  tied  the market for NES-compatible games,  formerly  open  to
449 See 35 U.S.C. ' 271(d)(5) (Supp. 1992).
450 See infra part V.A.2.
451 See infra text accompanying notes 478-83. 
452 See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 12 (1984) (AThe essential 
characteristic of an invalid tying arrangement lies in the seller's exploitation of its control over
the tying product to force the buyer into the purchase of a tied product that the buyer either did 
not want at all, or might have preferred to purchase elsewhere on different terms.@).
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anyone who could design a game with commercial appeal, to the
market for NES consoles.453 Under the patent misuse doctrine as origi-
nally formulated by the Supreme Court, any use of a patented item as 
the tying product constituted misuse per se.454 However, the Patent 
Misuse Reform Act of 1988 narrowed the scope of the patent misuse 
defense as applied to tying arrangements.455  Under the resulting sec-
tion 271(d)(5) of the Patent Act, tying does not constitute a misuse 
unless “in view of the circumstances” the patentee has market power in 
the market for the tying product—here, the computer system or video 
game console.456   Analysis of the misuse ramifications of lockout
programs must begin with consideration of the extent to which section 
271(d)(5) precludes or limits assertion of the misuse defense against 
the computer system manufacturers that install them.
The crucial question in the market power inquiry is, of course, the 
definition of the relevant market. In Eastman Kodak v. Image Techni-
cal Services,457 the Supreme Court approved, at least in principle, the 
use of a single-product definition of the tying product market when the 
tied product market is derivative of the tying product market.458 The 
first question, then, is whether the market for games or programs that 
are interoperable with a particular system is distinct from the market 
for that system, making it efficient to provide the two products
separately.459 The existence of independent game developers and the 
fact that multiple game programs may be purchased separately from
the game console demonstrate the existence of distinct, separate mar-
kets. Whether a computer system manufacturer that installs lock-out
programs has market power in the market for interoperable programs 
depends on the extent to which the initial system purchase locks the 
consumer in and precludes or militates against a later decision to
switch systems.460 Here the answer is less straightforward. Although
the number, variety, and cost of available programs for different sys-
tems will change over time in a manner that consumers may not fore-
see,   the  cost of switching consoles—or  even  of  owning  two  different
453 See Paul A. Durdik, Reverse Engineering as a Fair Use Defense to Software 
Copyright Infringement, 34 JURIMETRICS J. 451, 453 (1994).
454 See Morton Salt v. G.S. Suppiger, Co., 314 U.S. 488, 492 (1942) (AThe privilege of a 
patent monopoly Y excludes from it all that is not embraced in the invention.@).
455  Pub. L. 100-703, 102 Stat. 4674 (1988) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. ' 271(d)(4) 
& (5) (Supp. 1992)).
456  35 U.S.C. ' 271(d)(5).
457  112 S. Ct. 2072 (1992). 
458 Id. at 2090.
459 Id at 2080.
460 Id. at 2083-87. 
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ones—is significantly lower than the cost at issue in Kodak, that of 
switching photocopiers.461
Even though “lock-in” costs may be less significant for computer 
systems, however, the unique manner in which the tie-in is accom-
plished constitutes a factor that “in view of the circumstances”462
should lead courts inexorably to the conclusion that the market power 
requirement is met. The tying effect achieved by the adoption of a
lock-out regime is devastatingly absolute.463  The coercion required to 
show tying is not contractual and subject to negotiation, but rather
physical and incontrovertible. A lock-out program does not merely
restrict competitors’ ability to make and sell interoperable programs
and consumers’ ability to obtain them, but confers, instantly, an abso-
lute right to exclude competitors from making, using, or, selling the
tied product at all.464 And yet the patented program itself—the focus of 
the misuse defense, and the real tying product—is completely un-
necessary to the intended function and use of the de facto tying prod-
uct, the computer system.
Neither  the  text  nor  the legislative history of the Reform Act 
suggests that it was intended to shield a patentee's efforts to control the 
derivative  market of an unpatented  commodity by the simple expedi-
ent of manufacturing that commodity to include a supernumerary pat-
ented device.   And no  legitimate  business reason exists for the
adoption of a lock-out regime designed to control the market for pro-
grams compatible with an unpatented computer system. A system
manufacturer concerned with quality control has other avenues of
legal  recourse.465   Accordingly,  the  manufacturer  of  a  proprietary  but
461 See id. at 2085-87 (discussing the costs associated with photocopier purchases). Be-
cause both Nintendo and Sega license the rights to develop games interoperable with their con-
soles to third-party vendors under certain conditions, it might be argued that whether Nintendo 
or Sega has market power for antitrust purposes depends on whether the existence of third-
party licenses outweighs their restrictive terms. However, that argument ignores the fact that 
Nintendo also reaps a profit from its licensees. As a matter of antitrust tying law, Nintendo 
need not sell all of the tied product itself; all that is necessary is that it have a financial interest 
in sales of the tied product. See Peter J. Klarfeld, Tying Arrangements and Exclusive Dealing, 
in 34th ANNUAL ANTITRUST LAW INSTITUTE 853, 908-10 (PLI 1993) (collecting cases).
462  35 U.S.C. ' 271(d).
463 See Durdik, supra note 453, at 466.
464  For cases involving Atechnological tying,@ at least one commentator has distinguished 
between Aaccidental@ coercion as a result of technological development and interoperability re-
quirements, and Aactual@ coercion Amotivated by a desire to compel the purchase of two prod-
ucts.@ Klarfeld, supra note 461, at 883-34 (citing cases). Plainly, the coercion accomplished by 
lock-out programs is of the latter type.
465  See supra note 196.
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unpatented computer system who installs a lock-out program that ef-
fectively ties the market for compatible programs to the system market
should be deemed to satisfy the market power requirement.466
2. Lock-Out Patents and the Usefulness Requirement
To be patentable, an invention must be “useful” as well as novel 
and nonobvious.467 Compared to the other two statutory requirements
for patentability, the usefulness requirement has received relatively
little attention, for obvious reasons. Most inventions have self-evident
uses. Ordinarily, inventions are developed with an intended use in
mind, and that use is disclosed as part of the patent application.468 The 
10NES patent is no exception; it was developed to provide lock-and-
key functionality for a video game console, and the patent so
states.469However, the usefulness requirement also includes a public
policy element: The intended use may not be contrary to law.470 If the 
intended and only use of the 10NES violates the public policy behind 
the Patent Act, then the 10NES arguably lacks utility. 
As originally conceived, the public policy underlying the useful-
ness requirement was directed at inventions deemed “frivolous or in-
jurious to the well-being, good policy,  or  sound  morals  of  society.”471
466  The other theory of antitrust liability advanced in the interoperability context is mo-
nopolization of an essential facility. See, e.g., Jeff Barge, High-Tech Firms Face Scrutiny, 
A.B.A. J. July 1994, at 36, 37. Application of the essential facility doctrine in the context of 
lock-out is problematic, however, because its combination with a Kodak-type market power
analysis is inherently circular. A variant on the classic essential facility fact pattern illustrates 
this circularity. Instead of a river with one bridge over it, see United States v. Terminal R.R. 
Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383 (1912), imagine three bridges. One, operated by the Nintendo Bridge 
Company, is a railroad trestle. Another, owned by the Sega Bridge Corporation, carries truck
traffic. The third, operated by an upstart competitor of Nintendo and Sega called 3DO, is a 
monorail bridge. Once a freight company needing to transport goods across the river has 
purchased or leased its desired modes of transportation, the costs of switching are high. Under 
Kodak, each company has market power in the market for traffic over its bridge, but it does not 
follow that any one company’s bridge is an essential facility for crossing the river. Arguably, 
anyone denied access to the bridge of his or her choice can simply switch modes of 
transportation. If all three bridge proprietors deny access, there is no principled basis, other 
than assessment of each proprietor's market power in the larger market for traffic across the 
river, for deciding whose bridge is truly “essential.”
467  35 U.S.C. '101.   
468 See 35 U.S.C. '112 (requiring disclosure of “the manner and process of making and 
using [the invention] Y [and] the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out [the] 
invention”).
469  U.S. Patent No. 4,799,635, abstract, p. 1 (1989).
470 See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 673 F. Supp. 1278, 1325 (D. Del. 
1987).   
471  Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817); see generally ICHISUM, supra 
note 310, ' 4.03[l] (discussing public policy aspect of utility requirement).
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During the first part of the twentieth century, several patents on de-
vices for gambling or “games of chance” were invalidated on morality
based grounds.472 Gradually, however, courts retreated from a moral-
ity-based approach. At first, courts simply held that an otherwise im-
moral invention would satisfy the usefulness requirement if it had the 
capacity for beneficial use .473 More recently, although current formu-
lations of the public policy exception to the usefulness requirement
retain “immorality” as a basis for rejecting a patent, courts considering
utility-based challenges to patents have suggested that the public
policy exception will be invoked only to reject patents covering de-
vices whose use violates the law.474 As a result, the scope of the mod-
ern public policy exception is extremely narrow. In the last fifty years, 
there is no reported case denying patent protection on public policy
grounds.
Obviously, lock-out programs do not raise questions of immorality.
Instead, lock-out programs test the reach of the public policy ex-
ception's illegality prong. Assuming, still, that a lock-out program such 
as the 10NES has no use other than to enlarge the scope of the patent 
grant by excluding competitors from creating and marketing programs 
for an unpatented computer system, its “usefulness” turns on whether 
triggering an equitable defense to an infringement claim is sufficient to 
establish illegality. Lock-out programs are not illegal in the formal
sense. No law forbids their development or use, nor does their use 
violate any criminal law, in the way that use of a gambling machine 
violated nineteenth-century laws against gambling. The public policy
underlying the Patent Act is violated only if the lock-out patent is
enforced.475 And even then, what is violated is not a provision of the 
Patent Act, but a judicially created, highly fact-specific, equitable
rule.476 Militating against a finding of usefulness, however, is the fact 
that the public policy in question is not based on moralistic notions of 
correct behavior, but rather on the legislative purpose embodied in a 
federal statute.
Ultimately, however, we need not resolve the question whether
lock-out  programs  are  illegal,  and  so  nonuseful,  because enforcement
472 See, e.g, Brewer v. Lichtenstein, 278 F. 512 (7th Cir. 1922); Schultze v. Holtz, 82 F. 
448 (N.D. Cal. 1897). 
473 See, e.g., Callison v. Dean, 70 F.2d 55, 58 (10th Cir. 1934); Fuller v. Berger, 120 F. 
274 (7th Cir. 1903), cert. denied, 193 U.S. 668 (1904); 1 CHISUM, supra note 310, ' 4.03[l][b].
474 See, e.g., Whistler Corp. v. Autotronics Inc., 14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1885, 1886 (N.D. 
Tex. 1990); Phillips Petroleum, 673 F. Supp. at 1325. 
475 See supra text accompanying notes 447-48. 
476 See supra note 448 and accompanying text. 
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of a lock-out patent violates patent policy. Lock-out programs such as
the 10NES also have the potential for lawful—that is, non-misuse—
use. Accordingly, by analogy to the “beneficial use” rule developed in 
the turn-of-the-century gambling cases,477 they are “useful” within the 
meaning of the Patent Act.
Consider four scenarios. The first, which I shall call scenario A, 
involves the Atari fact pattern, minus Atari's fraud on the Copyright 
Office.478  Nintendo installs a lock-out program in its video game sys-
tem, the NES, and Atari reverse engineers the device so that it can
market NES-compatible game cartridges. Nintendo then sues Atari for 
patent infringement. In scenario B, the Rip-Off Company (“ROC”), an 
offshore computer company, copies Nintendo's games and imports the 
counterfeits into the United States for distribution. When ROC begins 
distributing counterfeit Nintendo games that incorporate the 10NES
lock-and-key technology, Nintendo files suit for patent infringement.
In scenario C, Nintendo decides to diversify its business portfolio. It 
begins marketing an office computer system (the “NOS”) that
incorporates a lock-out device designed to restrict access to the system 
to those holding authorized access cards. Hacker, Inc. reverse
engineers the device so that it can break into the secure system or, for a 
fee, enable others to do so, and Nintendo sues Hacker. In the final
scenario, scenario D, a manufacturer of IBM-compatible clones installs 
a lock-out program in its computers to enable their use as a secure 
office system.
In scenario B, the lock-out program is employed, at least ostensi-
bly, to make software counterfeiting more difficult—an indisputably
lawful purpose.479  When the 10NES is copied, the patent provides 
Nintendo with another remedy against ROC, in addition to any copy-
right, trademark, or unfair competition claims that Nintendo chooses to 
assert.    As  in  scenario  A,  enforcement  of   the  patent  in scenario  B
477 See Fuller, 120 F. 274; Ex parte Murphy, 200 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 801 (P.T.O. Bd. App. 
1977) (adopting the Fuller rule).
478 See supra text accompanying notes 53-55. 
479   There is no question that the 10NES has this effect. Evidence in the Atari case
showed that Atari's inability to decipher Nintendo's microcode was the stumbling block that 
led to its illfated decision to obtain a copy of the 10NES code from the Copyright Office under 
false pretenses. Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 836 (Fed. Cir. 
1992). 
Nintendo also might argue, as Sega did with respect to its lock-out routine, that the device 
was intended primarily as a means of quality control, to protect consumers from counterfeit or 
otherwise inferior products. See Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1515 (9th 
Cir. 1992), as amended, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 78 (9th Cir. 1993). As discussed above, 
however, the law provides other mechanismsCspecifically, the trademark and unfair 
competition lawsCfor controlling the quality of products associated with one’s name. See
supra note 196.
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results in a type of exclusion. However, the excluded party in scenario 
B is in a poor position to invoke equity, because it has simply appro-
priated Nintendo's intellectual property—Nintendo's game programs
and the 10NES program—for its own use.480 In this context,
Nintendo's use of the patent to identify and pursue ROC for software 
piracy constitutes an appropriate, though elaborate, strategy for pro-
tecting its intellectual property rights.481
The use of the 10NES technology suggested in scenarios C and D 
also is lawful. Although, technically speaking, the lock-out device in-
stalled in the NOS achieves the same result as that installed in the
NES, the consequences for the purchaser of the system are very differ-
ent. In scenario A, installation of a lock-out device in the NES results 
in fewer NES-compatible games available for purchase. In scenarios C 
and D, lock-out is precisely the result desired by purchasers of the 
system, whether it is the proprietary NOS or the adapted clone, to 
protect the security of information stored there. Nor does the use of
lock-out technology in the NOS exclude competitors in the absolute 
sense, since it does not affect the market for interoperable software that 
can be installed on the system, and also leaves room for competitors to 
design and market their own secure systems to other customers. Put 
differently, in scenarios C and D, the lock-out program targets alien
users, not alien programs, and thus does not effect an unlawful
expansion of the patentee's intellectual property rights.
It  may  be argued that the possibility of scenarios C and D does 
not save the 10NES patent, because the claims asserted in the patent
were  limited  to  a  device for authenticating “a videographics
software program.”482   The Nintendo  patent  contributes  to the goal 
of the Patent Clause  to advance knowledge in the “useful arts,” but the 
advancement  of  knowledge  alone  will  not  support  a  patent  grant.483
480 See Atari, 975 F.2d at 846 (holding that Atari was precluded from invoking the copy-
right misuse defense by its own unclean hands).
481  The elaborateness of the patented-device-as-decoy tactic would undermine any real-
life argument by Nintendo that it conceived of the 10NES solely as an anti-counterfeiting
measure. Nonetheless, Sega raised such an argument. Sega, 977 F.2d at 1515, 1530.
482 See U.S. Patent No. 4,799,635, col. 12, ll. 61-63 (1989). If, as I have suggested, this 
limitation represents an attempt to comply with the physical limitation rule derived from 
Benson and lwahashi, the idea that the patent might be too narrow to satisfy the utility 
requirement is not without irony. See supra section IV.A.
483 See U.S. CONST . art. I, ' 8, cl. 8; supra part IV.A.2. Use of an external key device to 
unlock a secure system, such as a bank system, might be less desirable than a password system 
because the key device could be stolen. However, the question of an invention's market 
viability forms no part of the patent analysis. Forecasting economic viability requires a degree 
of prescience that neither courts nor patent examiners can reasonably be expected to attain. See
Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 810 F.2d 1561, 1573 (Fed. Cir.) (AUnder our economic 
and patent systems, valuation of the worth of an inventor's contribution is left to the public, not
to the judiciary in determining patentability.@), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1052 (1987).
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Thus, scenarios C and D constitute an argument for the utility of lock-
out programs in general, not the 10NES in particular. However, under 
the “capacity for lawful use” standard advanced here, the possibility of 
scenario B is enough to establish the 10NES’ usefulness, or at least to 
incline courts to address that question on a case-by-case basis. Thus, 
we turn once again to the doctrine of misuse.
3. Lock-Out as Patent Misuse
The conclusion that lock-out programs have lawful uses, and so 
need not fail the public policy test for usefulness, also answers the
argument that holding Nintendo's enforcement of its patent against
Atari to be a misuse would nullify the 10NES patent. Quite clearly, it 
would not. The preceding section has identified at least three non-Atari
contexts in which a lock-out patent might be enforced. Unfortunately,
that does not entirely solve the first of our two misuse paradoxes. As a 
practical matter, application of the misuse doctrine in Atari might in
fact have barred any subsequent enforcement of the 10NES patent. 
That result is not unique to lock-out, however; it is a function of the 
current formulation of the patent misuse defense.
Consider again scenarios A and B. If Nintendo sues ROC, as in 
scenario B, it can enforce the 10NES patent; if Nintendo sues Atari, as 
in scenario A, it cannot. However, if the factual predicate for scenario 
A exists, Nintendo cannot enforce its patent against ROC, either. A
finding of patent misuse bars the patentee from enforcing its patent 
against anyone, even a clear infringer who otherwise could raise no
defense to the infringement claim.484 Under this approach to the patent
misuse doctrine, the core principle underlying the doctrine is one of
reciprocal obligation. When a patent is issued, the patentee's promise 
that it will not abuse the limited monopoly granted it is an implied quid 
pro quo.485 A misuse of the patent constitutes voluntary divestiture by 
the patentee of its right to invoke the protection of the patent laws until 
the misuse is purged and its consequences “fully dissipated.”486
484 See, e.g., Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 490 (1942); Transitron 
Elec. Corp. v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 487 F. Supp. 885, 892-93 (D. Mass. 1980), aff=d,  649 F.2d 
871 (1st Cir. 1981).
485 Morton Salt, 314 U.S. at 492.
486 See, e.g., B.B. Chem. Co. v. Ellis, 314 U.S. 495, 498 (1942).
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ROC, meanwhile, has received a windfall. It has defeated
Nintendo's infringement claim even though Nintendo committed no
misuse of the patent with respect to ROC. There is no requirement of 
standing to invoke the patent misuse defense.487 Accordingly, ROC 
may invoke the defense to its own benefit, whether or not it has been 
injured by Nintendo's use of the 10NES. A corollary to the absence of 
a standing requirement is that there need not be even rough parity
between the remedy—complete and unconditional nonenforcement of
the patent—and the injury suffered by the infringer as a result of the 
patentee's attempt to extend its grant. Thus, for example, in scenario B, 
ROC benefits even though its injury is nil.
For these reasons and others,488 Professor Lemley has suggested 
that the patent misuse defense should require an antitrust analysis.
Antitrust principles, it is claimed, more precisely match the remedy
afforded by law to the harm done, both to the accused infringer and to 
society generally.489 As argued in Part V.A.1, system manufacturers
who install lock-out programs to exclude competitors from unpatented
computer systems should be deemed to satisfy the Patent Misuse
Reform Act's requirement of antitrust market power. However,
whether or not installation of the 10NES to prevent competitors from 
developing   NES-compatible   games   constitutes  an  antitrust  violation,
487 See 3 CHISUM, supra note 310, '19.04, at 19-38 (discussing Morton Salt).
488  Advocates of an antitrust approach to patent misuse argue that allowing the misuse 
defense to exist separately from the antitrust laws affords the infringer a dual recovery. Not 
only is the patent declared unenforceable, but the infringer also may recover antitrust damages
where applicable. See Lemley, Economic Irrationality, supra note 446, at 1617-18. In this 
way, they maintain, the patent misuse doctrine overrewards even its deserving beneficiaries. In 
a sense, this view is based wholly on wishful thinking: If the criteria for invoking the misuse 
doctrine were tightened to require antitrust injury for a finding of misuse, then the misuse 
doctrine would be redundant. Otherwise, the misuse doctrine will often be invoked by those to 
whom no antitrust recovery is available,
Moreover, a declaration of nonenforcement due to misuse is an equitable remedy, in es-
sence an injunction. See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, Reflections on Current Legislation Affecting 
Patent Misuse, 70 J. PAT . & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 793, 796-98 (1988). Injunctions barring 
certain future conduct may be, and often are, awarded together with damages for past harm. 
Indeed, injunctive relief has long been available under the antitrust statutes, where it coexists 
peacefully with provisions authorizing recovery of damages. See 15 U.S.C. ' 26 (1988).
Professor Lemley argues that a declaration of misuse is not equivalent to an injunction because 
there is no express requirement that courts find irreparable harm and an inadequate remedy at 
law. Lemley, Economic Irrationality, supra note 446, at 1618 n.121. Arguably, however, both 
findings are implicit in a determination that the patent grant has been improperly extendedCthe
converse of the principle that a finding of infringement creates a presumption of irreparable 
harm and an inadequate remedy at law on behalf of the patentee.
489 See Lemley, Economic Irrationality, supra note 446, at 1615-17; cf. Note, supranote
446, at 1297-1303 (advocating an antitrust-based standard for copyright misuse).
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antitrust law does not afford an appropriate foundation for the doctrine
of patent misuse, although courts may find certain antitrust principles
useful in defining its scope.
It has been argued that the particular economic model adopted by 
the antitrust laws is uniquely ill-suited to evaluate the intellectual
property system, because the antitrust laws focus exclusively on short-
term, price-based competition among essentially fungible products.490
The intellectual property laws take a longer-term view, focusing on
competition through innovation.491 One consequence of this difference 
in emphasis is that, despite their vaunted capacity to measure the harms 
done to competition and mete out the appropriate quanta of redress, the 
antitrust laws may not view as cognizable certain harms to the
innovative process that flow from misuse of a grant of patent or
copyright protection. For example, an attempt to enforce a lock-out
patent against a legitimate software developer is, in essence, an attempt
to preclude, or at least control, continuing innovation in a particular
type of computer technology.492 Such conduct need not drive up
consumer prices—indeed, the intellectual property owner may use
license royalty rates to keep its prices low, out of recognition that low 
prices heighten existing barriers to entry by restricting a new entrant's 
ability to recoup its research and development costs.
Even more fundamentally, the antitrust laws delineate the per-
missible bounds of private use of private property. Generally speaking,
one may conduct a private enterprise for private gain until the point at 
which the public's interest in competition is injured.  A patent or
copyright, in contrast, implicates the public from the outset, and not 
only because the limited  monopoly accorded is a public grant.
Through doctrines such as fair use, the “idea-expression” distinction, 
and the rule against patent protection for natural laws and mathemati-
cal  formulae,  the public  is  given  rights  that  overlap  the  boundaries of 
490  Ramsey Hanna, Note, Misusing Antitrust. The Search for Functional Copyright 
Misuse Standards, 46 STAN. L. REV. 401 (1994). For a systematic critique of this Astatic@
approach to antitrust theory, and an argument that antitrust law should be reconceived to 
protect Adynamic@ competition and innovation, see ANTITRUST , INNOVATION, AND
COMPETITIVENESS (Thomas M. Jorde & David J. Teece eds., 1992).
491   Hanna, supra note 490, at 422-27. 
492 Cf. Robert P. Merges & Richard P. Nelson, Market Structure and Technical Advance: 
The Role of Patent Scope Decisions, in ANTITRUST , INNOVATION, AND COMPETITIVENESS,
supra note 490, at 185, 213-15 (arguing that patents in science-based industries should be 
given a narrow scope in order to prevent them from blocking future innovation).
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the copyright or patent even before the term of the grant has expired.493
The specialized doctrines of patent and copyright misuse are better
tailored to maintain the correct balance of public and private
interests.494
In short, the overbreadth of the patent misuse doctrine as currently
formulated does not justify abandoning the concept of patent misuse 
altogether. Both economically and normatively speaking, the patent
misuse doctrine serves important purposes that the antitrust laws do 
not. However, the expansive “abuse-it-and-lose-it” approach to the
patent misuse doctrine, which rewards “true” infringers and penalizes
the patentee for far more than its unlawful conduct, seems overly
harsh. Given that the application of patent and copyright principles to 
computer programs is often uncertain, and millions of dollars can turn 
on the answers, misuse as to one class of alleged infringers should not 
cost the patentee its rights as to others. In the copyright context, several 
courts have required that would-be beneficiaries of a misuse defense 
show some nexus between their infringement and the copyright
owner's inequitable conduct.495 Courts considering patent misuse
defenses should do the same.496
The  real  problem  with  application  of  the  patent  misuse 
defense in the context of lock-out is one that the antitrust laws do not
address.   If enforcement of a lock-out patent against would-be creators 
of interoperable software constitutes misuse, such legitimate
competitors need not  expend the effort to develop their own functional 
equivalents of the lock-out program.   They can simply copy the pat-
ented program, with the only barrier being the difficulty of copying.
Courts are thus faced with a new dilemma.  Use of the lock-out pro-
gram to exclude those seeking to create interoperable software imper-
missibly  extends  the  scope  of  the  grant, but allowing copying destroys
493 Cf. Durdik, supra note 453, at 464-66 (discussing social costs of broad copyright 
monopoly).
494 Cf. Merges, supra note 488, at 797-98 (APatent misuse…helps maintain patent law's 
equitable symmetry, in a way that antitrust critics, unschooled in the structure and balance of 
patent law, have overlooked.@).
495 See e.g., Bellsouth Advertising & Publishing Corp. v. Donnelly Info. Publishing, Inc., 
933 F.2d 952, 961 (11th Cir. 1991) (adopting an antitrust standard), vacated on other grounds, 
977 F.2d 1435 (11th Cir. 1992), on reh’g, 999 F.2d 1436 (11th Cir. 1993) (seven-judge panel), 
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 943 (1994); Supermarket of Homes v. San Fernando Valley Bd. of 
Realtors, 786 F.2d 1400, 1408 (9th Cir. 1986). But see Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 
F.2d 970, 979 (9th Cir. 1990) (rejecting the notion that some nexus should be required).
496  The Sixth Circuit has attempted to import notions of standing into the doctrine of pat-
ent misuse. See Kolene Corp. v. Motor City Metal Treating, Inc., 440 F.2d 77, 85 (6th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 886 (1971).
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the patentee's incentive to develop new technological solutions. How-
ever, the disincentive that results from literal copying is not one that 
the patent misuse doctrine can address, because the patent laws do not 
protect literal code, but only the product or process it embodies.497 As a 
practical matter, although the patent misuse defense may be available 
to some literal copiers, it will avail only the competitor who infringes 
by equivalent. A competitor who copies the literal code of a lock-out
device will be liable for copyright infringement.498
B. THIN COPYRIGHTS AND THE CONTRACTION
OF THE COPYRIGHT MISUSE DEFENSE
When the focus of the misuse inquiry shifts from patent to copy-
right, the outcome is radically different. If copyright allows a competi-
tor  like Atari to duplicate all of the functional features of a
copyrighted lock-out program, as I have argued it does,499 it appears 
that there is no conduct left for the copyright misuse defense to
reach.500      If   Atari  takes only  such  expression   as   is  necessary   to
497 See 35U.S.C.'101. Literal copying maybe an equitable factor militating against appli-
cation of the misuse doctrine in certain cases, such as scenario B discussed at text 
accompanying notes 479-81, 484-87, supra.
498 See 17 U.S.C. ' 106(1); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 
1240, 1246-48 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984).
499 See supra part III.
500  The doctrine of copyright misuse has been defined largely by negative implication. 
Many courts have conceded that under some circumstances a copyright misuse defense might 
apply, but only two have ever applied it. Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 976-
77 (4th Cir.1990); M. Witmark & Sons v. Jensen, 80 F. Supp. 843, 850 (D. Minn.1948); see
also Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 846 (Fed. Cir.1992) (Atari 
could not invoke copyright misuse defense because of unclean hands) (applying Ninth Circuit 
law); qad inc. v. ALN Assocs., Inc., 974 F.2d 836 (7th Cir. 1992) (no jurisdiction to review 
lower court dismissal of copyright misuse defense); Bellsouth Advertising & Publishing Corp. 
v. Donnelly Info. Publishing, Inc., 933 F.2d 952, 961 (11th Cir.1991) (refusing to find 
copyright misuse absent an antitrust violation), vacated on other grounds, 977 F.2d 1435 (11th 
Cir.1992), on reh=g 999 F.2d 1436 (11th Cir.1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 943 (1994); United 
Tel. Co. of Mo. v. Johnson Publishing Co., 855 F.2d 604, 610-12 (8th Cir.1988) (copyright
misuse defense available, but not supported by the facts in this case); Supermarket of Homes, 
Inc. v. San Fernando Valley Bd. of Realtors, 786 F.2d 1400, 1408 (9th Cir.1986) (no evidence 
of required fraud or misconduct that might support a copyright misuse defense); CBS, Inc. v. 
ASCAP, 607 F.2d 543, 544-45 (2d Cir.1979) (remanding for reconsideration of music 
licensing practices as misuse), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 970 (1981); Mitchell Bros. Film Group v. 
Cinema Adult Theater, 604 F.2d 852, 865 (5th Cir.1979) (copyright misuse defense may apply 
in some cases, but not this one), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 917 (1980). Consequently, academic 
commentators continue to debate whether the copyright misuse defense exists. See, e.g., 
Hanna, supra note 490; Philip Abromats, Note, Copyright Misuse and Anticompetitive 
Software Licensing Restrictions: Lasercomb America, Inc. v. Reynolds, 52 U. PITT. L REV.
629 (1991). This Article takes the Second, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Eleventh, and 
Federal Circuits at their word and assumes that the defense exists in some form. There is 
considerable disagreement among the courts as to the nature and scope of the copyright misuse 
defense. Compare Bellsouth, 933 F.2d at 961 (requiring antitrust violation) and Supermarket of 
Homes, 786 F.2d at 1408 (requiring some nexus between the conduct alleged to be a misuse 
and the infringing conduct) with Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 979 (no antitrust violation or nexus 
required). Because this Article concludes that installation of a lock-out program is not 
copyright misuse per se, it takes no position on that question.
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allow it to duplicate interoperability-related processes and routines,
there is no infringement. If Atari takes creative expression as well,
Nintendo’s assertion of its copyright to protest the qualitative differ-
ence in Atari’s copying is not a misuse.501 This section considers
whether this contraction of the copyright misuse defense is justified in 
view of lock-out's exclusionary purpose, and, if so, whether the doc-
trine of copyright misuse retains any independent force in lock-out
cases.
A lock-out program is, in a sense, a creative work designed to 
frustrate the production of other creative works. Lock-out programs are 
specifically designed to make copying and reverse engineering as
difficult as possible.502 The installation of a lock-out program in a
computer system constitutes an attempt by the copyright owner to dic-
tate who may create works based on a particular set of functional
principles and who may not. Nintendo and Sega used their devices to 
control the number and selection of video games interoperable with
their consoles503; in the future, the manufacturer of the “set-top box” 
that serves as my gateway to the “information superhighway” might
use a lock-out program to control the number and selection of on-line
services that I may access from my living room. Arguably, allowing
any enforcement of copyright in a lock-out program against would-be
creators of interoperable programs offends core principles of copyright
by preventing or reducing the likelihood of the development and
dissemination of new creative works. Under this view, such enforce-
ment would constitute misuse per se, even if the competitor has taken 
creative expression.
From the programmer's perspective, however, the difficulty of re-
verse engineering a lock-out program is one measure of its creativity. 
According  copyright  protection  to  a  newer  and  more ingenious lock-
501  Under the approach to copyright adopted by the Atari court, the concept of misuse 
plays a more central role. If copyright does not allow functional duplication, enforcement of 
the 10NES copyright has the same effect as enforcement of the 10NES patentCit denies 
would-be competitors in the market for NES-compatible games access to the unpatented 
console. In that case, the analysis of the scope of the copyright misuse defense parallels that set 
forth in Part V.A, supra.
502 See supra text accompanying note 15.
503 See supra text accompanying notes 26-27 (discussing Sega's and Nintendo's licensing 
practices).
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out program rewards and encourages this creative effort.504 A misuse 
allegation by an inartful reverse engineer thus pits two fundamental
copyright principles—the rule against monopoly of functional princi-
ples505 and the incentive structure for encouraging the production and 
distribution of new creative works—squarely against one another.
Ultimately, allowing the difficulty of reverse engineering to justify
a finding of misuse would beg the question why the difficulties
inherent in reverse engineering an operating system should be treated 
differently.  Reverse engineering an operating system, or any other
computer program distributed in object code, is difficult.506    A lock-
out  program  simply  builds  in another layer of programming that a 
reverse engineer must decipher, and another sequence whose function 
must be duplicated while avoiding substantial similarity to protected
matter in the original.     Moreover, given the short market life of many 
computer programs, increasing the difficulty of reverse engineering
arguably  promotes the purposes of copyright.   Lock-out routines that 
are difficult to reverse engineer increase the copyright owner's lead
time over would-be developers of interoperable products.  The freedom
to  develop  difficult  lock-out routines thus increases the likelihood
that  the  copyright  owner  will  be able to recoup its initial
investment  before competing products developed through reverse en-
gineering enter the market.507   Accordingly, the added difficulty of re-
verse   engineering   a  lock-out   program   is   not   something  that   the
504   Given the powerful market incentives for the development of lock-out programs, it is 
quite possible that such programs fall within the class of non-copyright-induced works and that 
no additional incentives need be provided by copyright law to encourage their creation. How-
ever, it is impossible to determine with certainty whether a particular computer program is pri-
marily copyright-induced or market-induced, and there is a strong countervailing argument. 
Lock-out programs are important to their owners in large part because copyright protection can 
be invoked against copiers. It is likely, then, that the availability of copyright protection at least 
contributes to the inducement of lock-out programs. See Oddi, supra note 16, at 378-83. 
505 See Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1526 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing 
Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 159-64 (1989)), as amended, 
1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 78 (9th Cir. 1993).
506 See Johnson-Laird, supra note 12, at 864-81. 
507 See Hanna, supra note 490, at 430-31; Karjala, Computer Documents, supra note 6, at 
984-85; Samuelson et al., Manifesto, supra note 19, at 2337-42. Professor Leaffer has argued 
that holding Aanti-reverse engineering measures@ to constitute copyright misuse would harm 
industry competitiveness by forcing disclosure of trade secret information. Leaffer, supra note 
13, at 1104-06. However, the copyright laws should not be used to protect trade secrets, which 
are unprotectable Aknow-how that may lawfully be reverse engineered. See Samuelson et al., 
Manifesto, supra note 19, at 2355-56 & n.191. For discussion of the ways in which copyright 
protection for computer programs and Copyright Office registration and deposit practices 
currently serve a trade secrecy function, see McManis, supra note 76, at 67-69; Rice, Sega and 
Beyond, supra note 16, at 1156-57, 1163-64; and Samuelson, CONTU Revisited, supra note
16, at 715-19. 
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copyright law should recognize as a ground for a finding of misuse. 
Such a rule would have a chilling effect on the innovation that the law 
seeks to encourage. The Copyright Act may shelter the reverse engi-
neer's efforts, but it does not forbid the copyright owner from making 
those efforts more difficult.
If the reverse engineer who takes protected expression in the course 
of duplicating unprotectable functionality may not argue difficulty as
grounds for invoking the copyright misuse defense, what becomes of 
the copyright misuse defense in interoperability-related cases?
Although the right to duplicate functional features of copyrighted
computer programs significantly narrows the scope of the defense, it 
does not eliminate it entirely. Would-be creators of interoperable
programs who choose to license the lock-out technology rather than 
reverse engineer it may be able to invoke the copyright misuse defense 
to challenge the console manufacturer's license agreement.508 The fact 
that a reverse engineering option is available should not justify the
imposition of contractual terms that amount to copyright misuse on
software developers who, for whatever reason, choose not to avail
themselves of the reverse engineering process.
It has been argued that the license restrictions in Atari and Sega
actually furthered the distribution of creative works by enabling
Nintendo and Sega to charge lower prices for their consoles, which in 
turn enabled more consumers to buy them.   Under this theory, such 
licenses serve as variable-proportion tying arrangements that further
the purpose of copyright by promoting overall “product diffusion.”509
Economically, that argument rests on the dubious assumption that
courts should look to the total number of games distributed, rather than 
the number of different games available, in making that determination.
The two measures are neither equivalent nor fungible, and maximizing 
the  former  number  will not necessarily maximize the latter.510   To 
the contrary, the licensing policies adopted by Sega and Nintendo
impose a ceiling on the number of different games that will be
approved for manufacture, and thus effect a decrease in the variety of 
games  that  would  otherwise  be  available for purchase.    Moreover,  it
508 See, e.g., Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990); 
Supermarket of Homes, Inc. v. San Fernando Valley Bd. of Realtors, 786 F.2d 1400,1408 (9th 
Cir. 1986). The right to create interoperable programs also leaves untouched the defense of 
fraud on the Copyright Office, which played such a critical role in favor of the copyright 
holder in Atari. 
509 See Hanna, supra note 490, at 432-35. 
510 See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright
Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 348 (1989). 
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strains credulity to argue that the purposes of copyright are served by a 
system that allows the console manufacturer to use its control over the 
uncopyrightable functional principles on which the console operates to 
dictate which creative works may be developed and distributed, and 
who may develop them. License agreements that restrict the
development of interoperable products in the purported interest of
product diffusion do not automatically or necessarily further the
purposes of copyright, and should be scrutinized carefully to ensure
that they do not have the opposite effect.
VI. CONCLUSION: REFLECTIONS ON THE MODELS
FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION OF
COMPUTER PROGRAMS
Where does this exploration of the intellectual property issues
surrounding lock-out programs leave us? As I indicated at the outset, I 
believe that it enables a systematic and concrete assessment of whether 
copyright and patent protection for computer programs, as currently
understood and applied, serves the purpose of “promot[ing] the
progress of science and the useful [a]rts.”511 Those questions are
important because they affect the competitive structure of an entire
industry, and, ultimately, each of us as consumers, whether of home 
entertainment systems, “set-top boxes,” or some other product yet to be 
conceived. If closed proprietary platforms and lock-out programs
become more common, competition and innovation cannot continue to 
thrive without systematic rethinking of the way that intellectual
property protection for computer programs is conceived and enforced.
As this Article has explained, a computer program, such as the 
10NES, that satisfies the PTO's standard for novelty is currently pro-
tected under both patent and copyright law—that is, both as a useful 
invention and as a creative work. That result was largely fortuitous; the 
debates over copyright and patent protection for computer software, 
though roughly contemporaneous, were conducted by separate groups. 
The result was dual protection for computer programs, with virtually
no attention paid to the potential consequences of the overlap.512
511  U.S. CONST . art. 1, ' 8, cl. 8.
512  Indeed, CONTU recommended copyright protection for computer programs in part 
because it doubted whether computer programs would be held patentable. CONTU, FINAL RE-
PORT , supra note 4, at 17.
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It has been argued that the overlap between patent and copyright 
protection for computer programs represents “a failure of consideration
for the original patent grant” or “a form of ‘double patenting,’ ”
because the protection afforded by copyright extends beyond the term 
of the patent.513 That is true only if, as in Atari, copyright and patent 
are construed to protect the same program features. There is no reason
that an individual cannot be both inventor and author, and that a
computer program cannot constitute both a useful invention and a
creative work. However, both designations cannot apply to the same 
element, and in particular, copyright protection cannot be invoked to 
bar duplication of functional program features that are protectable, if at 
all, only under the patent system.514 For the copyright/patent overlap
not to result in an unconstitutional failure of consideration, all
functional program features of a patented computer program must
enter the public domain when the term of the patent expires.515 Put 
differently, under the current scheme of intellectual property protection 
for computer programs, the overlap between copyright and patent
requires that the respective spheres of protection be clearly defined so 
that they are mutually exclusive, and so that neither sphere protects 
unpatentable, uncopyrightable ideas or mathematical principles. 
513  Michael J. Kline, Requiring An Election of Protection for PatentablelCopyrightable 
Computer Programs (pt. II), 67 J. PAT . & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 339, 340-51 (1985).
514 See Karjala, Computer Documents, supra note 6, at 983-97. The Federal Circuit's 
opinion in Atari recognized this principle of complementarity. Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo 
of Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 839-40 (Fed. Cir. 1992). Unfortunately the district court ignored its 
guidance in evaluating Nintendo's copyright infringement claim. See supra text accompanying 
notes 279-80.
515  This conclusion also disposes of the related argument that the disparity between the 
statutory terms of patent and copyright protection is itself illegal. See Kline, supranote 513, at 
341. If copyright and patent protect different aspectsCas they mustCwhether one type of pro-
tection outlasts the other is irrelevant from a constitutional perspective. It may be that the terms 
of protection grantedCthe same that apply to other copyrightable works or patentable inven-
tionsCoverreward when considered in light of the relatively short commercial life of most 
computer programs and the rapid and cumulative nature of advances within the industry. 
Menell, Application Programs, supra note 16, at 1057-61. Historically, both the Copyright Act 
and the Patent Act have specified that all covered works receive terms of equal length. See17
U.S.C. ' 302 (1988) (copyright extends for life of the author plus 50 years, or 75 years for 
works that are anonymous, pseudonymous, or for hire); 35 U.S.C. ' 154 (1988) (patent term is 
17 years). In neither case does the Constitution mandate that result. The terms of protection for 
computer program-related works or inventions could easily be shortened.
It also may be that dual protection for computer programs confers more protection than 
necessary to induce their creation and distribution. If true, this would be a strong argument for 
a sui generis scheme of protection for these intellectual property rights. See Samuelson et al., 
Manifesto, supra note 19, at 2356-65.
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The status of intellectual property protection for computer pro-
grams is shifting. In computer copyright cases, the trend is increasingly
toward recognizing that copyright affords only “thin” protection.516 In 
contrast, although some structural changes are underway at the PTO 
that will affect the initial processing of computer program-related
applications, the Federal Circuit commitment to an expansive approach 
to patentability has grown more entrenched. Among commentators and 
legal scholars, the past decade has seen a groundswell of criticism for 
both legal frameworks, but, so far, little consensus on the appropriate 
solution. Some favor sui generis protection,517 others advocate a
copyright-based systern,518 and still others argue that a patent-based
system is preferable.519  From a political perspective, the likelihood of 
systemic or paradigmatic change in the mode of intellectual property
protection of computer programs is small, because international
accords regarding the source of protection for computer programs have 
taken shape based on the existing copyright and patent models.520 As a 
practical matter, then, the options have been narrowed. The question, at 
least for the immediate future, is not whether a sui generis scheme of 
protection will be adopted, but whether and how to fine-tune the
models we have.
Based on analysis of the interoperability and lock-out problems, I 
have attempted to set forth a blueprint for appropriate and desirable 
changes. I have argued that computer programs should be identified 
within the existing framework of the Copyright Act as a sui generis 
category of copyrightable works, and that the fair use doctrine should 
be reconceived to include intermediate copying solely to gain knowl-
edge and understanding as a protected, “enabling” use. I have argued,
as well, that section 102(b) functionality, rather than limited and
inapposite doctrines such as scènes à faire or inherently slippery con-
cepts of current and future use, should be the touchstone by which
duplication of nonliteral program elements is evaluated. On the patent
side, I have advocated adoption of an “innovative programmer”
standard for judging the novelty and nonobviousness of computer pro-
gram-related   inventions,  to   preclude   patentability  for   unprotectable
516 See supra part III.A.
517 See, e.g., Samuelson et al, Manifesto, supra note 19, at 2356-65. 
518 See, e.g., Symposium, supra note 236, at 758-63 (comments of Prof. Rochelle Cooper 
Dreyfuss).
519 See, e.g., Oddi, supra note 16.
520 See Samuelson et al., Manifesto, supra note 19, at 2313 nn.7-8 (summarizing interna-
tional accords).
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mathematical and physical principles implemented via general purpose
computing equipment. Finally, I have recommended that use of a
patented lock-out program to exclude competing software developers
from unpatented computer systems be deemed a misuse of the patent. 
Taken together, these changes are designed to ensure that intellectual
property protection for lock-out programs in particular, and computer 
programs in general, will not protect what is unprotectable under
copyright law, patent law, or both.
The preliminary report released by the Working Group on Intel-
lectual Property Rights, an arm of the Clinton administration's Infor-
mation Infrastructure Task Force, sets forth a very different vision of
the future of computer program-related intellectual property rights.521
Among other things, the Working Group has proposed changes to the 
copyright laws that would ban and criminalize the manufacture or im-
portation of technology designed to defeat “anti-copying” devices
installed in computer software.522 Unmentioned in the report is the fact 
that the proposed changes would effectively eliminate the reverse en-
gineering right recognized by the courts, and so render wholly aca-
demic the right to develop interoperable programs that follows from
the language of section 102(b) of the Copyright Act.523 As an initial 
matter, if the intellectual property laws are to be changed in a way that 
would deprive the public of rights it currently has, that fact should be 
admitted. More fundamentally, the Working Group's proposal to make 
copyright protection for computer programs virtually ironclad ignores 
the role of the patent system and the constitutional significance of the 
two-tiered patent/copyright model of protection for intellectual
property rights.
Rarely in the development of any body of law have the lines of
conflict been so clearly and acrimoniously drawn. Fearing the effect on 
nuanced, carefully developed bodies of law, some of the leading
copyright and patent scholars have strenuously opposed any changes in 
copyright or patent doctrines premised on acknowledgment that
computer programs are different from other covered works. Professor 
Miller  envisions  the  gradual  erosion of  the  idea-expression  distinction
521 INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, INFORMATION POLICY COMMITTEE,
WORKING GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE 
INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, THE PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON IN-
TELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (1994).
522 Id. at 100-04.
523  For a thorough critique of this and other aspects of the report, see Pamela Samuelson, 
Legally Speaking: The NII Intellectual Property Report, COMM. OF THE ACM, Dec. 1994, at 
21. 
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as a result of according “thin” copyright protection to computer pro-
grams; Professor Chisum and Judge Rich resist the exclusion of obvi-
ously artificial “processes” from the class of potentially patentable
works, and foresee the disintegration of patent protection as claims are 
parsed ever more narrowly.524 On the other side of the debate,
opponents of copyright or patent protection for computer programs are 
increasingly adamant about the current systems’ inability to adapt to 
this particular technological change. One eminent computer scientist,
responding to Professor Chisum’s call for sanity and a return to time-
honored first principles of patent law, answered as follows: “The
Models Are Broken!”525
Both sides are right to fear the consequences of expanding intel-
lectual property doctrines to encompass computer programs, but, I
believe, wrong about what will avoid the apocalypse. All models are 
by nature imperfect, but (as Sega, Altai, and Flook demonstrate) the 
core doctrines governing copyrightability, patentability, and the scope 
of copyright and patent protection remain vital and resilient. In order to 
avoid doing violence to these basic models, which have proved so
well-suited to the other “sciences” and “useful arts,” new rules and 
new exceptions for computer programs must be incorporated into the 
models. The law must adjust to accommodate computer programs, so 
that the models will not break. As I have argued throughout this Arti-
cle, the adjustments required are not wrenching, and are themselves 
based on fundamental precepts of copyright and patent protection that 
require excluding functional principles from the ambit of copyright and 
keeping mathematical algorithms in the public domain. The
adjustments suggested are to secondary copyright and patent doctrines
developed to effectuate those purposes. It would be surprising, given
the faith placed in the models by their self-appointed guardians, if the 
models were not strong enough to bear the weight of these changes.
524  Rounding out the picture, and contributing substantially to the acrimony, are the 
Working Group on Intellectual Property Rights and various industry lobbying associations, 
which for the most part appear to view strong intellectual property protection for computer 
programs as a pure trade issue devoid of constitutional or philosophical significance. See
sources cited in note 211, supra. The intellectual property laws cannot be so easily divorced 
from their constitutional and philosophical foundations. The debate over the proper application 
of copyright and patent doctrines to computer programs cannot be resolved without resort to 
first principles.
525   Newell, supra note 315.
